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SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION 
The fo.cus of this thesis is on foreign direct investment (FDI). This is an aspect of 
international trade that has recently become increasingly important, not only to 
developing and developed countries in general, but to South Africa in particular; notably 
so when this country was admitted back to the larger international community of nations 
after April 1994. 
In the quest to address the many imbalances engendered by apartheid, South Africa's . ' 
policy-makers maintain that FDI may play a critical role in helping achieve the goals and 
objectives of the government's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). It 
is for this reason that the creation of a climate conducive to both local and foreign 
investment is expected to be one of the top priorities of the new government of national 
unity (GNU). 
The important point stressed in this thesis is that, when devising policies and strategies 
aimed at increasing trade flows and attracting foreign investment into the 'new' South 
Africa, this country's policy-makers should, always, take into account the profound 
changes that the world trading system is currently undergoing. The current trends in 
world trade, FDI and regional integration are poised to influence the position of South 
Africa and the role it may play in the world economy of the 1990s and beyond. The 
writer of this thesis believes that the daunting challenge facing South Africa's policy-
makers is to understand these patterns and changes, as well as forces behind them, as a 
basis for developing the ability to respond constructively and positively. This is 
important, because this country will be expected to play its respective role according to 
the existing rules of the prevailing world economic order. 
In short, South Africa's policy-makers are faced with the task of devising some ingenious 
strategies and policies that may maximise the opportunities provided for South Africa by 
the new world trading environment. At the same time, those measures should also aim to 
minimise the potential negative effects arising from increased world-wide competition for 
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international markets, trade and investment funds. The point is also made however, that 
the effectiveness of such strategies and policies will depend in large part on South 
Africa's efforts and political will to adjust to the new opportunities and challenges of the 
international trading environment. 
This thesis comprises four chapters. Chapter One discusses trends in world trade, FDI 
and regional integration in the 1990s and their possible implications for South Africa. Its 
aim is to provide the reader with a fuller appreciation of the international context within 
which South Africa's future trade and investment policies should be considered and 
implemented; because whatever approach South Africa adopts, it is imperative that it 
must be viable in the world trading environment of the 1990s. It will be shown for 
instance that, although the world trading environment of the 1990s is characterised by 
rapid 'globalisation' of world markets and proliferation of inward-looking regional 
trading arrangements (RT As), this decade is experiencing, on the one hand, growing 
'protectionism' and concentration of world trade and investment funds in the developed 
market economies and greater marginalisation of the developing and least developed 
(LDCs) countries on the other. It will be shown further that these phenomena have a 
negative impact on the ability of the latter countries to play a meaningful role in 
international trade and investment. Chapter One concludes by looking at the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and the impact it will have on international trade relations in the 
1990s and beyond. 
Chapter Two discusses the various determinants of FDI. In this chapter, it will be 
demonstrated that many analysts and governments hold the view that FDI is a 'good 
thing' as it is perceived to have a positive impact on other economic variables such as 
balance-of-payments, employment and capital creation, access to new markets and 
technological know-how. It will also be shown that in fact, many developing and 
transition countries are engaged in fierce competition for foreign investment, and that to 
this end, these countries have recently changed their respective foreign investment laws 
with the sole aim of creating a climate attractive to foreign investment in their respective 
economies. 
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The determinants of FDI in this chapter are discussed under the following headings, viz. 
government policies ( e.g. ownership policies, taxation and subsidies, convertibility of 
foreign exchange and remittance of earnings, performance requirements, capital and price 
controls, etc.), locational determinants (e.g. host comparative advantage, host market size, 
etc.), structural determinants (e.g. economic 'openness', investment infrastructure, etc.), 
and economic determinants (e.g. international trade links, etc.). The impact of these 
various determinants will also be discussed as well as policy implications for South 
Africa. 
Chapter Three discusses the current constraints and opportunities for the 'new' South 
Africa in the quest for increased foreign-direct-investment-flows. It will be argue.d that 
although South Africa has deep-seated structural problems ( e.g. shortage of foreign 
capital and skills, lack of international competitiveness of its manufactured products, 
chronic unemployment, etc.), this country stands a good chance (given its developed 
infrastructure and a relatively dynamic manufacturing sector by African standards for 
instance) of being a possible destination for FDI and international trade flows. 
The last Chapter (Four) discusses various policy implications for South Africa in its 
attempt to attract FDI into this country. It will be demonstrated that whatever approach 
South Africa adopts, will be impacted upon by various factors, inter alia, the prevailing 
world trading environment, growing protectionism in the developed market economies, 
its obligations under the WTO, its trade relations with other SACU and SADC countries, 
and so on. It is suggested that South Africa's current trade regime needs to be overhauled 
as it is not conducive to the development of competitive industrial capabilities inter alia, 
due to a strong anti-export bias that is inherent in its policies. It will also be argued that 
the state - like in other high-growth East Asian economies - has an important role to play 
in fostering the competitiveness of certain industries for instance, as a way of promoting 
the international competitiveness of South Africa's manufactured products. 
The Conclusion summarises briefly the major issues covered in this thesis. 
Before turning to Chapter One it is important to make the following point: the idea of 
FDI is broad, controversial and multi-faceted. The writer of this thesis does not claim to 
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provide a definitive account of how South Africa should deal with this complex 
phenomenon. On the contrary, this thesis should be treated merely as an attempt to 
provide a broad introductory overview from the South African perspective, of how this 
country could begin to address the issue of FDI with the aim of addressing its economic 
and trade problems, in the context of a changing world trading system of the 1990s. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
TRENDS IN WORLD TRADE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE 1990s 
1.1 Trends in world trade 
1.1.1 Introductory remarks 
Since the end of the Second World War international trade has grown at a faster rate than 
world output. 1 Although the world trading system experienced growth in international 
trade during this period, that trend has not been even all over the world. For instance, 
while on the one hand the developing countries'2 share of world trade fell from 31 per 
cent in 1950 to 20.4 per cent in 1990, developed (market) economies 3 on the other 
increased their share of world trade from 60,4 per cent in 1950 to approximately 70 per 
cent in 1990.4 In order for the reader to understand the current trends in world trade and 
to appreciate the international context within which the 'new' South Africa will be 
1 Peter J. Buckley and Michael Z. Brooke, International Business Studies: An overview, Blackwell 
Business, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1992, p.79. See also Marc Williams, International Economic 
Organisations and the Third World, Harvester Wheatsleaf, London, 1994, p.15; Diana Tussie, The Less 
Developed Countries and the World Trading System: A challenge to the GA TT, Studies in International 
Political Economy, St Martin's Press, New York, 1987, p. 39; Margaret R. Kelly and Bernhard Fritz-
Krockow, 'Trade policies in industrial countries and their impact on Arab countries', in Said EI-Naggar 
(ed.), Foreign and Intratrade Policies of the Arab Countries, IMF, Washington DC., 1992, p. 53; David 
Greenaway, 'Economic development and international trade: an introduction', in David Greenaway (ed.), 
Economic Development and International Trade, St Martin's Press, New York, 1988, p. l. 
2 The term 'developing countries' is usually discussed in terms of four geographical areas -Asia (including 
the Pacific Basin), Latin America (including the Caribbean), the Middle East and Africa [L.R. Klein, 
'African economic development: situations and prospects', in D.J.J. Botha et al (eds.), The South African 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 61., December 1993, p. 229. See also Dominic Salvatore, International 
Economics (4th ed.), MacMillan Publishing Company, New York, 1993, p.317] This is that part of the 
world which is also referred to as 'South' or the 'Third World' whose economies are characterised in 
general by low (and sometimes extremely low) average real per capita income, many of the labour force 
in agriculture and other primary activities such as mineral extraction, a low life expectancy, high rates of 
illiteracy, low rates of growth in real per capita income. 
3 The term 'developed countries' is usually used to refer to that part of the world which comprises mainly 
the Western Capitalist Countries (Canada, United States of America, the countries of the European 
Union) including, in the East, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. These countries are also referred to as 
the 'North' or the 'First World', whose economies are, in the main, technologically advanced. 
4 Williams Joe cit. See also Buckley and Brooke op cit 103. See also Mahmoud Sakbani, 'Comment' on 
Kelly and Fritz-Krockow op cit 87 et seq. 
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expected to conduct its trade policies, it is important to discuss these tends in developed 
market economies (DMEs) and developing countries separately. We start with DMEs. 
1.1.2 Developed market economies 
One of the defining characteristics of developed market economies (DMEs) is that they 
are marked by growing similarities in the broad pattern of their national economies.5 
These economies, which currently generate more that 80 per cent of world trade as well 
as two thirds of world output, do not reflect the tendency towards specialisation and 
divergent economic structures.6 On the contrary, they reflect great structural convergence, 
not only in the distribution of output and employment between agriculture, industry and 
services, but also to the distribution of subsectors within industry.7 The structural 
convergence of these countries has led to a situation where cross-border trade between 
these countries is increasingly taking place along horizontal, intra-industry lines with 
countries simultaneously exporting and importing the same type of products, such as 
textiles for textiles or chemicals for chemicals.8 With intra-industry, world trade in 
manufactures has grown at a much faster rate than production. 
Saunders [1975, p. 28]9 succinctly summarises the pattern of trade between developed 
countries when the learned writer suggests that trade between these countries 
is determined only to a small extent by comparative advantage of the traditional kind. The relative 
labour costs, capital costs, etc. of manufacturing one description machine tool than another are rarely 
likely to be different between Britain and ... Germany. The pattern of two-way trade seems likely to be 
determined rather by such factors as the special technical advantages of individual producing firms, 
their marketing capacity, or the state of their order books, and by the particular preferences and 
requirements of individual customers [ emphasis in the original]. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from this trend is that, trade in the developed industrial 
countries has been harmoniously coupled with an increasing fine degree of industrial 
5 Tussie Joe cit 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. See also Robert Z. Lawrence, 'Trends in world trade and foreign direct investment, in Pauline H. 
Baker, Alex Boraine and Warren Krafchik (eds.), South Africa and the World Economy in the 1990s, 
David Phillip: Cape Town and Johannesburg, The Brookings Institution: Washington DC, in association 
with IDASA and The Aspen Institute, 1993, p. 4; Grazia Ietto-Gillies, International Production: Trends, 
Theories, Effects, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 1992, p. 23. 
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specialisation rather than with what Tussie 10 refers to as "the threat of dislocation and 
'run away factories."' 
In his report to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
VIII, the Secretary General of UN CT AD noted that at the root of many structural changes 
that are taking place in the world trading system today, technological progress -
concentrated mainly in the DMEs - has been a major contributing factor. 11 In these 
countries, technology has led to increased product differentiation as well as to continual 
product innovation, which tends to be concentrated in larger firms that can cover the 
necessary capital outlays. 12 Trade in differentiated products necessarily means that DMEs 
compete in product style, quality or model, rather than simply price, leading to a 
sectorially balanced trade between these countries. This is manifested for instance by 
'the exchange of Fords for Austins and Renaults for VWs'. 13 As can be seen, product 
differentiation and product innovation in DMEs have contributed to altering the nature of 
modern trade without necessarily affecting the geographical location of industrial plants. 14 
The increase in trade between developed countries has also been attributed to increase in 
trade by companies (Multinational Corporations (MNCs)) based in the DMEs. 15 These 
companies have played a critical role in the 'internationalisation of production', by 
setting up new production plants and facilities in other developed countries as well as in 
countries outside of the o·MEs. 
In recent years, and in response to their slow growth and large unemployment, developed 
countries have increased the trade protection they provide to some of their large 
industries (such as textiles, steel, shipbuilding, consumer electronic products, TV sets, 
shoes and many other primary and agricultural products) against imports from developing 
9 Quoted by Tussie op cit 41 
10 Ibid. 
11 See Accelerating the Development Process: Challenges for National and International Policies in the 
1990s, Report by the Secretary General ofUNCTAD to UNCTAD VIII, United Nations, 1991, p. 5. 
12 Tussie op cit 43. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 See Lawrence Joe cit; Ietto-Gillies op cit 21. 
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countries. 16 The growing protectionism in DMEs is against the very industries in which 
developing countries have gained or are gaining a comparative advantage. To ensure 
greater protection of their industrial sectors, DMEs adopted a variety of measures for this 
purpose, inter alia, tariff peaks, tariff escalation, voluntary export restraints (VERs ), 
countervailing duties (CVDs) and antidumping duties (ADDs), and domestic subsidies. 17 
As far as agriculture is concerned, industrial countries support this sector (including 
fisheries and livestock) through various border and non-border measures. 18 For instance, 
market price support schemes comprise about 80 per cent of the total support provided, 
and are supplemented by extensive border measures (quantitative restrictions (QRs), 
variable import levies, and import control by state trading entities) and domestic 
measures (intervention purchases and supply control measures). 19 
It is interesting to note that the various protection measures used by industrial countries, 
against developing country exports go against the traditional theory in international_ trade, 
of comparative advantage, as well as the grain of 'free trade' propagated by the DMEs in 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). 
1.1.3 Developing countries 
One of the commonest characteristics of many a developing country, is that, unlike 
DMEs, they rely, in some eases almost exclusively, on one commodity for foreign 
exchange earnings20 (e.g. Cuba on sugar, Zambia on copper). As a result, their exports 
are concentrated in primary commodities which have a low income elasticity of demand 
(in world markets), and are vulnerable to substitution from synthetic fibres and other 
materials, due to technological innovation in the industrial countries. 21 
16 Salvatore op cit 341. See also Kelly and Fritz-Krockow op cit 52; Williams op cit 17. 
17 Kelly and Fritz-Krockow op cit 64. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid_ 
20 See ibid., 60. See also Alfred W. Chanda, 'The Organisation for African Unity: an appraisal', in 
Zambian Law Journal, Vol. 21-24, 1989-92, p.24. 
21 See Buckley and Brooke op cit 85. See also Williams op cit 16; Salvatore Joe cit. 
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During the 80s and 90s, the world trading system experienced a marked decline for 
commodity prices.22 The decline affected mainly the poorest countries that had not 
diversified their structures of production. Williams23 suggests that the two regions with 
the highest terms of trade 24 losses were Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Latin America, 
which lost 13 and 15 per cent, respectively, of their purchasing power in real terms 
relative to the 1970s. Although some developing countries in Latin America and Asia 
(e.g. Brazil, Hong Kong, Korea, Mexico, Singapore, and Taiwan) are characterised by 
rapid growth in gross domestic product (GDP), in industrial production, and in 
manufactured exports, African developing countries, particularly SSA, have experienced 
very slow or negative growth in GDP, worsening terms of trade, deteriorating economic 
conditions, and lagging productivity. 
During the 1980s, developing countries, especially those of Latin America had the huge 
international debt, which these countries are now finding very difficult to service, i.e. to 
repay. It is said that the debt arose as many developing countries borrowed heavily from 
private banks in developed countries to finance their growing capital needs and to pay for 
sharply higher oil bills during the 1970s.25 . In order to deal with the mounting 'debt 
crisis' of the 1980s, international financial institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) 
intervened in the economies of many indebted developing countries, and imposed 
various conditions through the 'structural adjustment programme'. It is argued by some 
economists that these programmes have played a role in hampering the development 
plans of developing countries.26 
For the developing countries as a group, the impact of falling commodity prices has been 
offset by an expansion in manufactured exports from the newly industrialising economies 
22 Buckley and Brooke op cit I 03. 
23 Loe cit. 
24 The 'terms of trade' of a nation are defined as the ratio of the price of its export commodity to the price 
of its import commodity, and that ratio is expressed in percentages. An improvement in a nation's terms 
of trade is usually regarded as beneficial to the nation in the sense that the prices that a nation receives 
for its exports rise relative to the price that it pays for imports. A deterioration in a nation's terms of 
trade means the opposite occurs. 
25 Salvatore op cit 339 - 40. 
26 See A.M. Mwanza (ed.), The Structural Adjustment Programme in Zambia: Lessons from Experience, 
- Sapes Books, Harare, Zimbabwe, 1992, pp 32 et seq. for an exposition of how Zambia coped with the 
(NIEs) of East and South Asia. 27 This increase in manufactured exports mainly benefited 
the NIEs, particularly the four 'Asian Tigers' of Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and 
Taiwan, which account for approximately 33 per cent of the developing countries' 
manufactured exports.28 It is clear therefore, that the more developed of the developing 
countries were not caught in the trap of dependence on a limited number of primary 
, commodities. The successful industrialisation strategies of the NIEs enabled them to 
diversify their production base and to increase, significantly, their exports of 
manufactured goods.29 
The expansion of developing country manufactured products has led to increased trade 
restrictions by the industrial countries. Powerful political forces (farmers and other 
businesspeople) have successfully persuaded governments in the developed industrial 
countries to enact protectionist measures against developing countries' exports as the 
latter group became more competitive. For instance, the Tariff and Trade Act of 1984 
authorised the President of the United States to deny Generalised System of Preferences 
(GSP) privileges to the NICs that did not curb their own 'unfair trade practices' and 
'restricted' U.S. exports. 30 31 
Industrial countries have not only used their domestic measures to protect their industries; 
they have also relied on a number of international instruments. Perhaps, the classic 
example of an international instrument used by industrial countries for this purpose is the 
Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA). The MF A, first concluded in 1974 and subsequently 
renewed, extended and increased restrictions on developing countries' exports of textiles 
and clothing.32 Williams33 cites the case of Bangladesh, and says that this country -which 
structural adjustment programme and the impact it had on the Zambian economy. 
27 Williams Joe cit. See also Salvatore op cit 341. 
28 Williams, ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Salvatore op cit 341-42. 
31 For a chilling account of how the U.S. 'punished' South Korea's 'unfair trade practices', see Walden 
Bello and Shea Cunningham, 'Trade warfare and regional integration in the Pacific: the USA, Japan 
and the Asian NI Cs', in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 15., September 1994, p.447 et seq. 
32 Williams op cit 17 ~ 
33 Ibid. 
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is one of the world's poorest countries- was subjected to restrictive MF A quotas when it 
developed an efficient textile industry in the 1980s. 
The trade and trade-related policies of industrial countries affected developing countries 
in a number of ways. For instance, policies that restrict access to industrial countries' 
markets limited the ability of developing countries to produce and export on the basis of 
their comparative advantage.34 It is on the basis of these and other observations that the 
present international trade system has been criticised as been unfair to developing 
countries.35 
In response to widespread poverty in most developing countries, and because of the 
widely held belief that the world economy worked in a way that was unfair to developing 
countries, the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) (in June 197 4) and the 
developing countries (through their mouthpiece, UNCTAD)36 called for the creation of a 
so-called New International Economic Order (NIEO).37 The developing countries' 
demands incorporated in an NIEO include ( 1) establishment of international commodity 
agreements for many commodities aimed at stabilising and increasing the export earnings 
of developing nations and financed primarily by developed nations, (2) preferential 
access in developed nations' markets to all the manufactured exports of developing 
nations, (3) removing trade barriers on agricultural products in developed nations, (4) 
increasing the transfer of technology to developing nations and regulating MN Cs, (5) 
increasing the yearly flow of foreign aid to developing nations, and ( 6) allowing 
developing nations a greater role in international decision making.38 
Salvatore39 records that, to date, most of these demands have remained unmet. The 
learned writer explains further that although developing nations do have a somewhat 
34 Kelly and Fritz-Krockow op cit 52. 
35 Salvatore op cit 42. 
36 UNCT AD started calling for most of the demands incorporated in an NIEO in Geneva in 1964, New 
,Delhi in 1968, and Santiago in 1972, and were repeated in Nairobi in 1976, Manila in 1979, Belgrade in 
1983, Geneva in 1987, Cartagena in 1992, (and Johannesburg (Midrand) in 1995?). 
37 See David B.H. Denoon, Facing the New International Economic Order: A US Response, NY, 
New York University Press, 1979 p.3 et seq. 
38 Salvatore Joe cit. 
39 Ibid., 343. 
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greater voice today than in the past in decision making in such international bodies as the 
UN, the World Bank, and the IMF, developing countries are far from controlling these 
crucial organisations, although they greatly outnumber developed nations.40 
1.1.4 Implications/or South Africa 
Padayachee41 maintains that South Africa is not a typical 'Third World' country. The 
learned writer points to the inherent and developed strengths of the South African 
economy that are impressive, despite their racially based provision and distribution as a 
case in point.42 According to Padayachee, these include its well-endowed natural resource 
base, especially in mineral and energy sources; its physical infrastructure (airports, 
harbours, railways, electricity, etc.); its sophisticated financial, banking, legal and 
communications network; and its lengthy and (until the mid-1980s) impeccable standing 
and repayment record with the IMF, World Bank and private bankers.43 Despite these 
strengths, this country has many faces resembling a typical 'Third World' country: 
widespread poverty, high illiteracy and poor quality of education and training (among the 
African population), and rising unemployment - to mention but a few. 
In the context of global trade, South Africa remains a small, open, mainly primary 
exporting country, which plays a marginal role in the global economy. Its share of world 
trade and world economic growth has been steadily reduced in the 1980s.44 South 
Africa's role in world trade has been further reduced by decades of economic isolation, 
and the overall strength of the economy has been eroded by sanctions and apartheid 
economic mismanagement. 45 
40 Ibid, 345. For further reading on the position of the developing countries in the world economy of the 
1990s, see Timothy M. Shaw, 'The South in the 'New World (Dis) Order': towards a political economy 
of Third World foreign policy in the 1990s', in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 15., 1994, p.17 et seq. See 
also Williams op cit chapters 2, 4, 5 and 6. 
41 Vishnu Padayachee, 'Foreign capital and economic development in South Africa: recent trends and 






Trends in world trade in the 1990s discussed above, will obviously affect South Africa's 
trade and investment prospects adversely, as they will those of other highly open 
developing countries.46.For instance, South Africa's impressive minerals and metals base 
will be affected by a continued decline in demand for such products from Western 
industrialised countries,47 and its minerals are likely to be quoted at a discount with the 
opening of supplies from the former Soviet Union.48 South African agricultural products 
are not likely to receive any special treatment than that accorded to the rest of the 
developing countries. The same protectionist practices prevailing in industrial countries 
will be used against South Africa's agricultural exports. As a matter of fact, the main 
concern underlying the refusal of EU countries to admit South Africa as a full member of 
the Lome Convention, is based on the fear that, South Africa's otherwise 'strong' 
agricultural exports will have a negative impact on the incomes of many a farmer in the 
EU.49 
The manufactured exports of the NI Cs are already facing pervasive barriers to entry into 
markets of industrial countries. Even if South Africa, like the NI Cs, succeeds in 
diversifying its production base, protectionist policies of the developed countries will 
surely hamstring any efforts to get these exports into the markets of the 'North'. 
Considering the prevailing trends in world trade, it would seem that the only solution (?) 
to the international trade problems of the developing countries (including South Africa), 
is to devise policies that will foster and expand trade amongst developing countries 
themselves; the so-called 'South-South' economic/trade dialogue. If this is the way 
developing countries should pursue, South Africa should seek to foster trade and other 
links with the African continent and other developing countries in Latin America and 
Asia. South Africa's trade and diplomatic relations with countries such as Libya, the 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 This point is made by Sam Nolutshungu quoted by John Daniel, 'South Africa's role in the changing 
world and its impact on the region', in Minnie Venter (ed.), Prospects For Progress: Critical Choices for 
Southern Africa, Maskew Miller Longman, Cape Town, 1994, p.28. 
49 This concern has not only been raised by industrial countries. Some developing countries belonging to 
the Lome Convention have expressed concern that if South Africa is given full membership of Lome, its 
agricultural exports are likely to 'out-compete' theirs, with the result that South Africa will be unduly 
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Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC), will invariably open 
'a window of opportunity' for exports to these emerging markets, particularly the large 
market of China. 
1.2 Trends in foreign direct investment 
J.2.1 Introductory remarks 
The United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) reports that since 
1983 foreign-direct-investment-outflows have increased at an unprecedented rate of 29 
per cent per annum, three times faster than that of the growth of exports and four times 
that of the growth in world output.50 However, like world trade, the rapid increase in 
world FDI (since 1983) has been unequally distributed between developed and 
developing countries.51 For instance, by the end of the 1980s, the developed world 
accounted for 75 per cent of the world's foreign-direct-investment-flows, while the 
developing countries' share fell from 26 per cent to 21 per cent during the same period. 52 
The reasons for this rapid increase in FDI in the world economy are many and diverse. 
We consider only a few. First, the 1991 UNCTC Report and other writers such_ as Calvo, 
Leiderman and Reinhart 53 attribute the rapid increase in world FDI to the changes in the 
world business cycle. According to Calvo et al,54 the early 1990s brought recessions in 
the US, Japan and many countries in Europe. This swing of the international business 
benefited at the expense of the agricultural exports from other 'less fortunate' developing countries. 
50 World Investment Report: The Triad in Foreign Direct Investment, UN, NY, Sales No. E. 91. II. 12, 
1991, p.3. ( hereinafter 'The 1991 UNCTC Report'). See also Lawrence op cit 2 and 4. Vincent Cable, 
'The new trade agenda: universal rules amid cultural diversity', in International Affairs, Vol. 72., April 
1996, p.235. De Anne Julius, Foreign Direct Investment: The Neglected Twin of Trade, Occasional ' 
Paper 33, Group of Thirty, Washington DC, 1991, p.4 et seq. Kelly and Fritz-Krockow op cit 55. 
51 Williams op cit 21. 
52 Ibid. See also Heinz Bachmann and Ken Kwaku (eds.), MIGA Roundtable on Foreign Direct Investment 
Policies in Africa: Proceedings and Lessons, Policy and Advisory Services, Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency, World Bank, Washington DC, 1994, p.13. 
53 Guillermo A. Calvo, Leonardo Leiderman, and Carmen M. Reinhart, 'Inflows of capital to developing 
countries in the 1990s', in Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 10., Spring 1996. p.126 et seq. 
(hereinafter 'Calvo et al'). 
54 Ibid., 127. See also the 1991 UNCTC Report op cit 4. 
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cycle, so argues Calvo et al, made profit opportunities in developing countries appear 
relatively more attractive, thus causing more capital inflows to the developing countries. 55 
The 1991 UNCTC Report56 on the other hand maintains that the economic spin-offs of 
. I 
the world economic recovery in the 1980s resulted in the improved economic 
performance of several developing countries, particularly those experiencing debt-
servicing problems, as the economic recovery reversed some factors which had been 
inhibiting foreign investment in the first half of the 1980s, such as the ability of investors 
to repatriate profits.57 
Secondly, during the 1980s, the number of developed countries that became significant 
outward investors increased, and this process led to the erosion of the established 
positions of the US and the UK. 58 The most important of the new outward investors 
mentioned by the 1991 UNCTC Report is Japan. In addition, a number of East Asian 
NICs who, like Japan, faced current account surpluses, appreciating currencies and rising 
production costs at home and protectionist policies in their export markets, emerged as 
significant outward investors. 
Thirdly, the world trading system in the 1990s, experienced a marked rise of the services 
sector.59 According to Lawrence,60 the rise of the services sector, coupled with a strong 
trend towards financial liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation (inter alia, on the 
movement of capital flows61 ) created investment opportunities in sectors such as banking, 
55 Ibid. For a discussion of how lower interest rates in the developed countries (particularly in the US 
during the early to mid 1990s) affected capital flows to developing countries, see ibid, 126. 
56 Loe cit. . 
57 This view is also shared by John T. Cuddington, Hong Liang and Shihua Lu, 'Uncertainty, trade and 
capital flows in Sub-Saharan Africa', in African Economic Research Consortium Plenary Sessions 1994-
95, Journal of African Economies, Supplement to Volume 5 ., Part 1, Oxford University Press, 1996, 
p.200 who suggest that the so-called 'push factors' (e.g. financial liberalisation) and 'pull factors' (e.g. 
removal of capital controls and liberalisation of restrictions on FDI) were responsible for renewed capital 
flows to developing countries during the early 1990s. 
58 1991 UNCTC Report loc cit. 
59 See the 1991 UNCTC Report op cit 5; Lawrence op cit 4-5; Cable op cit 228.; and Ietto-Gillies op cit 25-
26. 
60 Loe cit. 
61 See 1991 UNCTC Report loc cit. 
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communications, utilities and transportation in which investment opportunities for 
foreigners were once relatively limited.62 
Fourthly, technological progress has been at the root of almost all structural changes 
taking place in the world trade system in the 1990s.63 According to the Secretary General 
of UNCT AD, 64 the technological revolution of the 1990s, characterised in the main by 
advances in microelectronics, but also encompassing new materials, biotechnology and 
renewable energy, has had a profound impact on world economic activity and 
international economic relations. The Secretary General believes further that 
technological progress has given fresh impulse to econoIT1ic integration, both global and 
regional, and to changes in pattern of production and exchange in many fields, including 
information and communications and, in varying degrees, transportation, manufacturing 
and agriculture.65 
The above mentioned trends and causes of rapid increase in world FDI, notably, the 
'internationalisation' process of financial markets, the advances in computer and 
telecommunications technology, coupled with the trend towards abandonment of many 
financial regulations have led to what is now commonly referred to as the 'globalisation 
of the world economy and markets' .66 
We tum now to discuss trends in FDI in four of the world's major regions separately, 
namely, DMEs; Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR; East, South and South 
East Asia; and developing countries (Africa and Latin America). It is important to do so 
for the reader to have a fuller appreciation of how FDI has fared in individual regions. It 
will be demonstrated that although a bird's view of trends in world FDI shows a rapid 
increase, various regions of the globe have had different and sometimes conflicting 
experiences regarding the expansion of world FDI. 




66 For a caustic criticism of the 'globalisation process', see Manfred Bienefeld, 'The New World Order: 
echoes ofa new imperialism', in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 15., 1994, p.35 et seq. who argues that the 
process of globalisation of world markets is far more harmful to the poorer and poorest nations of the 
world, than is normally perceived. 
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1.2.2 Developed market economies 
The rapid increase in FDI in the 1990s has, to a large extent, been accounted for by 
companies (MNCs)67 based in DMEs.68 Whilst the US was by far the largest foreign 
investor during the greater part of the 1970s and 1980s, 69 in recent years, that country 
emerged as the world's largest new absorber of direct investment.7° Cheru71 maintains 
that Europe has replaced the US as the world's leading foreign investor. The European 
countries that have been leading role players in this regard include the UK, the 
Netherlands, France, Germany, and Austria. One of the prominent OECD countries that is 
currently an important player in international investment flows is Japan. According to 
Cheru,72 whilst by 1988, the EU (not including intra-EU foreign direct investment) was at 
parity with the US in terms of stock, Japan on the other hand was (and still is) investing 
_more abroad than the US in terms of flows. 73 
The DMEs are the main sources ofFDI and foreign-direct-investment-outflows from 
these countries have been growing.74 For instance, foreign-direct-investment-outflows 
from DMEs grew by 38 per cent annually after 1985, and reached $187 billion in 1987.75 
According to the 1991 UNCTC Report,76 the five major home countries (France, Federal 
Republic of Germany (before October 1990), Japan, UK and US) maintained their 70 per 
67 See V.N. Balasubramanyam, 'Foreign direct investment and technology transfer', in David Greenaway 
(ed.), Current Issues in International Trade: Theory and Policy. MacMillan Publishers Ltd, London, 
1985, p.160 who suggests that a multinational corporation/enterprise is an enterprise that owns or 
controls production facilities in more than one country. At 160, the learned writer quotes Raymond 
Vernon who defines an MNE as ' ... a parent company that controls a large cluster of corporations of 
various nationalities'. Vernon (in the same quotation) observes that '[T]he corporations that make up 
each cluster appear to have access to a common pool of human and financial resources and seem 
responsive to elements of a common strategy'. 
68 See also Lawrence op cit 4; letto-Gillies op cit 21. 
69 letto-Gillies Joe cit; See also Donald A. Ball and Wendell H. McCulloch Jr, International Business: 
Introduction and Essentials (5th ed.). IRWIN, Boston, Massachusetts, 1993, p 44; Julius op cit 9. 
7° Fantu Cheru, 'Africa and the new world order: rethinking development planning in the age of 
globalisation', in Adebayo Adedeji (ed.), South Africa: Within or Apart?, African Centre for 




73 See also Ietto-Gillies Joe cit. 
74 The 1991 UNCTC Report op cit 9. See also Williams Joe cit. 2 I. 
75 The 1991 UNCTC Report Ioc cit. 
76 Ibid. 
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cent share of total outflows throughout the 1980s. Over the 1980 - 89 period, the UK, the 
US and Japan were the largest home countries for outflows during this period,77 with the 
UK been the largest home country for the period overall, with annual outflows of $17 
billion (i.e. 20% of world outflows). 78 An interesting development came with Japan. The 
1991 UNCTC Report79 suggests that outflows from Japan have exceeded those from UK 
in 1989, with the result that Japan replaced the UK as the largest source country of 
investment flows, accounting for 23 % of total world-wide outflows in that year. 
The DMEs are also, by far, the major recipients of FDI, and over the years their share has 
been increasing.8° For instance, foreign-direct-investment-inflows to developed countries 
have grown at an average annual ratio of 46% since 1985, and reached a value of $163 
billion in 1989. 81 Again, the share of developed countries in world-wide inflows increased 
to 81 % in the 1985-89 period, up from 75% in the 1980-84 period. 82 According to the 
Report,83 the same five major countries (France, Germany, Japan, UK and US) - except 
for Japan - are also among the largest host countries, with an average share of 57% in 
world inflows during the 1980s. 
As can be seen, the trends in FDI in DMEs follow the pattern and trends in world trade in 
these countries. Given the uneven distribution of world trade and FDI among the various 
groupings of countries, one consequence of this trend is that the most dynamic 
developments in the world economy are bypassing a large section of the world's 
community; notably, the majority of 'Third World' countries. 
1.2.3 Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR 
The dramatic and unforeseen developments that took place in Central and Eastern 




80 Ietto-Gillies op cit 23. See also Williams Joe cit. 
81 The 1991 UNCTC Report Joe cit. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 These countries are normally referred to as 'the Second World' or 'countries in transition'. 
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former Soviet Union, let to the introduction of democratic forms of government in place 
of existing regimes, and encompassed the re-unification of Germany in 1990. The 
democratisation process was accompanied by far reaching institutional changes, rapid 
moves to market-based economic systems and further integration into the world 
economy. 
These countries took immediate steps to realise their market reforms and rejuvenation of 
their economies that were characterised by, inter alia, stagnation, lack of capital and 
consumer goods. By the end of 1990, virtually all countries in central and eastern Europe 
had passed legislation encouraging FDI, and several countries had passed privatisation 
laws. 85 In the case of the former Soviet Union, in 1990, that country allowed foreign 
investors 100% ownership of foreign enterprises and guaranteed profit repatriation. 86 Still 
staying with the former Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin (beginning in January 1992) initiated 
a series of bold reforms (affecting enterprises) amongst which the following were critical: 
'(1) price liberalisation; (2) devolution of authority over production and sales from 
ministries to enterprises; (3) legalisation of private property, including the privatisation of 
state enterprises; and (4) hardening of budget constraints, thereby introducing the 
possibility of bankruptcy'. 87 
The above mentioned developments in eastern and central Europe and former USSR have 
made most of these countries quite attractive to foreign investors. Compared to other 
developing countries, these countries represent large domestic markets with relatively 
high purchasing power and consumer demand, as well as untapped business 
opportunities. In addition, they have a highly skilled labour force and plenty of natural 
resources, particularly in the former USSR.88 It is therefore not surprising to note that 
there has been an increasing proliferation of joint ventures (Ns) between transnational 
85 See Melanie Lansbury, Nigel Pain and Katerina Smidkova, 'Foreign direct investment in central Europe 
since 1990: an econometric study', in National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of 
Economic and Social Research, Vol., 2., London, May 1996, p.107. 
86 The 1991 UNCTC Report op cit 14. 
87 Kathryn Hendly, 'The role of law in the Russian economic transition: coping with the unexpected in 
contractual relations', in Wisconsin International Law Journal, Vol.14., Summer 1996, p.632. 
88 The 1991 UNCTC Report loc cit. 
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corporations (TNCs) from DMEs and enterprises in eastern and central Europe.89 90 The 
Western TN Cs view transnational Ns as a way of penetrating into eastern Europe and 
having access to its high skill, low-cost labour force. 91 The eastern European countries on 
the other hand view JV s as a way of penetrating new markets and as a source of access to 
new technology, managerial and marketing skills, external financial resources as well as 
equity capital.92 
The number of registered N s in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia (before the break up), 
Hungary, Poland, Romania and the (former) USSR grew rapidly in 1990, reaching 13 120 
by the beginning of 1991, compared to 3287 at the beginning of 1990, with Hungary 
. surpassing the (former) USSR with number ofregistrations.93 In Yugoslavia (before the 
break up), the number ofregistered JV s was about 3000 at the beginning of 1991.94 
89 Chi-Chao and Eden S.H. Yu, 'Are wholly foreign owned enterprises better than JVs?', in Journal of 
International Economics, Vol. 40., 1996, p.225. 
90 Ietto-Gillies op cit 31 explains the nature of JVs, what they entail, their advantages etc.. As the learned 
writer explains. 'The term JV refers to a partnership between two or more enterprises in a specific 
business 'venture'. The partnership may involve both equity and management participation and can be 
on the basis of equal or different shares for the partners. It can involve the setting up of new production 
facilities or the buying of existing ones. The advantages for individual companies over other forms of 
involvement are many and include the following: 
( 1) lower risk, as the risk of a particular investment is spread among the participants; 
(2) the possibility of using complementary resources, skills and know-how on the part 
of participating enterprises; 
(3) the avoidance of competition in a particular market; 
(4) ease of penetration into a particular market or country. In some countries JVs with a 
domestic enterprise may be the only acceptable entrance route for a foreign TNC; 
(5) easier repatriation of profits for the TNC concerned; 
(6) the opening up of further possibilities for production and marketing in a new country; 
(7) flexibility with regard to the equity share, which can vary from case to case and can vary for the 
same venture through time according to the agreement between the participating companies: the 
new venture can be set up or closed down without excessive disturbance to the main corporate 
structure and organisation.' 
91 See Bruce London and Robert J.S. Ross, 'The political sociology of foreign direct investment: global 
capitalism and capital mobility 1965-1980', in International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Vol. 36., 
December 1995, p.198 et seq., where the learned writers argue that it is in fact the nature of capital to 
move out of the core-areas to non-core areas in search of low-cost labour. See also Dani Rodrik, 
'Coordination failures and governments policy: a model with applications to East and Eastern Europe', 
in Journal oflnternational Economics, Vol. 140., No. 1/2 February 1996, p.1 et seq. where the learned 
writer discusses some of the policy options open to countries such as those in Eastern Europe with 
skilled labour force in order to realise economic growth. 
92 Ietto-Gillies op cit 31 - 32. See also Ball and McCulloch op cit 63. 
93 The 1991 UNCTC Report Joe cit. 
94 See Lansbury et al op cit I 04 et seq. 
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According to the 1991 UNCTC Report,95 foreign equity capital in JVs (in Eastern 
European countries), with domestic partners is concentrated in the manufacturing sector. 
In Poland and Hungary (the two main host countries), foreign capital in the 
manufacturing sector accounted for over 60% of the total foreign capital during the 
1990s, while the remaining share was in the services sector, mostly in finance, trade, 
transport, storage and communications. 
More than half of the total number of JV s and foreign equity participation in these 
countries originate from countries in western Europe, particularly the EU and Austria and 
to a lesser extent, the US. The 1991 UNCTC Report 96 maintains that these home 
countries are likely to remain the largest investors in the years to come, although several 
Japanese companies are reported as having indicated that they plan to invest considerable 
amounts in central and eastern European countries. 
Although Eastern Europe has seen a plethora of JV s from 1990 onwards, only a few of 
these ventures have begun operations. In fact, it is reported 97 for example, that less than 
10% of these ventures have actually begun operations in the former USSR. The rapid 
increase in the number of JV s in these countries, was based upon the assumption ( on the 
part of western governments and some international institutions) that private FDI would 
play a key role in the transition process, and that this would obviate the need for official 
assistance on the scale of the Marshall Plan for example.98 The net inflow of FDI into 
Eastern Europe has been much less than was expected - or hoped for - by both western 
and eastern govemments.99 For instance, in 1993, the total of net inflow of FD I into these 
countries is estimated to have been some$ 3.5 billion, and that since 1990 the total 
inflow has been less than$ 10 billion (for nine countries). '00 Most of the investment is 
concentrated in a few countries; the four 'advanced' transition economies have received 
95 Loe cit. See also Ietto-Gillies Joe cit. 
96 Op cit 14 - 15. 
97 Ibid. 
98 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe in 1993-1994, New 
York, 1994, p.5 (hereinafter 'The 1994 UNECE Report'). See also United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe in 1994 -1995, New York, 1995, p.14. (hereinafter 
'The 1995 UNECE Report'). 
99 The 1994 UNECE Report loc cit. 
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over 90% of the total since 1990, with most of it (80%) going to Hungary and the Czech 
Republic. 
The poor performance of transition economies in attracting fixed investment is 
attributable to a number of factors, particularly the situation of uncertainty created by 
fundamental socio-economic and political changes that took place in those countries in 
the early 1990s. The rapid breakdown of the old command systems and their gradual 
replacement by the institutional framework of the market economy have created a 
situation of pervasive uncertainty in which the risks of investments are very high. 101 The 
1994 UNECE Report102 states that in many of the transition economies there is still a lack 
of clarity about property rights and their enforceability and, in general, the legal 
framework is still too weak to support a sustained expansion in private economic 
activity. 103 Whether the immediate removal of these stumbling blocks (in the way of FDI 
in transition economies) will have a positive impact is still a matter to be investigated. 
1.2.4 East, South, and South East Asia 
100 Ibid. 
101 See Erik C.F. Offerdal, 'Taxation of foreign direct investment', in Vito Tanzi, Fiscal Policies in 
Economies in Transition, IMF, Washington DC, 1992, p.233-34. See also Guy Pfeffermann, 
'Facilitating foreign investments: some dos and don'ts', in Finance and Development, March 1992, 
p.46. 
102 Op cit 4. 
103 Some of the factors mentioned by the 1994 UNECE Report pp.4 - 5, which have hampered fixed 
investment in transition economies include, high rates of inflation, political instability (Yugoslavia is a 
case in point), uncertainties over the macroeconomic outlook and the future level of demand, and other 
operational problems. The impact of the legal system on capital flows is also discussed by Andrei 
Shleifer, 'Establishing property rights', in Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on 
Development Economics 1994, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The 
World Bank, Washington DC, 1995, p.93 et seq. who suggests that (and here the learned writer refers to 
transition countries in central and eastern Europe) the establishment of secure property rights will go a 
long way in solving the problems of inefficient structures of control rights over assets (by bureaucratic 
or state machinery) and poor contract enforcement (through bribery). See also the comment of Michael 
J. Scown, 'Laying down the law', in Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol.5., October 1995, p.31 on the 
impact of Vietnamese laws on foreign-direct-investment-outflows in that country (Vietnam). 
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Foreign-direct-investment-flows to East, South and South-East Asia (hereinafter referred 
· to as 'East Asia') have been increasing steadily since 1985.104 In 1986 East Asia 
surpassed Latin America and the Caribbean for the first time as the largest host region for 
foreign-direct-investment-flows in the developing world. 105 Further, towards the end of 
the 80s, over half of all foreign-direct-investments-flows to developing countries went for 
East Asia. 106 A number of reasons explain the continuous increase of FDI in that part of 
the world; inter alia, these countries are quite attractive to foreign investors in the sense 
that their economies have been growing consistently since the 1980s, at the average rate 
of 6% per annum; intra-regional FDI became increasingly important for East Asia, 
particularly in the 1980s, when these countries emerged as important investors seeking 
new low-cost production locations in neighbouring countries in order to maintain their 
competitiveness in export markets; 107 the emergence of China as an important host 
country influenced many foreign investors to invest in that region with the hope of taking 
advantage of the 'largest market' in the world: China. 108 
Thomas and Yan109 suggest that the successes of East Asian countries are not only 
attributable to intra-regional trade and investment flows, but also to 'superior' public 
policy framework adopted by these countries. In fact, the governments of East Asia are 
known for their active intervention in their economies through various means. For 
104 See the 1991 UNCTC Report op cit 12. 
105 Ibid. See also Vinod Thomas and Yan Wang, 'Distortions, interventions, and productivity growth: Is 
East Asia different?', in Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 44., January 1996, p.265 et 
seq. 
106 The 1991 UNCTC Report Joe cit. 
107 Ibid. 
108 See Margaret M. Pearson, Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of China: The Control of Foreign 
Direct Investment under Socialism [Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1991] in 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 44., October 1995, p.230 (Book Review) who 
maintains that China's seemingly contradictory policy- of maintaining a controlled socialist economy, 
in which private ownership of the means of industrial production remained severely limited, yet at the 
same time maintaining an open economy, in which market forces and foreign investment played a 
significant role - continued to attract foreign investors who wanted to have access to the huge China 
market, in the face of strict controls over foreign exchange by the Chinese government. See also Chi-
Chur Chao and Eden S.H. Yu op cit 226. Peter Nolan, 'Large firms and industrial reform in former 
planned economies; The case of China', in Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 20., January 1996, 
pp.1-29, where the learned writer argues that the economic reforms pursued by China, although not 
properly understood by the West, make perfect sense from an economic point of view. 
109 Op cit 266. 
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instance, countries like South Korea have stringent labour laws that restrict labour union 
activity, and in some cases outlaw it; a situation that may be attractive to foreign 
investors who may wish to invest in labour intensive production activities!?110 
Developing countries in Asia received an estimated$ 66 billion in foreign-direct-
investment-flows in 1991-93, roughly half of the total flow to developing countries. 111 
East Asian countries that were destination for FDI during this period are Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia, with China being the largest recipient, accounting for 
more that 40% of the inflows to Asia. 112 
1.2.5 Developing countries (Latin America and Africa) 
1. 2. 5.1 Latin America 
110 Although stringent labour laws may have worked well in other East Asian countries, the current 
(January 1997) unrest in South Korea generated by the same stringent laws (outlawing union activity 
and giving the 'bosses' the right to 'fire' workers at will) is a manifestation of the fact that, in the long 
run, 'oppression of workers' is not in the long term interest of any country that wishes to attract FDI. 
111 Steven Dunaway et al, 'Private market financing for developing countries', in World Economic and 
Financial Surveys, IMF, Washington DC, March 1995, p.35. See also Vittorio Corbo and Leonardo 
Hernandez, 'Macroeconomic adjustment to capital flows: Lessons, from recent Latin American and East 
Asian experience, in Moshe Syrquin et al (eds.), The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 11, February 
1996: p.61. 
•
112 Dunaway et al loc cit. See also Calvo et al op cit 123.; Mohsin S. Khan and Carment M. Reinhart 
(eds.), Capital Flows in the APEC Region, Occasional Paper 122, IMF, Washington DC, March 1995, 
p. l. For a detailed discussion of capital flows to East Asian APEC region, see the following articles that 
. are all in Mohsin S. Khan and Carmen M. Reinhart (eds.), Capital Flows in the APEC Region, 
Occasional Paper 122, IMF, Washington DC, March 1995: 
(a) Shogo Ishii and Steven Dunaway, 'Portfolio capital flows to the developing 
country members of APEC', p.3 et seq. 
(b) Mohsin S. Khan and Carmen M. Reinhart, 'Macroeconomics management in 
APEC economies: The response to capital flows', p.15 et seq.; 
(c) David Folkerts-Landau et al, 'Effect of capital flows to the domestic financial 
sectors in APEC developing countries', p.31 et seq. 
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While net inflows ofFDI to developing countries113 have been rising rapidly since the 
mid-1970s, this upward trend was marked by substantial fluctuations. 114 Although many 
countries have experienced increases in foreign-direct-investment-flows, the latest upturn 
has been concentrated in only a few countries in Latin America. These countries - Brazil 
and Mexico115 - accounted for over 60% of all foreign-direct-investment-flows to 
developing countries between 1971 and 1981, while at the end of the 1980s, 63 per cent 
of the total stock of FDI in developing countries was held in five countries: Brazil, 
Mexico, (China and Malaysia in Asia) and Egypt (in Africa). 116 Between 1990 and 1993, 
the bulk of foreign-direct-investment-flows went to two regions: Latin America and 
Asia. 117 
In Latin America, the total inflow of FDI doubled after 1990, and reached a figure of$ 15 
billion in 1992 before declining to the level around $ 13 billion in 1993. 118 Mexico and 
Argentina received approximately 75 per cent of the total foreign-direct-investment-
inflows to Latin America during that period, with Chile, Venezuela, Brazil, and Colombia 
accounted for a large share of the remainder. 119 
Foreign-direct-investment-flows are not the only type of foreign capital that went to 
developing countries in the 1990s. There has also been an increase in foreign portfolio 
investment (FPI) as well. 120 According to Claessens, 121 the increase in FPI is attributable 
I 
to increased liberalisation of domestic financial markets, and to the opening up of 
markets to foreigners as capital controls and other barriers were removed in the 
developing countries. The increased flow of FPI to developing countries took the form of 
easily tractable securities - bonds, equities, and other negotiable instruments. 122 Claessens 
maintains that from 1989 to 1993, total portfolio flows (bonds, certificates of deposit, 
113 Including those developing countries in East Asia. 
114 Seven Dunaway et al loc cit. 
115 Including Indonesia in East Asia. 
116 Steven Dunaway et al loc cit. 
117 See Williams op cit 20. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120 For an explanation of the differences between the two types of foreign capital, see chapter 2. 
121 Stijn Claessens, 'The emergence of equity investment in developing countries: Overview', in Moshe 
Syrquin (ed.), The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 9., January 1995, p. l. 
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commercial papers, and equity) increased more than sevenfold to a level of$ 55.8 billion, 
and that these flows now account for about a third of overall net resource flow to 
developing countries. 123 Equity flows represented about a quarter of the total net external 
financing of Mexico in 1991 and 1992. 124 
The reasons for increased equity flows 125 to developing countries in the 1990s are many 
and diverse. Ishii and Dunaway 126 suggest that the decline in global interest rates in the 
1990s, and improved domestic policies 127 and better growth performance in the recipient 
developing countries, resulted in higher rates of return on equity. The learned writers 
suggest further that, with the process of globalisation of world markets, many developing 
countries (particularly in Latin America) and countries in transition removed barriers and 
restrictions on foreign ownership, liberalised. capital account transactions, improved their 
accounting and information standards, and thus made it easier for foreigners to access 
their markets. 128 129 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. See also Masood Ahmed and Sudarshan Cooptu, 'Portfolio investment flows to developing 
countries', in Finance and Development, March 1993, p.9 et seq. 
124 Claessens, ibid., 3. 
125 In the form of direct equity purchases by investors in the host stock markets, investment through 
country funds, direct foreign equity offerings, etc .. 
126 Op cit 4. 
127 Calvo et al op cit 127 say that a number of Latin American countries began to adopt sound monetary 
and fiscal policies as well as market-orientated reforms that have included trade and capital market 
liberalisation. For example, Bolivia, Chile and Mexico implemented major disinflation stabilisation 
programs in the late 1980s, while Argentina, Brazil, Equador, and Peru have done so during the early 
1990s. The learned writers maintain that an effective inflation stabilisation program can reduce 
maroeconomic risks and stimulate capital inflows. According to Calvo et al, the increase in capital 
flows to Latin American countries can also be attributed to the so-called 'contagion effect' (which 
presupposes that a large shift in capital flows to one or two large countries in a region may generate 
externalities for the smaller neighbouring countries). If this is indeed a possibility, then it could be 
concluded, so Calvo et al argue, that Mexico's and Chile's re-entry into international capital markets in 
1990 had made foreign investors more familiar and more willing to invest in other emerging markets in 
Latin America. 
128 Claessens op cit 4. 
129 Claessens, ibid.,14 suggests that '[E]quity portfolio flows can benefit developing countries by 
diversifying the sources of external finance, increase the risk-bearing by investors, reducing the cost of 
capital, improving incentives for managing the investment process, assisting in the development of 
domestic capital markets, and enhancing the mobilisation of domestic resources'. 
For further reading on determinants and consequences of capital flows, see the following articles in 
Determinants and Systemic Consequences of International Capital flows, A Study by the Research 
Department of the IMF, Occasional Paper 77, IMF, Washington DC., March 1991: 
(a) Morris Goldstein, Donald J. Mathieson and Timothy Lane, 'Determinants and systemic 
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1. 2. 5. 2 Africa 
While developing countries in Asia and Latin America have been experiencing a 
continuous rise of foreign capital flows since the late 1980s, Africa on the other hand 
experienced a decline in foreign-capital-flows during the same period. 13° For instance, 
Africa's share of world FDI fell from 6.7 per cent in 1975 to 1.9 per cent in 1989.131 It is 
reported 132 that in 1987 Singapore alone attracted more direct investment than the entire 
African continent. In 1991 - 93 annual flows to Africa were largely unchanged, with 
almost all the funds going to (oil-rich) Nigeria and South Africa. 133 
The two regions of Africa, Northern Africa (including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya 
and Egypt) and .Sub-Saharan Africa, show marked differences in their economic 
development. The former economies are not chronically depressed, while the latter group 
(with the possible exception of Nigeria and South Africa) is plagued by, inter alia, lack of 
a good industrial base and institutional organisations, shortage of financial capital, 
unfavourable debt positions, political instability (Rwanda, Burundi, and recently Zaire are 
cases in point), unfavourable terms of trade for primary products (except oil and precious 
metals), and pockets of inflation. Needless to say, this part of Africa has not been an 
attractive destination for foreign investment, with the result that there has in fact, been no 
significant growth of investment in this region. 134 Daniel 135 states that in 1993 Sub-
Saharan Africa's share of world trade (and hence direct investment) was a mere 0.7% of 
which South Africa alone contributed 0.5%. Williams 136 on the other hand holds the view 
consequences of international capital flows', p. l et seq.; 
(b) David Folkerts-Landau, 'Systemic financial risk in payment systems', p.46 et seq.; 
( c) Lilian Rojas-Suares, 'Risk and capital flight in developing countries', p.83 et seq. 
130 Williams op cit 21. See also John Daniel, 'Southern Africa in a global context: forever in the slow 
lane?', in The South African Journal of International Affairs (incorporating International Affairs 
Bulletin), Vol. 4., Summer 1996, p.88. 
131 Williams, ibid. 
132 See Daniel, fn 130 supra. 
133 Steven Dunaway et al op cit 36. 
134 See Klein op cit 232 et seq. See also Bienefeld op cit 37. 
135 Loe cit fn 130 supra. 
136 Loe cit. 
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that this trend is likely to continue in the 1990s unless the stumbling blocks to FDI in 
these countries are removed. 137 
1.3 Trends in regional integration 
1.3.1 Introductory remarks 
South Africa was introduced to a larger family of nations (following the first all-inclusive 
general election in April 1994) at the time when the world trading system was 
experiencing a proliferation of new regional trading arrangements (RT As), and many 
existing ones were been given fresh impetus. 138 These RTAs came in a variety of 
packages, with varying degrees of internal liberalisation and alternative external 
commitments. The arrangements took diverse forms, inter alia, Free Trade Areas 
(FTAs), 139 Customs Unions (CUs), 14° Common Markets (CMs); 141 and Economic Unions 
137 For a discussion of some of the obstacles to increased FDI to developing countries (in this case, the least 
developed ones) see Julius op cit 14 et seq. 
138 See Jaime de Melo and Arvind Panagariya, 'The new regionalism', in Finance and Development, Vol. 
29., December 1992, p.37 et seq. See also B.D. Nomvete, 'Regional development and economic co-
operation in Africa', in D.J.J. Botha et al (eds.), The South African Journal of Economics, Vol. 61., 
December 1993, pp.242-43. Gary P. Sampson, 'Compatibility ofregional and multilateral 
trading arrangements: reforming the WTO process,' in The American Economic Review, Papers and 
Proceedings of the Hundredth and Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, San 
Francisco, CA, January 5-7, May 1996, p.88 et seq. where he gives a birds-view account of the issues 
which RT As deal with . 
139 In principle an FTA is an RTA where the member states remove all trade impediments among 
· themselves but retain their freedom with regard to the determination of their policies vis-a-vis the 
outside world (the non-participants) (Ali M. El-Agraa, 'International economic integration', in David 
Greenaway (ed.), Current Issues in International Trade: Theory and Policy. MacMillan London, 1985, 
p.183). See also World Economic and Financial Surveys, International trade policies: The Uruguay 
Round and Beyond, Vol. II, Background Papers prepared by the team led by Naheed Kirmani, IMF, 
Washington DC, 1994, p.89 (hereinafter 'Kirmani et al'), where it is stated that in an FTA, rules of 
origin establish conditions under which an item qualifies for preferential access within the area. 
Kirmani et al maintain that some FT As have recently included provisions to liberalise investment rules, 
service trade, government procurement, and have taken steps to achieve greater economic integration. 
Provisions for factor mobility are not included, except perhaps in the context of facilitating services 
trade. The learned writers further refer to article XXIV of GA TT, which defines an FT A as an 
arrangement that seeks to eliminate duties and other restrictions on 'substantially all the trade' between 
members states, but point out that, in practice, however, FT As typically include a number of sectoral 




The GNU under the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC), will no doubt 
pursue economic, political and diplomatic ties with other countries in Africa, the 
Americas, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and the Far East, which were not traditionally 
its trading partners ( during the years of apartheid). The recent move by South Africa of 
cutting diplomatic relations with Taipei in favour of full diplomatic relations with Beijing 
is a case in point. The present South African government has shown keen interest in such 
ties by signing trade and other economic co-operation agreements with countries such as 
Cuba, Libya, Iran, Malaysia, Russia, Denmark, and Sweden. 
It is very important therefore, for the new government (and other stakeholders as well) t~ 
understand fully the prevailing context and economic environment in which its old and 
new, and potential trading partners operate, in order to be able to formulate and 
implement appropriate policies that will take into account the prevailing trends in 
regional integration around the globe. In the circumstances, a global survey of recent 
trends in regionalism is appropriate, and to that, we now tum. 143 
exceptions in which intraregional trade barriers remain in place (for example, in sensitive sectors such 
as agriculture, textiles and clothing). 
14° Customs Unions are in essence FT As except that member states must conduct and pursue common 
external commercial relations; for instance, they must adopt common external tariffs on imports from 
non-participants. (El-Agraa loc cit). Kirmani et al loc cit refer to article XXIV of GATT which also 
requires that in a CU duties and other regulations of commerce applicable to non-members "shall not on 
the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of these prior to the formation of the 
union". 
141 Common Markets have all the attributes of a customs union, but in addition, include provisions to 
liberalise regional factor movements (Kirmani et al loc cit). In other words, in a common market, 
capital, labour and enterprise should move unhindered between the participating countries (El-Agraa loc 
cit). 
142 Economic Unions have all the attributes of a common market, with the provision for the harmonisation 
of certain economic policies, particularly macroeconomic policies (monetary and fiscal) and regulatory 
policies. (Kirmani et al loc cit; El-Agraa loc cit). In an economic union, a central authority is 
introduced to exercise control over these matters so that existing member states effectively become 
regions of one nation (El-Agraa loc cit). There are other RT As where member states have the creation 
of a political union as their ultimate objective. In a political union, the central authority needed in an 
economic union not only controls monetary and fiscal policies but is also responsible to a central 
parliament with the sovereignty of a nation's parliament (El-Agraa loc cit). 
143 For the discussion that follows (i.e. discussion on trends in regional integration in various regions of the 
world), the writer of this thesis will rely extensively on the work of Kirmani et al supra, as they provide 
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1.3.2 Africa 
Some of the earlier African RT As include the South African Customs Union 
(SACU), 144Union Douaniere des Etats de I' Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) 145 ( established in 
1966), Manu River Union (MRU)146 ( established in 1973), the Economic Community of 
West African State (ECOWAS)147 ( established in 1975), and Communaute Economique 
des Pays des Grands Lacs (CEPGL)148 (established in 1976).149 The Lagos Plan of Action 
(LP A) ( comprising all countries in sub-Saharan Africa ( excluding South Africa before 
1994 ?) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 150 (formerly, the 
Southern African Development and Co-ordinating Council (SADCC) were both formed 
in 1980. In 1982 and 1984, the Preferential Trade Area (PTA), later to become the 
Community of Eastern and Southern African States (COMESA) 151 and the Indian Ocean 
Commission (IOC) 152 were formed, respectively. 
In 1991, the African Economic Community (AEC) comprising fifty one African member 
states was formed. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 153 the 
Cross Border Initiative (CBI), 154 and the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU) 155 were formed in 1992, 1993 and 1994 respectively. 
While the AEC, the CBI, the MRU, the LPA and W AEMU on the one hand, are aiming 
at attaining an economic union in each of their respective groupings, CO MESA, ECCAS, 
ECOW AS, UDEAC and SACU on the other hand, have a common market as each 
an elaborate up-to-date summary of trends in regional integration around the globe. 
144 Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. 
145 Cameron, Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon. 
146 Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone. 
147 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, 
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. 
148 Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire. 
149 Kirrnani et al op cit 108. 
150 Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
South Africa was formerly admitted as a member in 1994. 
151 Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Djiboti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
152 Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles. 
153 Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Zaire. 
154 Burundi, Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, (members ofCOMESA, SADC, or IOC can participate). 
155 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo. 
' 
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grouping's respective goal. The SADC and the IOC are poised at promoting economic 
co-operation among their respective member states. The CEPGL and Communaute 
Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEA0) 156 on the other hand are aiming at a free 
trade area and a customs union, respectively. 157 
The main objectives of the AEC are, inter alia, the strengthening of existing 
arrangements, the formation of a pan-African FTA, a CU, and eventually a common 
market and monetary union. The CBI ( as an economic union) aims at supporting 
integration objectives of CO MESA, SADC and IOC, and the promotion of cross-border 
trade, investment and payments. The other objectives of CBI include the following: 
facilitating factor mobility, removing intraregional trade barriers as well as lowering 
external tariffs, liberalisation of administration and other controls relating to investment. 
The W AEMU - as an economic and monetary union - aims at harmonising tax systems 
and co-ordinating sectoral policies among its member states. 158 
Those African states which have grouped themselves into common markets ( or who are 
working towards establishing a common market) have the following as their stated 
objectives: sectoral co-operation in industrial, agricultural, and interstate transport and 
communications development, environment, natural resources, energy, and the 
development of economically depressed areas. Along with these, the common-market-
African-countries aim to promote co-operation in monetary, financial and fiscal 
matters. 159 Some African countries have simply signed co-operation agreements in terms 
of which they will co-operate in economic, commercial, and industrial development 
matters. 160 
The progress made by African economic groupings in the quest for their stated objectives 
shows a mixture of successes, uncertainties and at times, crippling failures. 161 The 
156 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal. CEAO was established in 1974 
and abolished in 1994. The former member states now operate within the framework ofWAEMU. 
157 Kirmani et al op cit 107. 
158 Ibid., 109. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid., I 08. 
161 See Nomvete op cit 247 et seq. who argues that the weakness of many African economies is the answer 
to the failure of these countries to attain their stated objectives. For a discussion of some of the reasons 
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economic groupings that have shown some measure of success are CO MESA, SADC and 
SACU. For instance, COMESA member states introduced (in 1988) cheques 
denominated in UAPTA (PTA Units of Account) to facilitate intraregional transactions. 162 
Further, to ease intercountry flow of merchandise trade, CO MESA, member states 
introduced the Road Customs Transit Declaration and replaced diverse documents 
previously required by member states from citizens of other member states travelling· 
through the country of another member state. In 1987, the PTA Motor Vehicle Insurance 
Scheme was introduced to obviate the need to take out separate insurance in every . 
COMESA country. 
The SACU has relatively well integrated goods and labour markets. The SADC countries 
on the other hand, have made success in undertaking joint development projects in 
transport and communications, food and agriculture, and industrial rehabilitation. The 
Cahora Bassa (Mozambique) and the Lesotho Highlands Water Projects, as well as the 
Maputo Corridor are cases in point. 
A great number of African economic groupings has not made visible progress in the 
direction of attaining their objectives. For instance, while the CEPGL has not fully 
implemented the application of preferential tariffs, and the ECCAS framework is still 
' .. ,,..-
been discussed, the ECOW AS still has to design its common external tariff and to put 
into effect the Fund for Compensation and Development. 163 Further, although ECO WAS 
member states on the one hand signed a protocol on labour mobility (in 1979), and has 
sill not been implemented, MRU member states on the other, although trade among 
themselves is tariff free and _a common external tariff is in place, progress toward 
integration and intra-regional trade has been slowed by pervasive non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs).164 
why developing and LDCs in Africa have not achieved much in attaining their integration goals, see also 
Elianowy J. Kisanga, Industrial and Trade Cooperation in Eastern and Southern Africa, Avebury, 
England, 1991, p.28 et seq. 
162 Kirmani et al op cit 107. 




In Asia, new RT As were formed in the 1990s in addition to the Association for South-
East Asia Nations (ASEAN) 165 (established in 1967), the Australia - New Zealand Close 
Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA) (established in 1983) and the Asia 
Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) 166 (established in 1989). The three Asian 
economic groupings formed in the 1990s are, the ASEAN Free Trade Arrangement 
(ASEAN - FTA) 167 (in 1992), the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) 168 (in 1990), and 
the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC). 169 The so-called 
Bangkok Agreement has been entered into by Bangladesh, India, Republic of Korea, Lao 
People's Democratic Republic, Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka with the objective of 
promoting regional economic development through trade expansion. 170 
Both ASEAN-FTA and ANZCERTA are aiming at establishing a free trade area in their 
respective regions, while the APEC, ASEAN and EAEC have economic co-operation 
among their respective member states as their stated objective. 171 The ASEAN-FT A aims 
at promoting regional industrial co-operation, the elimination of quantitative restrictions 
(QRs) among member states, and the phasing down of tariffs to reach a zero to 5 per cent 
preferential tariff on manufactured goods by 2008. 172 
The SAARC countries are primarily committed to step-by-step liberalisation of trade in 
such a manner that all member countries in the region share the benefits of trade 
expansion equitably. 173 Australia and New Zealand on the other hand aim to achieve the 
harmonisation of business laws and promote co-operation in the area of standards and 
165 Brunei, Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand. 
166 Australia, Brunei, Darussalam, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, United States of America. 
167 Brunei, Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand. 
168 Brunei, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Thailand. 
169 Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. 
17° Kirmani et al op cit 110. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid., 109. See also Su Zhou, 'Trade connections and interest rate linkages among ASEAN, Japan and 
the USA: An empirical analysis', in Maurice Peston (ed.), Applied Economics, Vol. 28., Chapman & 
Hall, London, May 1996, p.617. 
173 Kirmani et al op cit 110. 
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customs procedures, and the elimination of dumping within the FT A. The ASEAN 
economic co-operation framework is aiming at the enhancement of regional trade, 
maintenance of the regions competitive position, and the promotion of beneficial 
exploitation of economies of scale. 174 
Although some Asian economic groupings have made visible progress in the quest for 
their stated objectives, there are still slow movements and stumbling blocks in others. 
For instance, while Australia and New Zealand (in ANZCERTA) have, since 1990, had 
all intra-area trade in goods and services free of tariffs, QRs, antidumping measures, and 
production subsidies, ASEAN-FTA, APEC, ASEAN and SAARC member states were 
still discussing or completing their agreement. For example, during 1994 APEC member 
states were still doing preparatory work reviewing member states' customs procedures 
and investment regimes and prospects for mutual recognition of standards. 175 
1.3.4 Europe 
There are approximately seventeen different economic groupings in Europe today, 
ranging from FT As to bilateral trade agreements. The collapse of Communism in the 
former Soviet Union and in Eastern and Central Europe, has resulted in the building of 
economic and political bridges between Eastern and Western Europe. There is now 
greater economic co-operation been fostered on both bilateral and multilateral levels 
between countries in Eastern and Western Europe. 
The majority of present day European economic groupings we formed in the first half of 
1990, while the rest were formed in the 1940s, 50s and 60s. The earliest European RTA, 
BENELUX, 176 was formed in 1948, followed by the European Community (now the 
European Union (EU)) in 1957. 177 The European Free Trade Association (EFTA)178 and 
the EU-Turkey Association Agreement (EU member states and Turkey) were formed in 
1960 and 1963, respectively. 
174 Ibid. See also Su Zhou Joe cit. 
175 Kirmani et al op cit 109. 
176 Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg. 
177 Kirmani et al op cit 110. 
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The following European economic groupings aim to establish an FT A in each of their 
respective regions; they are, (a) the Baltic FTA (established in 1993); 179 the Bilateral Free 
Trade Agreements ( established in 1992) between individual Baltic countries and Finland, 
Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland; the Central European Free Trade Agreement 
(CEFTA)180 or the so-called Visegrad Agreement (of 1992); the European Economic 
Area (EEA) 181 (established in 1994); EFTA; and EFTA-Turkey FTA (established in 
1991 ). The bilateral association agreements between the EU and the former Eastern 
European states of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Slovak 
Republic provide also for the establishment of a free trade area between the EU and each 
of these countries. Likewise, the countries of the former Soviet Union182 and the Baltic 
States are also aiming at forming an FTA with the EU. 183 
The Baltic FT A agreement went into force on 1 April 1994 and immediately thereafter 
the customs duties and QRs were abolished among the three countries. 184 In terms of that 
agreement, no new tariffs or NTBs are to be introduced among the three countries in 
future. 185 The Visegrad Agreement, 186 unlike the majority of other European RT As ( e.g. 
the Baltic FTA, the EEA, the EFTA, the EFTA-Turkey and the bilateral free trade 
agreements between individual Baltic countries and Finland, Norway, Sweden, and 
Switzerland), does not exclude agricultural goods completely, but makes provision for the 
liberalisation of trade in agriculture (including textiles and steel: the so-called "sensitive" 
goods) over a period of eight years (from 1993(?)), while liberalisation of trade in 
"normal" goods is expected to take place by no later than 1999 (?). 187 The EU 
Association Agreements provide for the liberalisation of trade in manufactured goods, 
178 Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland. 
179 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. 
180 The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic. 
181 EU, Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden. 
182 Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine. 
183 Kinnani et al op cit 116. 
184 Ibid.,l 10. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Was implemented as of March 1993. 
187 See Kinnani et al loc cit. 
and includes provisions relating to competition law and commitment to negotiate 
liberalisation of trade in services. 188 
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Unlike their African counterparts, European RT As appear to have made headway in 
attaining their objectives. For instance, all tariffs on manufactures and QRs have been 
eliminated by the EFT A member states, while by 1994 the same countries had abolished 
all customs duties on most imports from Turkey. 189 Turkey on the other hand, had, by 
1993 reduced the tariff rate on EFTA imports by 70-80 per cent. 190 
As far as the EU is concerned, by the end of 1993, the Internal Market Program had 
almost been completed. Although the EU has achieved free capital mobility and labour 
mobility is almost completely liberalised, some barriers still remain in areas such as 
energy, telecommunications and transportation. 191 Like the EFTA member states, the EU 
Association agreements with individual countries of Eastern Europe have achieved the 
elimination of most tariffs and QRs on industrial goods after the coming into effect of the 
agreements. 192 However, substantive restrictions still remain in steel, textiles and 
clothing, and coal, but these are to be phased out over a four-to-five-year period after the 
entry into force of the respective agreements. 193 The EU and the Baltic states have 
concluded negotiations in terms of which the former will liberalise imports of industrial 
goods and services from the latter. In terms of these negotiations, the same sensitive 
areas (e.g. agriculture) which receive special treatment under the so-called 'Europe 
Agreements' will be protected in the EU agreements with the Baltic States. 
1.3.5 The Middle East 
The Arab Common Market (ACM) is the earliest Middle East RTA set up by Arab 
countries 194 (in 1964) with the objective of establishing a customs union. 195 The three 
188 Ibid., 112. 
189 Ibid., 111. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Ibid., 112. See also C. Fred Bergstein, 'Globalising free trade', in Foreign Affairs, May/June 1996, 
p.106. 
192 Kinnani et al, ibid. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Mauritania, Syria, Yemen. 
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Middle East RTAs formed in the 1980s are, the Co-operation Council for the Arab States 
of the Gulf (also referred to as the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)1 96 (in 1981), the 
Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO) 197 (in 1985), and the Arab Maghreb Union 
(AMU) 198 (in 1989) (formerly, Maghreb Customs Union). These RTAs aim to establish a 
common market, promote economic co-operation, and an economic union in their 
individual regions, respectively. The only Middle East RTA formed in the 1990s is the 
Black Sea Economic Co-operation Project (BSEC) 199 (in 1992) with the objective of 
fostering economic co-operation among member states. 200 
In its 1991 meeting , the AMU agreed to a four-stage economic integration process in 
terms of which deadline announced set the target of establishing an FT A by 1992, a 
customs union by the end of 1995, and a common market by the end of2000.201 The 
member states ofBSEC aim at enhancing movements of goods, services, labour and 
capital, while member states of ECO are poised at promoting bilateral trade and 
investment, and economic co-operation. 202 The envisaged co-operation agreement among 
GCC states is designed to achieve "deep integration" by establishing free movement of 
goods, services, and factors of production. 203 
The GCC appears to be the only Middle East RIA that has achieved a lot in terms of 
progress to date. For instance, by the end of 1983 (i.e. two years after it was formed), the 
member states had virtually eliminated customs tariff and trade in services had been 
liberalised. Further, the free movement of factors of production has now been achieved.204 
The other RI As in the Middle East are, in the main, still in the planning and /or 
implementation stages. For instance, the ACM member states have still made no progress 
195 Kinnani et al op cit 113. 
I% Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates,. 
197 (Fonnerly, the Regional Cooperation Development). Islamic Republic oflran, Pakistan, Turkey. And 
since 1992: Islamic State of Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrghyz Republic, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. 
198 Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia. 
199 Albania, Annenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Turkey, Ukraine. 
20° Kinnani et al loc cit. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Ibid., 1 14. 
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on the common external tariff, and although they had, by 1992, removed tariffs on 
manufactured goods - with a few exceptions though - considerable QRs still remain. 205 
The five central banks of the AMU signed an agreement in 1991 to help facilitate inter-
bank payments, and has been implemented since April 1992.206 As far as the BSEC is 
concerned, working groups have been established covering areas such as organisational 
matters, exchange of statistical data and economic information, banking and finance, 
trade and industrial co-operation, transport and communications, agriculture and agro-
industries, and free travel of business-people of the participating states.207 In 1992, the 
ECO member states established a very limited system of tariff preferences granting a 
10% reduction on specific tariff lines.208 Some of the initiatives been considered by the 
ECO member states include the establishment of a regional trade and development bank 
and the formation of an ECO shipping company.209 
1.3.6 The Americas 
The Western Hemisphere (the Americas) has, by far, the largest number of RT As. 
Although the majority of these RTAs are multilateral in nature, there are many that are 
conducted on bilateral basis. The earliest RTAs in this part of the world formed in the 
1960s and revived in the 1990s are, the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) 
(now called, the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA),210 the Central American 
Common Market (CACM),211 and the Andean Common Market (ANCOM) or the so-
called Andean Pact.212 
The ANCOM member states aim to harmonise their respective social and economic 
policies and to undertake joint programmes. The bilateral agreement between Argentina 
204 Ibid. 
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39 
and Brazil provided for the establishment of a bilateral common market by 1994. 213 The 
majority of bilateral agreements between various Latin American countries (for instance 
between Chile and Colombia; Chile and Venezuela; Colombia and Venezuela; El 
Salvador and Guatemala; Mexico and Costa Rica) provide for the establishment of an 
FT A between respective contracting states. The member states of CACM, as well as 
those of the Chile-Venezuela bilateral agreement, have agreed to liberalise trade 
completely among and between their respective members. Both agreements, as well as 
the agreement among the 'Group of Three' countries 214 exclude agricultural products. 
The countries of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 215 entered into negotiations 
with Colombia to provide, during a transition period, a system of unilateral preferences 
for access of CARI COM products into Colombia, and for the former to later 
reciprocate.216 The CARICOM member states (as a group) have also entered into an 
agreement with Venezuela that provides that during a period of five years (by 1998?), all 
duties on Venezuelan imports from CARICOM should be phased out. 
The agreement provides further that after that period, negotiations should start on how to 
eliminate barriers on Venezuelan imports into CARICOM countries.217 Negotiations were 
also taking place between Colombia on the one hand and a host of other Latin American 
countries 218 on the other, in terms of which Colombia is to grant unilateral tariff cuts to 
central American countries during a transition period, followed by reciprocity by the 
latter, and ultimately result in the formation of an FT A. 
Colombia, Equador and Venezuela have agreed to eliminate tariffs and NTBs to bilateral 
trade and establish a simplified common external tariff. 219 The Enterprise for the 
Americas Initiative (EAi) aims to achieve a free trade zone for the entire western 
hemisphere, by reinforcing market-oriented reforms in Latin America through trade 
expansion, increasing investment, easing the debt burden, and strenghthening 
213 Kirmani et al op cit 114. 
214 Columbia, Mexico, Venezuela. 
215 Comprising countries in the Caribbean. 
216 Kirmani et al loc cit. 
217 Ibid. 
218 Namely, Cost Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Venezuela. 
219 Kirmani et al op cit 115. 
... 
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environmental policies.220 The 'Group of Three' (Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela) signed a 
treaty in June 1994 creating a free trade zone over a ten year period starting in January 
1995. The treaty excludes agricultural goods, while the car sector will be liberalised over 
a thirt~en-year period.221 
The member states of the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR)222 are co-
ordinating fiscal and exchange rate policy, with the objective of accelerating economic 
development. These countries are also gradually liberalising intraregional trade and 1995 
was set as the final deadline for the elimination of tariffs and NTBs.223 The bilateral 
agreement between Mexico and Chile provides for the promotion of inward investment, 
the elimination of tariffs and NTBs by 1998, and the harmonisation of taxation and 
investment rules. 224 Colombia, Equador and Venezuela signed an automobile trade 
agreement in 1993 (which came into effect in January 1994) which includes a unified 
automobile industrial policy through a common external tariff and common rules of 
origin.225 These countries have also entered into negotiations on the harmonisation of 
agricultural policy to stabilise prices and align them within the customs union. 226 
One of the most important RTAs in the western hemisphere is the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).227 This agreement covers goods and services, government 
procurement and intellectual property rights - except for Canadian agricultural and 
Mexican petroleum products that are partially excluded. NAFT A further provides for the 
liberalisation of investment flows and professional services. 228 The USA has also entered 
into a bilateral free trade agreement with Israel with the objective of eliminating (by 
1995) tariffs on all products traded between the two countries.229 
220 Ibid. See also Bergstein op cit 107. 
221 Kinnani et al loc cit. 
222 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay. 
223 Kinnani et al loc cit. 
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228 Kinnani et al op cit 116. 
229 Ibid. For a fuller discussion on integration process in the Western Hemisphere (the Americas), see 
Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott (assisted by Diana Clark), Western Hemisphere Economic 
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1.3. 7 Reasons for regionalism 
Regional trading agreements are pursued for a variety of reasons, ranging from economic 
issues to political considerations. According to Braga,23° the growing network of 
interdependence among economies around the world has increased the interest in 
regionalism. The learned writer suggests that this process of globalisation of economic 
relations led economic agents to begin to pressure for some type of economic 
harmonisation and governments began to react through regional arrangements. 231 
According to Kirmani et al,232 the prospects of enhanced economic growth (stemming 
from the opportunity to exploit scale economies, regional specialisation and learning-by-
doing, as well as attracting investment by expanding the regional market) is a motivation 
that is present in virtually every RTA . The learned writers suggest for instance, that the 
realisation of scale effects was a major consideration underlying the Internal Market 
Program in the EU, while in Africa, the most important reason for regional integration is 
possibly the belief that individual economies need to overcome the drawbacks of small 
size and limited physical and human capital, which constrain economic growth.233 
Regional trading arrangements are perceived by some countries as enhancing the 
prospects for sustaining domestic policy reforms, including unilateral trade liberalisation, 
as well as fostering an environment conducive to the maintenance of macroeconomic 
Integration, Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, July 1994, Chapter 6. 
23° Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, 'Regional trade organisations: strengthening or weakening global trade', 
in The American Society oflntemational Law: Proceedings of the 88th Annual Meeting, Washington 
DC, April 6-9, 1994, p.310. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Op cit 90. 
233 Ibid. See also Carlo Perroni and John Whalley, 'How severe is global retaliation risk under increasing 
regionalism', in The American Economic Review, Vol. 86., Wisconsin, May 1996, p.57, who maintain 
that the fears (that strengthened regional blocs may lead to global trade conflict and result in more 
retaliatory power for each bloc, etc.) have in fact fuelled the recent growth in regional blocs, as smaller 
countries have rushed to join larger blocs to insure .themselves against the risk of being squeezed out of 
vital foreign markets. There are however, writers on regional integration (such as Jagdish Bhagwati 
and Paul Krugman) who argue that contrary to popular belief, strengthening of regional trading 
arrangements will do more harm than good to the world trade system. See also Ronald J. Wonnacott, 
'Free trade agreements: for better or worse?', in The American Economic Review, Papers and 
Proceedings of the 108th Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, San Francisco, CA, 
(January 5-7), May 1996, p.62 where the learned author discusses what he refers to as the 'hub and 
spoke' structure which may develop with strengthening of RT As. 
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stabilisation (in particular in developing countries and countries in transition).234 Kirmani 
et al 235 suggest for instance that, the East European countries view their association 
agreements with the EU as very important in enhancing and cementing their economic 
' 
reforms, while MERCOSUR is viewed by Argentina as complementing domestic 
deregulation, and in Paraguay, it has supported market-based policy reform and trade 
liberalisation . It has been suggested 236 that NAFT A serves the key US foreign policy 
objective of enhancing the prosperity and stability (both economic and political) of its 
neighbour to the south. 237 
1.3.8 The World Trade Organisation 
Agreement signed in April 1994 in Marrakesh, Morocco, establishing the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) is one of the most important achievements of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations (UR).238 Taking into account its rationale, scope and 
objectives, as well as the impact it will have on various countries, this organisation is 
poised to radically change the way the world does business. 
It is trite fact, that in the context of the world trading system of the 1990s, that is 
characterised by rapidly increasing international economic interdependence and 
liberalisation of trade relations, countries (including South Africa) can no longer 
effectively implement their national economic regulations (ranging from interest rates to 
banking measures, to fairness in the stock markets, even to labour standards) without 
taking into account the new rules-based regime brought about by the WTO . There are 
often international constraints and implications related to almost any national measure, 
234 Kirmani et al op cit 91. 
235 Ibid. 
236 By Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, NAFTA: An Assessment, Institute for International 
Economics, Washington DC, February 1993, p.4. 
237 For a Further discussion on the reasons for regionalism, see Kirmani et al op cit 92 et seq.; Bergstein op 
cit 106 et seq.; Rashad Cassim, 'Rethinking Economic Integration in Southern Africa, in Trade 
Monitor, Vol. 10., September 1995, p.9 et seq. 
238 The Uruguay Round, the eighth multilateral trade negotiations of the GATT commenced in September 
1986 in Punta de! Este, Uruguay, and ended in April 1994 in Marrakesh, Morocco. The Agreement 
establishing the WTO came into effect on I January 1995. See Tsediso Matona, 'From GATT to the 
World Trade Organisation; Opportunities and Constraints for South Africa', in Trade Monitor, Vol. 9, 
June 1995, p.16 
43 
even those of the largest economies.239 Consequently, in formulating trade and investment 
policies for instance, South Africa will be obliged to always take into account its 
obligations under the WTO, and to implement them in such a manner that they accord 
with the general principles and regulations of the WTO.240 
The UR introduced 'new areas' to those that were discussed in the previous rounds of the 
GATT. These include, trade related intellectual property rights (TRIPS), and trade related 
investment measures (TRIMs).241 The contracting member states of GATT also 
introduced the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) during the UR negotiations.242 
The General Agreement in Trade in Services (GATS) establishes the unconditional most 
favoured nation (MFN) clause as a fundamental principle of agreement and provides for 
increased participation of developing countries in world trade in services. 243 The TRIPS 
agreement on the other hand, involves an international upward harmonisation of 
standards of intellectual property protection (IPP) for all countries, irrespective of the 
level of their development.244 This agreement also includes the obligation to comply with 
the substantive provisions of the Stockholm Act of the Paris Convention.245 As far as 
TRIMs is concerned, it has the effect of liberalising investments by reducing 
requirements for the entry and operation of foreign firms in host countries.246 
239 John J. Jackson, 'The World Trade Organisation and the 'Sovereignty Question', in M. van Empel et al 
(eds.), Legal issues of European Integration, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, The Netherlands, 
1996, p.186. 
240 See Matona op cit l 8. 
241 See Samuel M. Wangwe (ed.), Exporting Africa: Technology, Trade and Industrialisation in Sub-
Saharan Africa, GNU/INTECH Studies in New Technology and Development, Published in association 
with the UNU Press, Routledge, London and New York, 1995, p.57. See also UNCTC/UNCTAD, The 
Impact of Trade Related Investment Measures on Trade and Development: Theory, Evidence and 
Policy Implications, UN, New York, 1991, Preface. Belinda Coote, The Trade Trap: Poverty and the 
Global Commodity Markets, An Oxfam Publication, 1992, p 1 IO. David Hartridge,' Implications of 
the Uruguay Round and the new GATT for South African trade policy', in Baker et al ( eds.), South 
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The objectives of the TPRM are to contribute to improved adherence by all contracting 
parties to GATTI WTO rules, disciplines and commitments, and hence to the smoother 
functioning of the multilateral trading system, by achieving greater transparency in, and 
understanding of the trade policies and practices of contracting parties. 247 Under the 
TPRM, trade policies and practices of contracting parties and their impact on the 
functioning of the multilateral trading system are subject to periodic review.248 
The WTO establishes the legal basis for the new multilateral trading system.249 Its 
primary function is to implement all the multilateral and plurilateral 250 agreements and 
legal instruments negotiated in the UR.251 According to Matona, 252 it will also provide 
an implementation forum for all future trade negotiations, administer the dispute-
247 GA TT, Trade Policy Review: South Africa, Vol. 1 loc cit. 
248 Ibid. 
249 See Raed Safadi and Sam Laird, 'The Uruguay Round Agreements: Impact on developing countries', 
in Janet L. Craswell (ed.), World Development, Vol. 24., Pergamon, July 1996, p.1238. See also 
Matona op cit 16. 
250 Plurilateral agreements include Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Agreement on Government 
Procurement, International Dairy Agreement, and Agreement Regarding Bovine Meat. 
251 See also Jesus Seade, 'Results of the Uruguay Round', in Said El-Naggar (ed.), The Uruguay Round 
and the Arab Countries, IMF, Washington DC, 1996, p.17. 
252 Loe cit. 
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settlement procedures and the TPRM, and co-operate with the IMF and the World Bank 
with a view to achieving greater coherence in global economic policy-making.253 254 
253 See Sheila Page and Michael Davenport, World Trade Reform: Do Developing Countries Gain or 
.Lose?, ODI special Report, London, 1994, p.101. 
254 Jackson Joe cit remarks that there are however many issues still requiring attention by the WTO. The 
learned writer expresses scepticism about whether the new dispute settlement procedures (spelt out in 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)) will work effectively, and op cit 187 enquires about how new or 
emerging subjects which arise in the future (such as the problem of environment and trade rules) will be 




DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
2.1 Introductory remarks 
International private capital flows or foreign investment may be divided into two main 
components: portfolio capital flows and foreign direct investment (FDI). 1 Portfolio 
investment refers to the acquisition of securities (stocks and bonds) by individuals or 
institutions issued by foreign institutions, solely for the purpose of obtaining a return on 
the funds invested, without any associated control over, or participation in their 
management.2 Direct investment on th~ other hand involves direct participation in the 
management or the exercise of control over the decision making process of a domestic 
enterprise by foreigners. 3 Balasubramanyam4 observes that, the ability to exercise control 
over operations of a domestic firm by foreigners, suggests that there is something more 
involved in FDI than mere flows of financial capital. The learned writer opines that this 
relates to 'the transference of technology and managerial skills from the investing entity 
to the investor entity' .5 It is this ability to transfer technology and managerial skills, so 
Balasubramanyam argues, that enables foreign firms to exercise control over operations 
of a domestic firm/enterprise. 
During the 1960s and 1970s many developing countries (including some industrialised 
countries in the West such as Canada, and recently the US), 6 which are host to numerous 
1 Donald A. Ball and Wendell H. McCulloch Jr., International Business: Introduction and Essentials, 
(5 thed.), IRWIN, Boston, Mass, 1993, p.35. See also Peter J. Buckley and Michael Z. Brooke, 
International Business Studies: An Overview, Blackwell Business, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1992, 
p.15. V.N. Balasubramanyam, 'Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer', in David 
Greenaway (ed.), Current Issues in International Trade : Theory and Policy, MacMillan Publishers Ltd, 
London, 1985, p.160. C.M. Jenkins, 'Foreign capital flows and welfare in the receiving economy : A 
review of the theory', in Economics Leaming Resources, Series No. 9., UCT School of Economics, 
Rondebosch, October 1986, p.2. 
2 Balasubramanyam, ibid. See also Ball and McCulloch Jr. ibid. 
3 See also Jenkins Joe cit. 
4 Loe cit. 
5 Ibid. 
6 For an interesting account of the concerns and worries of the US about the impact ofFDI on its economy, 
see Rachel McCulloch, 'Foreign direct investment in the United States', in Finance and Development, 
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MNCs, maintained a rather cautious, and sometimes outright hostile and negative 
position with respect to foreign investment.7 During that period, FDI was perceived, 
ideologically, as another manifestation of imperialism and neo-colonialism, as MN Cs for 
example, ended up being too powerful and having a grip on the developing host 
economy. From an economic and financial point of view, foreign investment was 
perceived as having a potential possibility of crowding local borrowers out of capital 
markets, as foreigners attempted to raise as much investment funds as possible in the 
markets of the host country in order to finance their investments. 8 
In the 1980s there was a radical shift away from hostility towards foreign investment on 
the part of developing countries to a more accommodating and welcoming policy stance.9 
Jansen 10 suggests that this change in attitude on the part of developing countries was not 
due to new research findings on the impact of FDI, but to the pervasive economic 
problems facing the developing world (including the balance-of-payments problems, low 
levels of private investment, stagnant or declining economic growth, worsening terms of 
trade). In fact, as observed in chapter one, developing countries (as a group) experienced 
an increase in flows ofFDI and portfolio foreign investment (PFI) in the 1990s . 
. It is held, almost axiomatically, that FDI is a 'good thing', especially for capital-starved 
developing countries. FDI is seen as having a positive impact on capital formation, job 
creation, competitiveness of the receiving economy, and overall economic performance. 
These views are also expressed by many a businessperson and politician in South Africa 
in their deliberations on how the problems of this country (e.g., unemployment, low 
domestic investment etc.) could be solved. 
March 1993, pp.14-15. See also Steven A.Y. Lin, 'Causes ofJapanese finns' direct investments in US 
manufacturing industries', in Maurice Peston (ed.), Applied Economics, Vol. 28, Routledge, September 
1996, p.1143. 
7 Balasubramanyam op cit 16 I. See also Karel Jansen, 'The macroeconomic effects of direct foreign 
investment: The case ofThailand', in World Development, Vol. 23, February 1995, p.193. Pan-Long 
Tsai, 'Foreign direct investment and income inequality: Further evidence', in World Development, Vol. 
23, Pergamon, March 1995, p.469. 
8 See Alan Hirsch, 'Inward foreign investment in a post-apartheid SA - Some policy considerations', in 
South Africa International, Vol. 23, July 1992, p.40, who maintains that in South Africa this problem 
is not likely to be of major concern, as this country has 'sophisticated capital markets'. 
9 Jansen Joe cit. 
10 Ibid. 
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Before discussing policies and other factors affecting FDI, we will look first look at 
some of the reasons put forward in support of the argument that developing and transition 
countries in particular need FDI to address many of their economic and structural 
\ 
problems. Secondly, we will briefly discuss some of the theories explaining the process 
of FDI. Thirdly, a brief discussion will follow on the recent policy changes initiated by 
various countries, and groups of countries in an attempt to foster FDI in their respective 
economies. 
2.2 Need for inward FDI 
Jansen11 holds the view that borrowing from international banks and/or on international 
bond markets is partly to blame for the debt crises of the 1980s that ravaged many 
developing countries, particularly those in Latin America. In the circumstances, the 
learned writer suggests that in order to avoid that problem in the future, countries should 
try to attract non-debt creating private capital flows, i.e. FDI and PFI. The financial 
advantage, Jansen maintains, is that such capital flows need not be repaid and that the 
outflow of funds (remittances of profits) would fluctuate with the cycle of the economy, 
with the result that balance-of-payments crises due to financial obligations would thus be 
less likely. 12 There are many other possible advantages of FDI that have been suggested; 
some of them are discussed hereunder. 
2.2.1 Investment Capital 
The policy-makers and businesspeople in developing countries desirous of attracting FDI 
think that foreign investment will boost the overall rate of investment. 13 When looking at 
South Africa, this 'expectation' should not be surprising. Hirsch14 points out that 
investment has been extremely low in South Africa during the period ( 1980-1990 ?) and 
II Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 See Hirsch Joe cit. 
14 Ibid. 
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that gross fixed domestic investment has declined ( during that period) in all sectors of the 
economy except for mining and the private service sector. 
Jansen 15 suggests three reasons why it could be expected that FDI would have a positive 
impact on the level of private investment. First, according!? Jansen, since FDI is part of 
private investment, any increase in FDI will, by itself, contribute to an increase in private 
investment. In other words, as far as Jansen is concerned, an increase in FDI is therefore 
likely to be accompanied by an increase in local investment 16 (provided of course the 
domestic investment climate is acceptable to both FDI and local private investment). 17 
Second, and related to the first point, Jansen maintains that new FDI projects may invite 
complementary local private investments that provide input to, or use outputs of, the 
foreign firm. 18 Third, Jansen imagines that 'it is likely that private investment increase by 
more than the foreign-direct-investment-flows because foreign equity capital finances 
only part of the local investment project', while a substantial part thereof is usually 
financed from local financial markets, notably so if a project in question is a joint 
venture. 19 20 
15 Op cit 196. 
16 Ibid. 
17 However, see Vishnu Padayachee, 'Foreign capital and economic development in South Africa: Recent 
trends and postapartheid prospects', in World Development, Vol. 23, February 1995, p.164 where the 
learned writer quotes Bell (1990: p.22) as having observed that 'in developing countries foreign direct 
investment has generally been a consequence, rather than a cause of rapid industrialisation'. In other 
words, according to Bell (quoted by V. Padayachee), FDI comes about as a result of first, domestic 
investment/industrialisation. This view is also expressed by Gustav Ranis, 'Another look at the East 
Asian miracle', in Yale University Economic Growth Centre, Paper No. 505, Yale University Press, 
Connecticut, 1995 where the learned writer discusses the economic success of East Asian countries. 
18 Jansen loc cit. 
19 Ibid. 
20 The ability of foreign investors to raise funds in the financial markets of a host country is one of the 
major reasons for discomfort on the part of domestic investors, as such practices may lead to the 
crowding out of domestic investment (see Hirsch loc cit and Jansen Ibid.). Jansen ibid makes the point 
further that, 'crowding out may also occur on commodity and factor markets, ..... when foreign investors 
claim scarce resources (such as import licences, skilled manpower, credit facilities, etc.) or when foreign 
investors foreclose investment opportunities for local investors'. It is for these reasons that Hirsch Ioc cit 
warns that the 'investment funds argument' for foreign investment needs to be presented more carefully 
that it usually is. 
50 
2.2.2 Balance of payments21 
Many analysts suggest that lack of foreign exchange is one of the key factors constraining 
the growth of many less developed countries (LDCs).22 It is for this reason that FDI is 
perceived as a critical ingredient for providing much-needed foreign exchange.23 
According to Hirsch,24 when South Africa begins to grow again, it will face.enormous 
pressure on its foreign payments balance. It is important for this country therefore to 
ensure that whatever trade regime it puts in place does not worsen its balance-of-
payments position. 
The balance-of-payments effect on the host country by inward FDI consists of a once-for-
all positive effect on the capital inflow. 25 However, according to Buckley and Brooke,26 
this positive effect is usually (?) followed by an ongoing impact made up of outflows to · 
service the resource inflow. The outflows will be in the form of (a) dividends and interest 
in respect of the capital imported, (b) royalties in respect of technological imports, ( c) 
fees for management and other skills, and ( d) payments for imported inputs and 
services.27 The learned writers point out further 28 that there are also indirect effects on 
the balance of payments occasioned by inward FDI. These concern the impact on exports 
and on import substitution as well as the effect on host-country economic aggregates such 
as income and demand.29 
21 Balance of payments here refers to accounting balance of payments (as opposed to the market balance of 
payments). The former is a record of all the financial transactions in goods, services and capital assets 
which have taken place between a country's residents and the residents of other countries within an 
arbitrary accounting period, normally one year. The latter concept of balance of payments refers to the 
balance of supply and demand for a country's currency in the foreign exchange market at a given rate of 
exchange. See A.P. Thirlwall, Balance-of-payments Theory and the United Kingdom Experience, (2nd 
ed.), The MacMillan Press Ltd, London, 1982, p. l. 
22 See Buckley and Brooke, op cit p247. 
23 Hirsch Joe cit. 
24 Ibid. 






As can be seen, balance-of-payments problems can act as a serious constraint on a 
country's ability to attain other macroeconomic goals. 3° For instance, as the economy 
expands towards its capacity level (as a result of inflow of investment funds and capital?), 
bottlenecks in particular sectors of the economy may raise the aggregate level of imports 
in excess of the capacity to export, making necessary contraction of the economy, and 
thus constraining, for example, the achievement of faster, investment led growth.3' 
2.2.3 Access to (new) technology 
The developing countries have adopted a more welcoming policy towards foreign 
investment, because these countries view FDI as a positive way of having access to new 
technology that is so desperately needed in the developing world.32 Hirsch33 maintains 
that the prevalent structural problems in South Africa ( e.g. international isolation during 
the days of apartheid, very poor educational system, economic sanctions, etc.) have 
contributed to a shortage of new technology in this country. In fact, Hirsch is of the view 
that 'we have fallen far behind our potential competitors as far as technological capacity 
is concerned'. 34 The success that many developing Asian countries have had with their 
mastery over new technology is a model to many a developing country that will want to 
take advantage of technological innovation (that accompanies FDI) in order to address 
some of their problems relating to poor productivity, lack of competitiveness etc. 
Hirsch 35 however, makes an interesting observation that it may be difficult to attract 
MNCs (and hence new technology) based in developed countries, as these MNCs 'are 
trying harder than ever before to restrict access to those [new] technologies'. The learned 
writer points out that the moves to protect intellectual property rights within the Uruguay 
30 Thirlwall, Joe cit. 
31 Ibid. See also Trevor Bell, 'Should South Africa further liberalise its foreign trade', in Economic Trends 
Research Group, Working Paper No. 16., Development Policy Research Unit, UCT, Rondebosch, 1992, 
p.29. 
32 See Jansen op cit 193. See also Erik C.F. Offerdal, 'Taxation of foreign direct investment', in Vito 
Tanzi (ed.), Fiscal Policies in Economies in Transition, IMF, Washington DC, 1992, p.232 where the 
learned writer makes the same point about Eastern European countries. Guy Pfeffermann, 'Facilitating 
foreign investments: Some dos and don'ts', in Finance and Development, March 1992, p.46. 
33 Op cit 41. 
34 Ibid. 
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Round of multilateral trade negotiations are a classic example, on the part of MN Cs, of 
the desire to exploit the fruits of their research and development more effectively.36 Be 
that as it may, foreign investment in South Africa is seen as a positive way of transferring 
technology and technological knowledge to the people of this country, who will, in tum, 
so it is believed, be skilled and become more effective and competitive. 
2.2.4 Access to markets 
One of the arguments put forward in support of the need for FDI, is that foreign 
investment may raise the productivity of investment and stimulate exports, and in this 
way enable the host country to have access to new markets. 37 Those economists who view 
export-led growth strategy as the most crucial for developing countries, would argue that 
FDI will play a crucial role in the expansion of exports, particularly the exports of higher 
value-added products. Growth in exports, so the argument would go, will increase trade 
(intra-firm and intra-industry trade), international competitiveness and improve the 
balance of payments. 
The World Development Report 1989 38 on the other hand maintains that PFI will also 
play a crucial role in opening up a host country to new markets. For instance, according 
to the Report, PFI helps to increase demand for stocks on the stock markets which, in 
most developing countries, are still very small.39 In this way, the Report concludes, PFI 
may stimulate the development of these markets.40 In the context of South Africa, which 
has strong and sophisticated stock markets, it is envisaged that PFI may play a role in 
enhancing and expanding these markets. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 See The World Development Report 1991, World Bank, Washington DC., 1991, pp.94-95. 




2.2.5 Competition on domestic markets 
The inflow of FDI is perceived as a positive way of increasing competition on domestic 
markets and thus increasing efficiency.41 It is trite that, the South African economy is, in 
the main, under the tight grip of very few firms / conglomerates which have become too 
powerful. Foreign investment should be welcomed, so the argument would go, so that 
the new inward firms can provide competition for domestic conglomerates.42 
2.2. 6 Employment creation 
The popular perception, even in South Africa, is that inward FDI will increase 
. employment as more and more people who were previously unemployed are swallowed 
by the new MNCs coming into the country to invest. However, Buckley and Brooke 43 are 
of the view that this may in fact not be so. The learned writers observe that FDI, 
particularly in developing countries is not labour intensive but more capital-and skill-
intensive, with the result that the unemployment problem is quite not solved.44 The 
learned writers allege further that more capital- and skill-intensive FDI leads to a creation 
oflabour-elites and is likely to create social tension and divisiveness.45 Notwithstanding 
that, Buckley and Brooke 46 suggest that there may be positive employment-creating spin 
offs from inward FDI. The learned writers suggest that these effects will result from . 
inward FDI by way of the incoming firms' purchase of inputs, services, construction 
demand and sub-contracting. According to the two writers, the multiplier effect of the 
firms' expenditure will stimulate activity and employment.47 
41 See Jansen Joe cit. 
42 See Hirsch Joe cit. 
43 Op cit 245. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 246. 
46 Ibid. 
47 For a detailed discussion of other advantages (and possible negative effects) ofFDI on the developing 
host economy see Buckley and Brooke ibid et seq. 
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2.3 Some theor1es explaining the process of FDI 
In order to explain the process of FDI, Balasubramanyam 48 suggests that it is important 
to consider, in the first place, why do firms prefer to export the package of capital, 
technology and managerial skill rather than exporting the products produced with the 
package; and also why do firms prefer to create production facilities abroad rather than 
export the capital or the knowledge, or both separately. According to Balasubramanyam, 
the answers to these questions will highlight the essential conditions necessary for FDI to 
take place. 
First, analysts seem to agree that firms decide to transfer production abroad (in this case, 
from developed countries to developing countries) when, at a certain stage in the 
production process cost considerations are of great significance.49 For instance, at the 
stage when costs are high (income and labour) and competitors emerge in the developed 
countries, firms decide to move production facilities to LDCs to take advantage of lower 
labour costs in the latter countries. 50 When production takes place abroad (in a host 
.country), third markets as well as the home market may be serviced from LDCs. 
Lansbury et al 51 opine that wages in East European transition economies are amongst the 
lowest in Europe, and that this factor has been instrumental in the location decision on the 
part of those investors who moved production facilities to these countries. The view held 
by other analysts 52 is that the export success of countries such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
South Korea, Singapore and Brazil in recent years, is largely attributable to a combination 
48 Loe cit. 
49 Balasubramanyam op cit 162. See also Melanie Lansbury, Nigel Pain and Katerina Smidkova, 'Foreign 
direct investment in central Europe since 1990: An econometric study', in National Institute Economic 
Review, 2/96, May 1996, p.109. (hereinafter, 'Lansbury et al). This view is held by those analysts who 
adhere to the so-called 'product-cycle hypothesis' explanation of FDI. According to this 'hypothesis', 
technological innovation occur in developed countries and production is transferred abroad as a result of, 
inter alia, rising labour costs and gaining of comparative advantage in these new technologies by 
developed countries. For a detailed discussion of this theory see Balasubramanyam ibid as well as 
Padayachee Joe cit et seq. 
so Balasubramanyam ibid. 
si Loe cit. 
s2 For instance, Balasubramanyam Joe cit. 
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of technology and managerial skills supplied by foreign firms and their endowments of 
low-cost labour and materials. 53 
Second, the explanation provided to why firms choose to invest abroad than to lease the 
technology they possess through licensing agreements, suggests that firms decide to 
undertake FDI in order to exploit the monopoly over rent-yielding advantages that they 
possess in foreign markets.54 According to Balasubramanyam 55 and Offerdal, 56 these 
advantages range from access to patented and generally unavailable technology, team-
specific managerial skills, plant economies of scale, preferential access to financing or to 
markets, to the possession of a brand name. The learned writers state further that, such 
advantages must outweigh the disadvantages firms face in operating in foreign markets. 
The disadvantages which must be outweighed by advantages include, ignorance of local 
customs and tastes, local legal and social institutions, increased costs of 
communications,57 language barriers and the like.58 The learned writers conclude that 
when this situation prevails (i.e. when advantages outweigh disadvantages) firms decide 
to invest abroad. 
The third explanation of why firms undertake FDI, is based on the "theory" that, since 
markets for intermediate inputs and technology are imperfect in the sense that they are 
difficult to organise, pose serious problems of uncertainty, and that they often preclude 
pricing arrangements by which rent-yielding advantages can be fully exploited, firms 
resort to "backward and forward integration", i.e. firms "internalise" their operations in 
53 See however, a contrary view expressed by Padayachee op cit 163 and John F. Devlin and Nonita T. 
Yap, 'Sustainable development and the NICs: Cautionary rules for the South in the New World 
(Dis)order', in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 15., 1994, p.49. et seq., where the learned writers argue that 
the export success of the so-called Asian 'tigers' was not so much rooted in foreign technology and 
managerial skills as to profound and sound macroeconomic policies and domestic savings and investment 
as well as very strategic government intervention in these economies. 
54 Balasubramanyam op cit 163. See also Offerdal op cit 235. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Loe cit. 
57 Balasubramanyam loc cit. 
58 Offerdal loc cit. 
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order to overcome market imperfections. 59 The process of internalisation of markets 
across national boundaries, so Balasubramanyan/0 suggests, results in FDI.61 
From the aforegoing discussion, it can be concluded that there are basically three 
preconditions which must be fulfilled for FDI to take place. First, investing firms should 
possess ownership advantages.62 Second, locational considerations (such as tariffs, 
exchange rate etc.) should determine FDI rather than exporting the product. Further, the 
firm should be capable of overcoming the disadvantages of operating in a foreign 
location, and it should be profitable for the firm to combine its ownership advantages 
with factor endowments located in foreign countries.63 Thirdly, internalisation must be 
much more beneficial to the firm than selling the advantages it possesses on the open 
market through licensing. It is important to note however, that any one of the above 
mentioned considerations may be necessary but not sufficient to give rise to FDI. 
Writers such as Padayachee,64 Lansbury et al,65 Milner and Pentecost66 and Lin,67 
maintain that there is a myriad of other factors which have a direct bearing on whether or 
not firms decide to undertake FDI. According to Padayachee,68 all these factors combine 
59 Balasubramanyam op cit 165. 
60 Ibid. See also United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), The Determinants of 
Foreign Direct Investment: A Survey of the Evidence, UN, NY., 1992, p.3. (hereinafter 'The 1992 
UNCTC Report'). 
61 For further reading on theories explaining the process of FDI, see Padayachee op cit 164 where the 
learned writer discusses the following theories : neo-classical approach, the dependencia school, the 
bargaining approach, and the structuralist approach. See also Pan-Long Tsai op cit 470 et seq for 
further discussion of contending theoretical perspectives on FDI. J. Saul Lizondo, 'Foreign direct 
investment', in Determinants and Systematic Consequences of International Capital Flows, Occasional 
Paper 77, IMF, Washington DC., March 1991, p.68 et seq. 
62 For a discussion of how foreign firms in the US have used ownership and other advantages in enhancing 
their activities, see R McCulloch op cit 13 et seq. See also Dennis J Encarnation, Rivals Beyond Trade : 
America versus Japan in Global Competition, Cornell University Press, 1992, p. 31 where the learned 
writer portrays the importance of possessing full control of ownership advantages. For example, 
Encarnation is of the view that it is 'only with majority ownership (that] multinationals exercise sufficient 
managerial control to dictate their subsidiaries' decisions to import supplies from their parents'. UNCTC, 
Government Policies and Foreign Direct Investment, UNCTC Current Studies, N.Y., November 1991, 
p.8. (hereinafter 'The 1991 UNCTC FDI Report'). 
63 See Balasubramanyam op cit 165. See also Offerdal Joe cit. Lin Joe cit et seq. 
64 Op cit 166 .. 
65 Op cit 106. 
66 Chris Milner and Eric Pentecost, 'Locational advantage and US foreign direct investment in UK 
manufacturing', in Maurice Peston ( ed.), Applied Economics, Vol. 28, May I 996, p.606. 
67 Loe cit. 
68 Loe cit. 
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to make complex any analysis of the determinants of foreign capital flows (to developirig 
countries). Padayachee points out further that the determinants of foreign capital flows 
(by geography or sectoral destination) also differ depending upon the precise from of 
capital that is being considered.69 
Padayachee70 refers to Claessens (1993) who has identified four kinds of factors which 
affect the profitability of private financing (mainly FDI) to developing countries. These 
are: 
( 1) real factors in the host country; 
(2) government policies; 
(3) real factors arising from the interactions between debtors and creditors; and 
( 4) country risk factors. 71 
Some examples falling under (1) above include, inter alia, 'an outward-orientated 
economic strategy, the credibility of exchange rates, a convertible currency, repatriation 
requirements, the quality of fiscal policies, the transparency of the tax system, the 
interaction between private and public investments ( e.g. possible crowding in/out of 
domestic investment), the state of the country's physical and financial infrastructure and 
system, the quality of its education system and human resource potential, the conditions 
of demand and trading arrangements in both local and regional markets, the buoyancy of 
. the local business climate, and domestic content specifications'. 72 
Under category (2) above, the following factors have been identified as factors affecting 
the profitability of FDI, inter alia, incentives, tax holidays, differentiated tax structures, 73 
regulations in the form of authorisation procedures, requirements of employment levels 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. See also Offerdal loc cit. 
72 Padayachee, ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
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and technology transfer, limits on ownership, limits on repatriation of profits,74 and 
specific investment promotion strategies. 75 
Examples of country risk factors having an impact on FDI include, inter alia, economic 
and political stability, unexpected changes in the legal or fiscal environment (e.g. 
expropriations, abrupt changes in the macroeconomic environment, such as spiralling 
inflation and exchange rate volatility). 76 Other factors which have been postulated as 
affecting FDI are, privatisation programs,77 host comparative advantage,78 levels of per 
capita income and real per capita growth rate,79 the external debt burden,80 and capital 
controls.81 
2.4 International policy changes 
In recent years, the world trading system has been dominated to a very large extend by 
issues and policies relating to FDI. This is not surprising because, according to 
Encamation, 82 FDI has recently 'driven global competition well beyond the narrower 
limits of international trade', and that FDI 'has moved national competition beyond 
simple bilateral rivalries to encompass multilateral contests among the far flung (but 
closely linked) subsidiaries of MN Cs'. The area of FDI has thus been given increased 
attention by policy makers at both the international and the national levels. 
At the international level, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) 83 and the WTO are currently perceived as the two most important forums for 
74 Offerdal loc cit. 
75 Pfeffennan op cit 47. 
76 Offerdal Joe cit. 
77 Lansbury et al Joe cit. See also World Investment Report 1991 : The Triad in Foreign Direct 
Investment, UNCTC, N.Y., 1991, pp.23 and 26. 
78 Milner and Pentecost loc cit. 
79 Joshua Greene and Delano Villanueva, 'Detenninants of private investment in LDCs', in Finance and 
Development, December 1990, p.40. 
80 Ibid. See also Michael T Hadjimichael et al, Sub-Saharan Africa : Growth, Savings, and Investment 
1986-93, Occasional Paper 118, IMF, Washington DC., January 1995, p.44 et seq. 
81 Determinants and Systemic Consequences oflntemational Capital Flows, Occasional Paper 77, IMF, 
Washington DC., March 1991, p.22. See also S. Neal McKnight, 'Stepping stones to refonn: The use of 
capital controls in economic liberalisation', in Virginia Law Review, Vol. 82, August 1996, p.864. 
82 Op cit 5. 
83 Comprising mainly of developed market economies. 
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crafting and implementing multilateral policies relating to FDI.84 Concerning the former, 
OECD countries took measures to harmonise the treatment ofMNCs by host countries 
and to strengthen the OECD codes ofliberalisation.85 Further, the OECD added a chapter 
on MNCs and the environment to its Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises.86 The 
Guidelines cover the following areas : general policies, 87 disclosure of information, 88 
competition,89 financing,90 taxation,91 employment and industrial relations,92 and science 
and technology.93 
Concerning the WTO, the creation of a framework to govern international transactions in 
services, and rules governing the application of trade-related-investment-measures 
(TRIMs) by member states,94 are two very important issues for the future of a multilateral 
approach to foreign direct investment issues.95 However, as far as TRIMs are concerned, 
there seems to be no consensus on how they must be applied. According to the World 
Investment Report 1991,96 differences of opinion concerning TRIMs centre on four basic 
issues : the coverage of a TRIMs agreement (whether it should be extended to measures 
applied to established firms or only to measures on new investments); the level of 
discipline to be imposed; the treatment of developing countries (whether they may be 
granted a special allowance to use TRIMs in the context of their socio-economic 
84 World Investment Report 1991 op cit 23. 
85 Ibid. 
86 See International Investment and Multinational Enterprises : The OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, OECD, Paris, 1986. The Guidelines were annexed to a Declaration on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises/MNCs/TNCs which was endorsed by the OECD member 
governments at the 1976 meeting of the OECD Council at ministerial level and which was accompanied 
by related Council Decisions on Guidelines for MNEs, on National Treatment (for firms under foreign 
control), and on International Investment Incentives and Disincentives. According to the OECD 
member states, the objective of the Guidelines is 'to encourage the positive contributions which 
multinational enterprises can make to economic and social progress and to minimise and resolve the 
difficulties to which their various operations may give rise' (p7). 
87 Ibid., 13. 
88 Ibid., 13-14. 
89 ,Ibid., 14. 
90 Ibid., 15. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid., 15-16. 
93 Ibid., 16. 
94 Discussed in the Uruguay Round (UR) of Multilateral Negotiations. 
95 World Investment Report 1991 loc cit. 
96 Ibid., 25. 
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development goals); and the treatment of restrictive business practises in the context of 
restrictions of TRIMs. 
2.5 National policy changes and recent policy developments 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, a large number of countries changed their polides and 
regulations affecting MNCs and capital flows in general. The reasons for doing so were 
many, and varied from countries to countries. 
As for developed market economies (DMEs), those changes were 'a component of 
policies aimed at improving the climate for business operation in general, and did not 
single out the activities ofTNCs'.97 For example, the process of privatisation of 
previously government-owned or government-regulated assets in some developed 
countries ( e.g., UK and US) is viewed as a positive way of increasing efficiency and 
national competitiveness as foreign MNCs entered markets previously dominated by state 
enterprises.98 
In developing countries, policy changes were frequently part of explicit attempts to attract 
greater amounts of FDI and/or to influence the impact of such investment. 99 Some 
developing countries, by introducing these changes, hoped to provide some medium to 
long term solutions to their economic problems ( of e.g., lack of capital, indebtedness). 
For example, some developing countries have reduced or removed their exchange 
controls, thus permitting wider currency convertibility and allowing greater repatriation 
of profits and dividends. 100 
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe introduced sweeping changes in order to 
create a climate attractive to foreign MNCs, and thus opened ways for new capital flows 
into the region. As mentioned earlier (in chapter one), these countries formulated new 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid., 25-26. 
99 Ibid., 26. 
100 Ibid. 
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legal and regulatory regimes allowing substantial foreign participation, and in some cases 
100 per cent ownership of foreign MN Cs. 101 
2.6 Policies and factors affecting FDI 
2.6.J Government Policy instruments 
2.6.1.1 Ownership policies 
In our earlier discussion ( of why do firms decide to move production abroad than to lease 
the technology they possess through licensing agreement), it was suggested that firms 
decide to undertake FDI in order to exploit the monopoly of advantages ( e.g. access to 
patented technology, brand names, team specific managerial skills) they possess in 
foreign markets. As can be seen, in order to exploit these to their fullest advantage, 
foreign firms must be in a position to exercise substantial managerial control over their 
foreign subsidiaries. In other words, firms should possess ownership advantages which 
should outweigh any disadvantages (such as tariffs, exchange controls, local content 
requirements) which may be prevalent in the host country. In the circumstances, it is 
fairly axiomatic that any policies geared toward limiting or in any way interfering with 
the crucial ownership advantages of an investing firm are likely to be viewed as hostile to 
FDI, and consequently discourage these firms from undertaking it (FDI). 102 
Conversely, policies that ensure that the ownership advantages of foreign firms are 
enhanced ( e.g. through strict protection of patents and copyrights) will most likely be 
regarded as investor-friendly, and consequently encourage foreign firms to move 
production abroad. 
101 See ibid., 27. 
102 For a discussion of the impact of Japan's restrictive foreign ownership policies on US exports/sales to 
Japan, see Encarnation loc cit where the learned writer explains how Japanese policies have constrained 
US exports to Japan and not the other way around. In that explanation, Encarnation shows why 
Japanese are able to sell more in the US, than Americans in Japan. 
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According to the 1991 UNCTC Report, 103 a number 9f countries (in both the developed 
and developing worlds) have systematically moved away from policies imposing 
(sectoral) limitations on foreign equity ownership, to policies that allow more and more 
control of foreign equity. For instance, the Report 104 refers to recent moves by Mexico to 
allow 100 per cent foreign ownership for enterprises with assets up to $100 million as one 
recent example of many announcement of liberalised ownership policies. 
The other countries which, according to the Report105 have also liberalised their foreign 
ownership policies are Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Trinidad and Tobago, and Yugoslavia. In the light of the aforegoing discussion, it should 
therefore be important for South African policy-makers to consider carefully the impact . 
that their new trade and/or investment policies (if any) may have on foreign equity 
ownership, as it is clear that those policies may no doubt have a positive or negative 
impact on the foreigners' decision to move production to this country. 
2.6.1.2 Taxation I Subsidies 
According to the 1991 UNCTC FDI Report, 106 tax measures and subsidies remain the 
single most common policy instrument in the overall foreign investment regime, and 
governments seem to continue to announce changes in this category. It is widely 
believed that low or lower corporate income taxes, accelerated depreciation allowances, 
investment allowances, and granting of tax holidays, etc. are incentives which create a 
climate conducive to FDI. Conversely, an environment characterised by high corporate 
taxes and absence of tax holidays (to mention but two) is likely to be viewed by potential 
investors as unfriendly and risky. 
The Report 107 records that during the period 1977-1987, twenty developed market 
economies, five NI Cs, and twenty-one developing countries appear to have changed often 
their respective tax/subsidy policies, in an attempt to entice MNCs to invest in their 
103 Loe cit. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Op cit 9 and footnotes thereto. 
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respective economies. Cull108 refers to Rudolf Gouws (of Rand Merchant Bank) who 
suggests that one of the many reasons why Zimbabwe attracted no new fixed investment 
in the 1990s is that country's relatively high corporate tax rate. 
In the case of South Africa, it was suggested that the absence of tax holidays was one of 
the negatives cited by foreign firms operating in South Africa which made South Africa 
unattractive to FDI. 109 However, Padayachee 110 points out that the literature suggests that 
special incentives (such as tax holidays and differentiated tax structures) that are aimed at 
influencing the allocation of FDI are less important than the general investment climate 
and policies affecting specific factors. According to Padayachee, 111 this is especially so 
when such incentives can be easily withdrawn. 112 Pfeffermann113 on the other extreme 
hand recommends that tax holidays be abandoned as a measure of attracting foreign 
investors. The learned writer is of the view that companies do expect a reasonable level 
of taxes, and that in fact, companies prefer a steady, reasonable tax rate that enables them 
to make long-term financial plans, rather than a tax holiday followed by high, uncertain 
101 Ibid. 
108 Patrick Cull, Economic Growth and Foreign Investment in South Africa, IDASA, Cape Town, 1992, 
p.36. 
109 Ibid. 38. 
110 Loe cit. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Padayachee ibid., hastens to add that '[T]his does not mean that government intervention of other kinds 
is not significant and positive detenninant of private capital flows'. The learned writer cites the cases of 
South East Asia and says that many writers (e.g. Pfeffermann and Madarassy) have found that active 
government intervention undoubtedly played a major role in boosting private investment. For instance, 
Korea did this by increasing manufactured exports through incentives and penalties; extending 
subsidised credit from the state owned banking sector, restraining union activity [at their own peril - see 
recent (January-February I 997)labour unrest which has paralysed that economy]; setting in place sound 
macroeconomic policies, and making other targeted interventions. For a detailed and interesting reading 
on the East Asian economic success, and the role governments played in that 'economic miracle', see the 
following articles all in World Development, Vol. 22, April 1994: 
(a) J.M. Page, 'The East Asian Miracle: An introduction', p.615 et seq. 
(b) A.H. Amsden, 'Why isn't the whole world experimenting with the East Asian model to develop?: 
Reviewing of The East Asian Miracle', p.627 et seq. · 
(c) J. Kwon, 'The East Asian challenge to Neo-Classical Orthodoxy', p.635 et seq. 
(d) S. Lall, 'The East Asian Miracle: Does the bell toll for industrial strategy', p.645 et seq . 
. (e) D.H. Perkins, 'There are at least three models of East Asian development', p.655 et seq. 
(t) T. Yanagihara, 'Anything new in the Miracle Report? Yes and No', p663 et seq. See also Ranis loc 
cit. 
113 Op cit 47. 
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rates. 114 Pfeffermann maintains further, that eliminating tax holidays will boost 
I 
government revenues. 115 116 
2. 6.1. 3 Convertibility of foreign exchange and remittance of earnings 
Foreign investors may need to convert local currency into foreign exchange for a number 
of purposes, inter alia, for the import of capital goods, for recurrent inputs needed by the 
enterprise, for repayment of international loans, for the remittance of dividends, royalties, 
and other fees. 
In order to be able to do all these, it is important for the foreign investor to have ready 
access to local currep.cy which can easily and expeditiously be converted into foreign 
currency. As can be seen, the type of foreign exchange regime a country puts in place, 
\ 
will have an impact on FDI decisions. For instance, some countries have eased or 
eliminated limits on capital repatriation, and removed ceilings on the payment of 
dividends, royalties and other fees to foreign parties in order to attract FDI. 117 
The 1991 UNCTC FDI Report' 18 points out that, although a country ( e.g. Brazil) may 
offer attractive incentives and have few other constraints, it may be unattractive to some 
investors as a result of a tight foreign exchange regime. Pfeffermann119 maintains that 
restrictions placed on foreign investors' access to foreign exchange, will deter foreign 
investors, particularly those who intend to sell products locally, which may be in short 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Pfeffermann's suggestions herein are drawn from a body of The World Bank Group's Foreign 
Investment Advisory Service (FIAS). FIAS was created in 1986 by the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) in response to a strong interest among governments for attracting FDI. Two years 
later, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) was added as a joint venture partner in 
sponsoring FIAS. 'Today, FIAS works around the world, advising governments in over 40 countries on 
how to obtain increased flows ofFDI. FIAS also offers help in building an attractive investment climate 
by counselling government on laws, policies, regulations, and procedures. It also assists iri creating an 
effective institutional framework for government to interact with investors, including developing 
investment promotion strategies. FIAS helps governments to meet their long-term development needs 
by maximising the advantages of foreign investment for transferring capital, technology, and managerial 
expertise' (p.47). Whether FIAS will succeed in its recommendations for many poor developing 
countries is still a matter to be investigated. 
117 See 1991 UNCTC FDI Report op cit 9. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Loe cit. 
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supply. 120 In order to create a climate conducive to FDI, Pfeffermann121 advises that 
unrestricted transfer abroad of dividends, royalties etc. should be permitted, as this is in 
fact the motive (profit making) for investment on the part of investors. 
However, economists argue that (unrestricted) outflow of foreign exchange will have a 
negative impact on the host country's balance-of-payments. 122 Buckley and Brooke123 
observe that, since lack of foreign exchange is a key factor constraining the growth of 
many LDCs, the balance-of-payments impact of repatriation of foreign exchange (by 
MN Cs) is a source of concern and often of conflict. Thus exchange control regulations 
are frequently used in LDCs to prevent outflows; a phenomenon which, in tum, impacts 
negatively on much needed investment funds/capital. 
In his attempts to lure foreign investors into this country, President Mandela has been 
promising potential foreign investors that they will be able to repatriate all their profits 
and other remittances (without restrictions?). Hirsch124 has pointed out that when South 
Africa begins to grow again, it will face enormous pressures on its foreign payments 
balance. It is still to be seen therefore, whether the President's 'promises' can be 
reconciled with the 'danger' Hirsch foresees. 
2. 6.1. 4 Sector-specific limitations and incentives 
The 1991 UNCTC FDI Report125 reports that virtually all countries that are significant 
recipients of FDI (mainly the OECD countries) have put a circle around some sectors of 
their economies from which FDI is restricted. For instance, in the OECD countries 
limitations on foreign ownership are placed on so-called "sensitive" industries such as 
120 This point is also emphasised by Roland Brown, Mike Faber and Max Sisulu, 'Policies toward inward 
foreign investment', in Raphael Kaplinsky (ed.), IDS Bulletin, Vol. 25., January 1994, p.47 (hereinafter, 
Brown et a[). 
121 Loe cit. 
122 See Buckley and Brooke op cit 247. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Op cit 40. 
125 Op cit 12. 
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broadcasting, transportation, electronics, banking, insurance and other services. 126 In 
developing countries ( e.g. Brazil), sectoral limitations are also common in industries such 
as petroleum, communications, transport etc. 127 The policies which deliberately bar 
foreign investors from entering these sectors and using their ownership advantages they 
possess in foreign markets in these industries, may create an environment that may be 
interpreted as hostile toward foreign investment. 
In order to lure specific kinds of investments, the 1991 UNCTC FDI Report128 
recommends that a country may, (like India, Mexico, Singapore, and Venezuela) begin to 
offer sector-specific incentives. Pfeffermann129 on the other hand suggests that, as a rule, 
unrestricted entry of foreign investment should be allowed. The least that governments 
can do, Pfeffermann130 suggests, is to limit the number of sensitive industries (to 
industries related to national defence or highly protected industries). Further, the learned 
writer suggests that the types of investment activities that will garner incentives must be 
clearly defined and that these incentives must be granted automatically, thus minimising 
discretion or negotiation which may further lead to delays and corruption. 131 
Pfeffermann132 concludes by cautioning that foreign investors must not be favoured over 
local ones in granting incentives, as offering superior benefits to attract international 
capital is not only unfair to national entrepreneurs but will also encourage questionable 
N s, in which foreign partners will be sought merely to qualify for incentives. In other 
words, government policy should be non-discriminatory to domestic and foreign firms 




129 Op cit 46. 
!JO Ibid. 
!JI Ibid, 46-47. 
132 Ibid. 
Ill Ibid, 47. 
134 For a reading on the incentives South Africa gives in order to promote exports and access to foreign 
markets, see the following documents (available from the Department of Trade and Industry): 
(a) Exports Promotion and Marketing. 
(b) Guidelines in respect of the Export Marketing Assistance Schemes (EMA) (3/95). 
( c) Guidelines for the General Export Incentive Scheme ("GEIS"), Revision No.4 : 1995-04-0 I. 
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2. 6.1. 5 Performance requirements 
In general, performance requirements include government mandates which affect the 
content and composition of the value-added activities within a country .135 The most 
common requirements are minimum exports 136 and local content137 requirements. The 
former is sometimes expressed in terms of a foreign exchange balancing requirement, 
while the latter is sometimes expressed in policies which limit the use of foreign 
personnel and other imported inputs. 138 In some instances the host government may also 
dictate the nature of technology the investor proposes to use, as well as the manufacturing 
capacity. 139 Offerdal 140 says that in a number of studies conducted ( e.g. by Agarwal ( 1980) 
and OECD (1989)) on the impact of these and other government regulations, it has been 
shown that such regulations appear to have had a definite impact on foreign investment, 
both by introducing additional costs, and by creating and environment that may be 
interpreted as hostile toward foreign investment. 
In South Africa, the General Export Incentive Scheme (GEIS) was originally introduced 
on 1 April 1990 for an initial period of five years which ended on 31 March 1995. The 
main objective of GEIS was to counteract the anti-export bias in the South African 
economy .141 The Scheme was also intended to encourage higher levels of beneficiation of 
products before export and the export of products with 'a high South African content' .142 
Recently, a revised GEIS was developed which entails a downward adjustment of the 
GEIS benefit levels, the elimination of certain structural imbalances ( eliminating relative 
primary products from benefits), with the objective of eventually terminating the Scheme 
on 31 December 1997 in compliance with South Africa's commitments under the 
WTO. 143 Now, whether the scrapping of GEIS and concomitant performance 
135 The 1991 UNCTC FDI Report op cit 10. 
136 For examples of these requirements in the context of South Africa, see EMA op cit 6 and 12. 
137 See GEIS op cit 4 and 9. 
138 The 1991 UNCTC FDI Report loc cit. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Loe cit. 




requirements will result in increased inward foreign investment flows is still a matter to 
be investigated. 
2. 6.1. 6 Investment promotion and trade missions 
Many countries, including South Africa, do from time to time undertake expensive 
investment promotion efforts and sponsor trade missions to and from their countries with 
the objective of encouraging potential foreign investors to move production to these 
areas. When undertaking these efforts, it is advisable and important, so Pfeffermann 144 
argues, not to do so until the investment climate at home is satisfactory. 
This is quite interesting in the light of numerous visits overseas and talk to foreign heads-
of-state and investors by President Mandela and Deputy President Mbeki and others 
before and immediately after the transition to democratic rule. At that time (as was the 
case with transition countries of central and eastern Europe in early 1990), there was still 
uncertainty about the durability of the transition process in South Africa. 
In their study of FDI trends in central Europe since 1990, Lansbury et a/145 observed that 
there is a considerable risk associated with investments in the transitional economies due 
to the relatively unknown and unpredictable economic and social environment. In central 
Europe, factors such as the tax regime and the structure of property rights which were 
been implemented in situations of uncertainty and expectations may have played a role in 
determining FDI in those countries. The second issue pointed out by Lansbury et a/146 is 
that, there may be an important role for expectations, with investments during the 
transitional period being dependent on estimates of potential economic growth, the long-
run level of the real exchange rate, and (in the case of Eastern Europe) the impact of 
market competition of newly privatised companies. 
144 Loe cit. 
145 Loe cit. 
146 Ibid. See also : United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe in 
1993-1994, N.Y., 1994, p.5. Andrei Shleifer, 'Establishing Property rights', in Proceedings of the 
World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics 1994, The International Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank, Washington DC., 1995, p.93 et seq. 
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In the case of South Africa, although there is still much work to be done to address the 
chronic imbalances of apartheid, it is now fairly accepted that the political system is 
durable. For instance, a Constitution with a justiciable bill ofrights which protects and 
guarantees rights (e.g. right to property) is in place; the government's macroeconomic 
strategy is being implemented; and a market system committed to privatisation is 
entrenched. Whether or not South Africa is likely to see increased FDI flows into this 
country, now that some of the crippling uncertainties have been made certain, remains to 
be seen. 
2. 6.1. 7 Capital and price controls 
The 'free marketeers' hold the view that capital controls are impediments to market 
access and can eliminate all flows as such controls tend to make international transactions 
more costly and consequently discourage FDI. 147 These 'theorists' argue further that, 
while capital controls and other restrictions have been designed to limit foreign 
ownership of 'sensitive' domestic industries, they have, at the same time reduced 
competition both within domestic financial systems and in the provision of financial 
services across countries. 148 
However, according to McKnight, 149 unfettered capital inflows can be detrimental to a 
country's economic development and liberalisation processes. The learned writer cites a 
certain IMF report which concluded that in some circumstances, capital controls have 
been useful in managing large capital inflows and reducing short term inflows. 15° For 
instance, McKnight 151 points out that a number of countries that have experienced strong 
economic growth, including Chile, Malaysia and South Korea, have used taxes on short-
term foreign loans and other measures to limit capital inflows and encourage long-term 
investment. 152 
147 See Detenninants and Systemic Consequences of International Capital Flows, loc cit. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Loe cit. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid. 
152 For further reading on policies to encourage capital flows through MNCs see Ari Kokko and Magnus 
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2.6.2 Other determinants of FDI 
2.6.2.1 Locational determinants 
2.6.2.1.1 Host comparative advantage 
Traditional international trade theory states that trade takes place between countries on 
the basis of each country's comparative advantage. In their analysis of the determinants 
of American firms' investment decisions, Milner and Pentecost153 conclude that where the 
cost of servicing a distant foreign market through arm's length trade are sufficiently high 
for example, it could be argued that US firms would have a greater incentive to invest, 
ceteris paribus, where internalisation provides greater access to specific sources of 
comparative advantage in the host economy. In fact, the learned writers mention that 
Baldwin ( 1979) has recorded evidence, for instance, of US manufacturing firms investing 
abroad in order to take advantage ~fa relative abundance of unskilled labour. 154 
Now, one of the defining structural characteristics of the South African labour market 
(and hence its comparative advantage?), is that there is abundance of unskilled (African) 
labour, the majority of whom are unemployed. Ceteris paribus, and according to the 
traditional international theory of comparative advantage, is South Africa likely to see 
inflow of FDI from those foreign firms wishing to invest for exports in labour intensive 
sectors and wishing to take advantage of South Africa's abundance of unskilled labour? 
If so, will South Africa be able to compete with eastern and central European countries 
which have an abundance oflow cost labour, but which is highly skilled?155 
Blomstrom, 'Policies to encourage flows of technology through foreign multinationals', in World 
Development, Vol. 23., March 1995, pp.459-468. 
153 Loe cit. 
154 Ibid. See also Lansbury et al op cit I 09 who suggest that the cost of labour in the host country is 
potentially a major factor in the location decision, particularly for finns seeking to produce labour 
intensive products for exports. However, the learned writers point out that wage levels reveal only a part 
of the story. As far as they are concerned, what matters to the finn are differences in unit costs, taking 
account of the productivity of labour as well as wage levels. 
155 See Lansbury et al ibid. 
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2.6.2.1.2 Host market size 
It is assumed that when attractive locational advantages prevail, then it could be expected 
that more inward investment would go into those industries with the largest 'host' 
market. 156 In fact, it is argued that one of the critical factors which prompted Western 
firms to invest in the economies of central and eastern Europe, was the desire on the part 
of these firms to take advantage of a large and potentially growing market for the 
products of these firms. 157 The same argument has been made in the case of China. In 
the case of South Africa, this country is perceived by many as a gateway to accessing the 
markets of the whole Southern African region, if not the markets of the continent as a 
whole. Does that make South Africa a possible destination for FDI? 
Milner and Pentecost158 seem to suggest that one of the consequences of the broadened 
host market accessed by inward investment is that the host market is likely to be more 
competitive as more producers enter the market in a given product. The learned writers 
seem to suggest further that competitiveness is a two-edged sword; it increases efficiency 
while at the same time reduces the opportunity for monopoly profits, and further reduces 
the incentive for inward investment to try to capture the "abnormal" returns it (inward 
investment) may wish to get from exploiting its ownership advantages to the fullest. 
2.6.3 Structural determinants 
There are a number of country-specific factors that may influence the location of foreign 
investment. These include human capital endowments, long term trading links, 
technological endowments, economic infrastructure, expenditure on research and 
development, and number of registered patents. 159 The impact of these factors on FDI 
has been illustrated in the following examples: 
156 See Milner and Pentecost op cit 607. 
157 Lansbury et al op cit 110. 
158 Loe cit. 
159 See Lansbury et al op cit 106. Milner and Pentecost op cit 108 and 109. Padayachee op cit 166. 
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(1) Lansbury ei'a/160 state that a number of studies161 have suggested that investment in 
developing countries is positively associated with indicators of 'openness', typically 
measured by the ratio of total trade (imports plus exports) to GDP. Thus, liberal regimes 
accompanied by privatisation programmes, can act as a signal of the host authorities' 
commitment to private ownership.162 
(2) It is suggested that one of the main impediments to FDI in Poland has been the lack of 
investment in infrastructure, particularly in upgrading rail and road links and 
telecommunications. 163 164 
It is fairly intuitive that economic and political instability (which often go together) may 
contribute to an unfavourable investment climate. 165 
2. 6.4 Economic determinants 
There are a number of economic variables that may influence foreign investors' decision 
to move production abroad. These include real per capita growth rate, real interest rate, 
level of per capita income, public investment rate, domestic inflation rate, and the 
external debt burden. 166 A number of studies of the East Asia economic development167 
have suggested that these variables (coupled with sound macro-economic policies) have 
played a critical role in attracting FDI to that part of the developing world. In fact,· 
Ranis 168 suggests that the inflow of FDI to East Asia followed industrialisation in these 
countries, which means that these countries had generally an attractive investment climate 
from an economic point of view. 
16
~ Op cit 108. 
161 Conducted by Harrison and Revenga (1995) and Hufbauer et al ( 1994). 
162 Lansbury et al op cit 106. 
163 Ibid, I 09. 
164 The likely impact which these and other factors may have on South Africa's chance of attracting FDI is 
discussed fully in chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
165 See Cull op cit 3 7. Padayachee Joe cit. Lansbury et al loc cit. 
166 Greene and Villanueva op cit 40-41. 
167 See the writers at footnote 112 supra. 
168 Ibid. 
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2. 7 Concluding remarks 
During the 1980s and early 1990s many countries (in particular, developing and transition 
countries) changed their policies (toward MNCs for example) with the objective of 
attracting FDI. These policy changes included reduction of taxes, elimination of capital 
controls, granting of subsidies, removing restrictions on foreign ownership, profit 
repatriation, and access to foreign exchange. 169 
The World Investment Report 1991 170 states however that, despite such substantial 
changes in policies, flows of FDI to developing countries have increased only slightly, 
and that those increases have tended to be concentrated in the largest and most rapidly 
growing developing countries of East Asia. From this observation, it can be concluded 
that policy changes by themselves may have a limited or no impact at all on FDI flows. 
In fact, the Report 171 states that in a sample of 300 policy changes analysed statistically to 
assess the relative importance of policy changes and economic variables in explaining 
changes in flows of FDI to host countries, it was observed that, for most countries, the 
policy changes explained very little of the observed changes in FDI inflows; and that for 
developing countries in the sample (except of the NI Cs), the policy changes explained 
almost none of the flows of FDI. 
According to this Report, 172 the size of host country market has the most important 
determinant in the analysis, while in the sample ofNICs, extensive policy liberalisation 
was accompanied by a significant augmentation of FDI inflows, indicating that policy 
changes enhanced the growing economic attractiveness of these countries as hosts to 
FDI. 173 From the discussion of trends in FDI to developing countries in the 1990s, it is 
169 For a fuller discussion of these changes see 1991 UNCTC FDI Report op cit 12-20. 
170 See footnote 84 supra op cit 27. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid. 
173 However, this Report is not unaware that statistical analysis of the type undertaken in the research is 
limited in its ability to provide definitive answers. For example, the Report points out that when a 
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manifestly clear that basic economic conditions are the most important determinants of 
where MNCs engage in foreign production, and of how much capital they transfer to their 
foreign production location. 174 'In general, however, while appropriate policies appear to 
be a necessary precondition for attracting FDI, they are not sufficient, by themselves, to 
improve the ability of host countries to obtain larger inflows of FDI' .175 In short, when 
considering policy changes, it is difficult and inadvisable to make general statements 
about the effectiveness of FDI policies, since each policy instrument has a different effect 
on a different aspect of the firm's operations. 176 
policy change is recorded, it is not always possible to distinguish whether one type of policy change is 
more important than another. 
174 See World Investment Report 1991 op cit 29. 
175 Ibid. 
176 For a detailed treatment of the issues involved in policy changes and their impact on various aspects of 
the firm's operations see the 1991 UNCTC FDI Report op cit 23-28. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
FOSTERING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: CHALLENGES 
AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE 'NEW' SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1 Introductory remarks 
In the previous chapter, we discussed some of the policies and factors which are regarded 
as important determinants of FDI. In this chapter, we shall discuss some of these 
determinants in the context of South Africa, in an attempt to assess this country's chances 
of ever being a possible destination for FDI in the context of the prevailing world trading 
environment. As discussed in chapter one, the prevailing world trading system is 
characterised by, inter alia, globalisation of world markets, internationalisation of 
production, and a proliferation of inward looking regional trading blocs. In seeking to 
address the problems currently besieging both the developing countries and countries in 
transition, these countries (including the NICs) are destined to compete fiercely to attract 
FDI flows into their respective economies. The major policy changes introduced by 
many developing countries and countries in transition during the late 1980s and early 
1990s with the objective of creating a domestic climate conducive to FDI and improved 
beneficial trade links with the international community1 are cases in point. 
It is intuitive that the 'new' South Africa will enter that competition, more so because it 
'has shed some of its share in world trade over the period 1965 to 1985', and that '[M]ost 
probably the newly industrialising countries have conquered part of South Africa's 
market'. 2 No doubt, South Africa will introduce new policy changes (like scrapping 
GEIS and other export incentive schemes for instance?) which would be interpreted by 
potential foreign investors as conducive to FDI. The adoption of the new macroeconomic 
1 See Stephen Haggard and Sylvia Maxfield, 'The political economy of financial internationalisation in the 
developing world', in John S. Odell et al (eds.), International Organisation, Vol. 50., Winter 1996, p.35. 
See also discussion in chapter two of this dissertation. 
2 Timothy M. Shaw, 'South and Southern Africa in the new international division oflabour and power: 
Development prospects in the 1990', in Adebayo Adedeji (ed.), South Africa: Within or Apart?, African 
Centre for Development and Strategic Studies, SADRI Books, Cape Town, Zed Books, London and New 
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strategic (by the GNU) which received the blessing of in,ternational financial institutions 
is a case in point. 
3.2 Challenges for South Africa 
3.2.1 On the international level 
3.2.1.1 The 'Africa' factor 
The previous apartheid government and its leadership sought to create a perception that 
South Africa was 'different' and apart from 'the rest of Africa'. That perception was 
false. South Africa is an inextricable part of the African continent, and its destiny is tied 
to that of the entire continent. 
It is incontrovertible therefore, that the impact of the prevailing world trading system on 
Africa's trade and position in global trade will be felt in South Africa.; This country 
entered a larger community of nations ( after 1994) at the time when perceptions of 
foreign investors about Africa were negative (and still are). In the eyes of foreign 
investors and the powerful international financial institutions, Africa is a 'basket case' as 
far as world trade and FDI are concerned. In fact, some analysts (such as Coker3) have 
suggested that, after apartheid, South Africa will become irrelevant to the EU for instance 
and to the world at large. Nolutshungu on the other hand has suggested that the world in 
which South Africa emerged in 1994 is one 
'in which South Africa has no greater salience than other semi-industrialised countries ...... and, 
barring major changes in the international security situation, no particular strategic interest, apart 
from its minerals (now, however, likely to be quoted at a discount with the opening of supplies 
Jersey, 1996, p.75, (quoting Strydom, 1987: 205). 
3 See Christopher Coker, 'Experiencing Southern Africa in the twenty-first century', in International 
Affairs, Vol. 67., 1991, pp.281-292. Coker's views on this point are shared by G.M.E. Leistner, 'Towards 
closer economic union in southern Africa', in D.J. van Vuuren, N.E. Wiehahn, N.J. Rhoodie, and M. 
Wiechers (eds.), South Africa in the Nineties, HSRC Publishers, Pretoria, 1991, p.419. See also John 
Daniel, 'Southern Africa in a global context; Forever in the slow lane?', in The South African Journal of 
International Affairs (incorporating International Affairs Bulletin), Vol. 4., Summer 1996. p.86 who 
quotes one US corporate executive who is reported as having stated: 'who cares about Africa, it is not 
important to us; leave it to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank'. 
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from the former Soviet Union and with the Cold War over). The 'new' South Africa may expect 
. no special consideration as far as economic assistance, foreign investment and access to markets 
are concerned' .4 
Given the prevailing trends in world trade, FDI and regional integration,5 Cheru6 observes 
that MNCs will probably move away from further 'Third World' production. According 
to Cheru, this factor, and the fact that the rampant political and economic instability in 
Africa is inimical to investment, Africa - unlike South Asia - no longer has a comparative 
advantage in either low-cost labour or agricultural commodities.7 The triad (US, EU and 
Japan) is likely to be the relevant dominant force in world trade and FDI in the 1990s and 
beyond. These three power blocs are the major global investors, and are, at the same time 
the major recipients of investment.8 As far as Cheru is concerned '[A]s investment 
becomes concentrated among these powers9 few developing countries will benefit, other 
than some of the NI Cs and second tier countries'. 10 Africa on the other hand, which 
barely accounts for one per cent of world trade, will certainly be the loser 'despite a 
decade of liberalisation at great social cost'. 11 As can be seen, the prevailing patterns of 
world trade and FDI that have excluded Africa, imply that most African nations will have 
little hope of attracting investment, and since Africa is not linked to any one of the triad 
blocs in a substantive way, this continent will be completely shut out of effective 
participation in global trade. 12 
4 John Daniel, 'South Africa's role in the changing world and its impact on the region', in Minnie Venter 
(ed.), Prospects for Progress: Critical Choices for Southern Africa, Maskew Miller Longman, Cape 
Town, 1994, p.28 (quoting Sam Nolutshungu). 
5 These trends are discussed in detail in chapter one of this dissertation. See also Robert Swain, 'The 
European Communities and South Africa - new threats, new opportunities', in South Africa International, 
Vol. 23., July 1992 p.12. 
6 Fantu Cheru, 'Africa and the new world order: Rethinking development planning in the age of 
globalisation', in Adebayo Adedeji (ed.), South Africa: Within or Apart?, African Centre for 
Development and Strategic Studies, SADRI Books, Cape Town, Zed Books, London and New Jersey, 
1996, p.45 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 46. 
9 Which account for approximately 80 per cent of investment, world-wide. 
'° Cheru op cit 46. 
II Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 49. See also Lawrence R. Klein, 'Future trends and issues in world trade and economic 
development', in Keio Economic Studies, Vol. 2., International Academic Printing Co, Tokyo, Japan, 
1995, p.2. 
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South Africa, like its neighbouring African countries, faces a harsh international trading 
environment because it is still dependent on primary and semi-processed exports, against . 
which the terms of trade have turned. 13 Chern maintains that most of South Africa's 
products are uncompetitive on international markets, 14 and that this country's economy 
lacks the diversified human resource base that is a vital component of economic 
prosperity. 15 Further, during the period 1980 - 1989, South African economy performed 
badly compared with the neighbouring countries. 16 For instance, this economy performed 
at an average of 1,3 per cent, 'a strikingly depressing performance' compared with 
countries such as Botswana (11,4 per cent), Lesotho (2,9 per cent), Malawi (2.6 per cent), 
and Zimbabwe (2.7 per cent). 17 It is clear therefore that South Africa is not likely to be 
any different from other African countries, nor it is it likely to emulate the NIC model in 
the near future. 18 The daunting challenge facing South Africa therefore is, having to 
compete in a global economy dominated by the existing centres of power in North 
America, Europe and Japan, whilst also having to compete with the now well established 
NI Cs of mainly South, and South East Asia. 19 
3 .2.1.2 The international 'political' factors 
Munch20 opines that South Africa's pariah status within the international community 
severely affected South Africa's ability to attract FDI from the early 1970s onwards; a 
phenomenon which eventually culminated in the almost unprecedented exclusion of this 
country from world financial markets in 1985.21 The punitive economic sanctions 





18 See R. Stephen Brent, 'South Africa: Tough road to prosperity', in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75., 
March/April 1996, p.118. 
19 Shahid Qadir, 'A new South Africa', in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 15., June 1994, p.183. 
20 Ronaldo Munch, 'South Africa: The great economic debate', in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 15., 1994, 
p.205. 
21 See Michael Duggan, 'Out from the cold : South Africa and international capital markets', in South 
Africa International, Vol. 22., July 1991, p.4 who suggests that after 1990 the international community, 
bankers and governments started relaxing their attitude toward South Africa (in the light of major 
positive political changes that were taking place then). In fact, Duggan mentions that the first new 
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imposed on South Africa by the international community (in an attempt to pressure this 
country to change its internal racial policies, and to force this country to implement the 
UN Security Council resolution 435 in Namibia22) during the 1980s, have somewhat 
retarded the progress and integration of this country's economy into the world economy 
by at least a decade. 
The negative perceptions which have built up in the minds of private investors and 
bankers after years of isolation, sanctions, violence, poor economic performance and 
political instability will take time to disappear. 23 According to Padayachee, 24 foreign 
companies which disinvested in the 1980s may be reluctant to make the psychological 
and logistical adjustments, and undertake the strategic calculations necessary to return so 
quickly. Padayachee points out further that some foreign companies may in fact be 
prevented from reinvesting in terms of agreements reached with the South African 
companies which bought them out.25 
The end of the Cold War is one of the factors poised to have great impact on countries 
such as South Africa.26 In the context of southern Africa this has meant that superpower 
interest in this region, for strategic and political reasons, has declined;27 and that overtime 
this part of the world will slowly be relegated to the 'forgotten past' .28 This factor, 
money borrowing on the international capital markets by any South African entity since the first half of 
1985, was when the South African government raised (in 1991 ?) a $50m, four-year bond on a private 
placement basis from a group of German banks and chartered West LB - the London-based merchant 
bank jointly owned by Standard Chartered Bank and Westdeutsche Landesbank. See also Deon 
Geldenhuys, 'The changing nature of foreign involvement in South Africa', in South Africa 
International, Vol. 23., April 193, pp.147-155 where the learned professor discusses the involvement of 
international organisations (UN, OAU, the Commonwealth, as well as the EU) in the political life of 
South Africa in the period leading to the first all-inclusive general election of April 1994. 
22 UN Security Council resolution 435 was adopted in the late 1970s calling for the holding of a general 
election in South West Africa/Namibia under UN supervision, with the objective of facilitating full 
Namibian independence and the ending of South African colonial rule in that country. 
23 Vishnu Padayachee, 'Foreign capital and economic development in South Africa : Recent trends and 
postapartheid prospects', in World Development, Vol. 23., Pergamon, February 1995, p.172. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 171. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Contrast the position of South Africa and the region with that of East Asia. Some commentators on the 
East Asian economic development suggest that the continued involvement of the US in the politics of 
the East Asian region has had a positive impact on the economic 'miracle' of East Asia. These 
commentators argue that American presence in that part of the world (which is primarily aimed at 
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combined with the increased competition for global funds from 'post Cold War' regions 
such as Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, will tend to affect 
negatively the chances of South Africa of been able to play a ~ominant role in attracting 
FDL29 Some commentators30 predict that in the future, major FDI flows to the developing 
countries will be concentrated in the NI Cs, the transition countries of Eastern and Central 
Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China. 
Some analysts (such as Munch31 and Christie32) argue that the position and attitude of the 
ANC immediately after the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 and during the 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) talks, towards nationalisation (of 
mines, banks and monopolies), as well as the ANC's view that a post-apartheid ANC 
government may not feel obliged to honour the obligations of apartheid South Africa to 
international financial institutions and bankers, send wrong signals to potential investors 
and that these phenomena contributed to a reluctance on the part of potential foreign 
investors to invest as soon as an ANC-led GNU was installed.33 
'containing' Communist North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and the People's Republic of China) meant 
massive injection of foreign funds (in the form of US dollars) into the economies of those East Asian 
countries (such as Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore) which had expressed a 'dislike' of 
centrally-planned economic activity typified by Communist economic philosophy. With the civil wars 
(sponsored by the US, the (former) Soviet Union, Cuba and apartheid South Africa) in Angola and 
Mozambique over; Namibia independent; and South Africa free, this region is no longer in the 
limelight of international focus and the funds which were coming into this region to finance the war 
effort have dried up completely. 
29 See Swain loc cit. 
30 See Cheru op cit 45. Margaret M. Pearson, [Joint ventures in the People's Republic of China: The 
Control of Foreign Direct Investment Under Socialism ,Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University 
Press, 1991], in Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 44., October 1995, p.230 (Book 
Review). Dani Rodrik, 'Co-ordination failures. and government policy : A model with applications to 
East Asia and Eastern Europe', in Journal oflnternational Economics, Vol. 40., February 1996, p. l et 
seq. Padayachee op cit 171. 
31 Loe cit. 
32 Michael Christie, 'US perceptions', in South Africa International, Vol. 23., July 1992, p.50. 
33 The ANC has since somersaulted on that position, and has in fact rejected nationalism ( of banks etc) as a 
principle. 
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3.2.1.3 The international 'economic' factors 
It is a trite point, but worth emphasising, that South Africa, like any other country in the 
world, will be affected by developments in the global economy, and that its policies 
( designed to attract FDI) ought to take into account the prevailing trends in world trade 
and FDI. 
Padayachee34 observes that forecasts of economic growth, both globally and in Europe, 
for the rest of the decade remain mixed. The learned writer predicts that GDP per capita 
for the world as a whole is forecast to increase by just 1,8 per cent between 1990 - 2000, 
though the prospects for China (4,2 per cent), South and East Asia (3,9 per cent), and 
Eastern Europe (including the former Soviet Union) (3,0 per cent) are much brighter.35 
According to Padayachee, the developed market economies (DMEs) are expected to 
grow per capita at only 2,6 per sent during the same period.36 As mentioned above, all 
these global developments will obviously affect South Africa's trade and investments 
prospects adversely, as they will those of other highly open developing countries.37 
.,..-
It was mentioned in chapter one that in the context of the global economy, South Africa 
remains a small, open, mainly primary exporting country that plays a marginal role in the 
global economy. It was further mentioned that this country's share of world trade and 
world economic growth has been steadily reduced in the 1980s, and its role has been 
further reduced by decades of economic isolation.38 
Now, South Africa's impressive minerals and metals base will be affected by a continued 
decline in demand for such products from the Western industrialised countries, accounted 
for by substitutes resulting from advances in biotechnology, micro-technology and bio-







engineering in these countries.39 The only other countries that may still demand South 
Africa's minerals and metals are countries such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and Hong 
Kong, which may continue to be 'dependent for their economic growth on further imports 
of minerals and raw materials'. 40 Be that as it may, it seems that other long term 
structural changes in the international division of labour due to technological 
breakthroughs in, for instance, electronics, information technology and bio-engineering, 
as well as resource saving processing methods in other branches, threaten to marginalise 
minerals and metals producers (like South Africa that has depended, to a very large 
extent, on gold exports for its foreign exchange). 
As far as primary agricultural products are concerned, South Africa is not likely to be 
treated any differently from a typical primary producer from the 'Third World'. 
Pervasive protectionist policies, practices and measures in the industrialised countries 
will make it harder for new producers to penetrate many developed country markets.41 
With the developed world now having organised itself into major powerful inward-
looking regional trade blocs,42 most notably the EU and NAFTA, market access for 
countries like South Africa will increasingly be predicated upon separate, often bilateral 
negotiations that are less firmly based on non-discriminatory principles enshrined in the 
GATT/WTO system.43 The current negotiations between the EU and South Africa on 
trade and market access are cases in point. The fact that such bilateral negotiations are 
not firmly based on non-discriminatory principles, but on reciprocal ones, may place a 
39 Ibid. See also Cheru Joe cit. 
40 Padayachee, ibid. 
41 Jesmond Blumenfeld, 'Sustainable growth after sanctions: Opportunities and constraints', in Ken Cole 
(ed.), Sustainable Development for a Democratic South Africa, Earthscan Publications, London, 1994, 
p.23. See also Swain op cit 15. John B Goodman, Debora Spa and David B Yoffie, 'Foreign direct 
investment and the demand for protection in the United States', in John S. Odell et al ( eds.), International 
Organisation, Vol. 50., Autumn 1996, pp.565-589 where the learned writers discuss the demands of 
American finns for greater protection against imports from other (developing and developed) countries. 
Edward John Ray, 'Changing patterns of protectionism: The fall in tariffs and the rise in non-tariff 
barriers', in Jeffrey A. Frieden and David A. Lake (eds.), International Political Economy: Perspectives 
on Global Power and Wealth (2nd ed.), UNWIN HYMAN, London, 1991, Chapter 21. 
42 For a discussion of intra-regional trade in the three major regional trading blocs, see Marc L Busch and 
Helen V. Milner, 'The future of the international trading system : International finns, regionalism and 
domestic policies', in Richard Stubb and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill (eds.), Political Economy and the 
Changing Global Order, MacMillan, London, 1994, p.260 et seq. 
43 Blumenfeld, ibid. 
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'weaker' party in a tight spot, in having to make reciprocal concessions (such as been 
forced to open its markets to the imports of a 'stronger' party) which may be injurious to 
its (i.e. the 'weaker party') trade patterns. Going back to the current South Africa-EU 
trade negotiations; South Africa will, no doubt, seek to persuade the EU to open its 
markets to South African agricultural exports - a matter that is likely to cause tension 
among various stakeholders and some members of the Lome Convention.44 
3.2.2 On the national level 
Foreign-direct-investment-flows are not only determined by international events. There 
are some country-specific factors (such as government policies, human and natural 
resource endowments, level of economic growth, etc. ) which play a crucial, if not a 
decisive role, in determining the final destination of foreign investment. We tum now to 
discuss some of those internal/domestic factors that are likely to be stumbling blocks in 
the way of inward FDI in South Africa. 
3.2.2.1 The apartheid economy 
Economic performance i~;outh Africa has, since the early 1970s, been on a 
~ ----~ 
declining trend.45 Abedi~-;nd-Standish46 claim that, in spite of dramatic increases in the 
gold price, the economy registered an average annual growth rate of only 2.9 per cent 
over that decade. According to the learned writers this poor economic performance was 
attributable to three factors. First, 'the internal and external pressure in South Africa led 
to declining confidence on the part of both foreign and domestic investors, and 
investment time horizons-we~ortened~ Second, 'the policy of import substitution ---~ 
44 Swain op cit 14. See also Martin Holland, 'From pariah to partner: Relations with the EU', in Greg 
Mills (ed.), From Pariah to Participant: South Africa's Evolving Foreign Relations 1990-1994, The 
South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, with assistance from the Standard Bank 
Foundation, April 1994, p.133. 
45 Peter Brixen and Finn Tarp, 'South Africa: Macroeconomic perspectives for the medium term', in 
World Development, Vol. 24, Pergamon, June 1996, p. 989. See also Iraj Abedian and Barry Standish, 
'The South African economy : and historical overview', in Iraj~~-~ds~}, 
Economic Growth in South Africa : Selected Policy Issues:-6xford University Press, Cape Town, 1992, 
p.9. Blumenfeld, op cit 15. 
46 Ibid. 
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reached its limits, yet export promotion ( despite being recommended by the Reynders ~-----
Commission in 1972) was never pursued seriously. Industrialisation slowed and 
manufacturing became dependent on the whims of the gold market'. Third, 'the poor 
conduct of monetary and exchange rate policies led to substantial inflation and 
inflationary expectations which further reduced investment'. 47 
It is interesting to compare the economic developments in South Africa during that time 
(the 70s) with the developments in some East Asian countries. After the oil shock of 
1973, global economic growth slowed down dramatically, and this factor had a 
devastating impact on South Africa's economic growth during that period. What is 
noteworthy is that, during the same period, a group of Asian developing countries were 
able not only to sustain their growth, but to do so in an outward oriented fashion. 48 
Lawrence49 points out that, in an era in which natural resources (such as oil and gold) and 
primary commodity prices soared it was, paradoxically, these poorly endowed nations in 
Asia that outperformed the rest. While the rest of non-oil producing developing 
countries were 'price takers' on the international commodity markets, the Asian 
developing countries50 that had reoriented their economies toward export-led growth in 
the 1960s were able to penetrate foreign international markets for basic commodities, 
particularly steel, consumer electronics and textiles. 
--- 1 
South Africa on the other hand, suffered severely in terms of trade and investment when \ 
economic sanctions were imposed and the importation into the EU of certain iron and 
steel products was banned. 51 It is therefore not surprising that some analysts (such as 
Brent52) have suggested that it is unlikely that South Africa will emulate the NIC model 
in the near future. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Robert z. Lawrence, 'Trends in world trade and foreign direct investment', in Pauline H. Baker, Alex 
Boraine and Warren Krafchik ( eds.), South Africa and the World Economy in the 1990s, David Phillip : 
Cape Town and Johannesburg, The Brookings Institutions : Washington DC, in association with IDASA 
and The Aspen Institute, 1993, p.19. (hereinafter, 'Baker et al ( eds.)'). 
49 Ibid. 
5° For example, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan. 
51 Holland op cit 129. See also Brixen and Tarp Joe cit. 
52 Loe cit. See also Cheru op cit 64. 
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Traditionally, South Africa has relied heavily on exports of minerals, especially gold, for 
the bulk of its export earnings. Although the price of gold rose during the late 70s, by 
1992 however, earnings from gold exports had fallen to less than 23 per cent (from the 
previous high of some 30 to 35 per cent) of total export earnings.53 For this reason, and 
the fact that South Africa's minerals are likely to be quoted at a discount with the 
resulting competition due to the opening of supplies from the former Soviet Union, this 
country (South Africa) faces a major challenge ( on the international front) of finding 
ways to diversify and to strengthen exports. 54 The experience of East Asia shows that 
those countries that adopted export-led economic policies were able to expand trade and 
increase inward FDI. As Bell (1990): p 22)55 explains, in these developing countries FDI 
has generally been a consequence rather than a cause of rapid industrialisation. 
markets.57 Blumenfeld58 explains that this situation was aggravated by the labour policies 
of the apartheid era which, in seeking to deliver supposedly 'cheap' (African) labour, 
severely prejudiced the productivity of the workforce by depriving it of skills, training, 
motivation and a stake in the mainstream of economic activity. 
The learned writer explains further that, by concentrating wealth in the hands of the few 
(whites), apartheid also had an adverse impact on efficiency in that production was 
~cessarily restricted to a small scale ~~~S:~~ts~ It 
goes without saying_therefore that, the 'new' South Africa is faced with a daunting task of 
improving export performance, by having to make its exports internationally competitive 
53 Blumenfeld op cit 20. See also Leo Katzen, 'The employment problem in post-apartheid South Africa', 
in Ken Cole (ed.), Sustainable Development for a Democratic South Africa, Earthscan Publications, 
London, 1994,p55. 
54 Blumenfeld, ibid. 
55 Referred to by Padayachee op cit 164. 
&Blumenfeld op cit 24. See also Sanjaya Lall, 'What will make South Africa internationally competitive', 
in Baker et al (eds.) op cit 50'." Cheru op cit 63. 




and its production efficient. This is not an easy task, and it threatens to create some 
painful dilemmas for policy making in the 'new' South Africa.6° For instance, in order to 
improve efficiency and competitiveness in the manufacturing industry, it is argued that it 
will require a reduction in production costs per unit of output, or greater productivity per 
unit of input ( or both).61 It is further argued that wage increases may have to be halted as 
they cannot be allowed to run ahead of productivity increases. This point is destined to 
be a thorny one to black trade unions that are bent at improving their members' wages. 62 
3.2.2.2 The apartheid education and training system 
One of South Africa's greatest weaknesses when compared to other developing countries 
(like Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong) which successfully made the transition to high 
growth, is the poor quality of its education and training system, which has affected the 
quality levels of its workforce. 63 Some of the defining characteristics of' ban tu 
education' are as follows. Compared with whites, Africans in education had a worse 
· pupil-teacher ratio (38:1 vs 17:1), more underqualified teachers (52% vs 0%), lower per 
capita education expenditure (R765 vs R3082), and a significantly worse std 10 pass rate 
(40,7% vs 96%).64 Munslow and Fitzgerald65 point out that, perhaps the most startling 
educational statistics is that 53% of the white labour force matriculated compared with 
only 2.2% of blacks, a phenomenon which, according to the learned writers, is not 
surprising, given the fact that in 1987 for instance, only one seventh of the amount spent 
on each white child's education was spent on each black child. 
The university students to population ratio is 31 per 1000 for whites, which is among the 
highest in the world.66 For blacks it is'2,5 per 1000.67 According to Padayachee,68 fifty 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Blumenfeld op cit 25. 
63 Padayachee op cit 172. 
64 Barry Munslow and Patrick Fitzgerald, 'South Africa : The sustainable development challenge', in Third 
World Quarterly, Vol. 15., 1994, p.228. 
65 Ibid. 




one per cent of African students are located in the historically black universities (which 
are faced with crippling financial difficulties). Further, there is a highly racially skewed 
output of professionals from the universities, 87% of engineering and science graduates 
being white.69 As can be seen, technical knowledge is restricted almost exclusively to a 
minority of whites (some of whom are constantly threatening to leave, while others are 
emigrating from South Africa). 
It is axiomatic that the development of South Africa's human resource base is essential to ~ 
\1,1'1. the efficient use of advanced information technologies, and the present limitations may 
pose an obstacle to those potential foreign direct investors whose operations are heavily 
reliant on a highly skilled and technologically advanced labour force. 70 
It has been argued71 that MNCs may seek to locate in host countries with a well-
established research base, and a reasonably high expenditure on research and 
development (R&D). As far as South Africa is concerned, Clark72 maintains that this 
country has been allocating a declining percentage of its GDP to R&D over the last few 
years, while most of the developed nations have, over the last 10 - 20 years, been 
spending a higher and higher percentage of GDP on R&D. Contrast this position (in 
South Africa) with the one in South Korea. Clark mentions that South Korea which 
spent less in the 1950s than South Africa is currently spending on R&D, is now spending 
more than the United States in percentage terms, and that the Koreans plan to spend in 
excess of 4,5 per cent of their GDP on R&D by the end of the century. 73 In South Africa, 
much of expenditure on R&D was accounted for by government, and not by the private 
sector as it happens in developed countries like Japan and US. 
Clark says although it is difficult to evaluate the return on investment on science and 
technology (S&T) in the way that one would measure return on investment in a business, 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. A worrying factor was reported in Sunday Times of 24 November 1996, p. l showing that South 
African kids scored the lowest points in both mathematics and science in an international test. The list 
was headed by children from East Asian countries. 
71 See Melanie Lansbury, Nigel Pain and Katerine Smidkova, 'Foreign direct investment in Central Europe 
since 1990: An econometric study', in National Institute Economic Review, 2/96, May 1996, p.109. 




some studies ( done by Solow in the 1950s on impact of S&T on economic growth in the 
US over a period of almost a century, and in the EU) indicate that typically, 40-90 per 
cent of economic growth in the developed nations of the world is directly attributable to 
the implementation of new S&T.74 In other words, according to Clark, the value of S&T 
for the nation does not lie in the pursuit of S&T for its sake, but in the benefits a nation 
derives from the implementation of the products of S&T. South Africa will have to re-
adjust its budget to ensure that S&T and R&D are given the priority they deserve. 
Whether the 'new' South Africa will be able to do this in the face of other pressing issues 
such as housing, unemployment etc. remains to be seen. 
3.2.2.3 Other apartheid consequences 
Successive white minority governments (before and after 1948) were bent at excluding 
Africans form mainstream economic activity through various measures, notable so, 
through legislation. Abedian and Standish75 say that while inherently racialistic 
legislation existed before 1948 ( e.g., the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936), apartheid marked 
a turning point in racially repressive legislation. 
The learned writers argue that it was as a direct result of these laws (e.g. Group Areas 
Act, Job reservation Act, Influx Control measures, etc.) that South Africa emerged with 
one of the most skewed distribution of income in the world (measured by Gini Co-
efficient of 0, 71 ). 76 Influx Control laws for example prevented people from improving 
their relative standard of living by urbanisation and confined Africans to the rural 
'homelands'. 
The cumulative impact of apartheid has left this country with many deep scars: serious 
overcrowding in townships, squatter camps and environmentally degraded 'homelands'; 
low per capita income among Africans; the majority of Africans live below the poverty 
74 lbid.,19. 
75 Op cit 7. 
76 Abedian and Standish op cit 8 & 9. See also Munslow and Fitzgerald op cit 227. F. Wilson and M. 
Ramphele, Uprooting Poverty : The South African Challenge, David Phillip, Cape Town, 1989, p.18. 
Desmond Lachman and Kenneth Bercuson, Economic Policies for a New South Africa, Occasional 
Paper 91, !MF, Washington DC, January 1992, p.3 et seq. Brixen and Tarp Joe cit. 
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datum line; illiteracy; unemployment; widespread poverty, ad infinitum. It is intuitive 
that an economy characterised by such a legacy is not a favourable location for foreign 
investment flows. Whether the introduction of new legislation and implementation of the 
RDP will reverse this legacy in order to create a climate conducive to foreign investment 
remains to be seen. 
3.3 Opportunities for South Africa 
3.3.1 On the international level 
3 .3 .1.1 The end of international isolation 
The advent of a democratic dispensation in South Africa and the end of apartheid rule 
have many positive things in store for the 'new' South Africa. For instance, the removal 
of politically motivated constraints ( economic and financial sanctions) on South Africa's 
full participation in the world economy, is expected to bring many new op~ 
foreign trade, foreign investment and foreign economic assistance. 77 Although bilateral 
and multilateral financial assistance is unlikely to reach Marshall Plan proportions, South 
Africa stands a good chance of receiving some amounts of official development 
assistance as the international community seeks to 'reward' this country's transaction to 
~
The opportunities following the ending of South Africa's international isolation, embrace 
increases in both trade and capital flows. According to Blumenfeld,79 on the trade front, 
the removal of most trade sanctions has not merely allowed for re-entry to traditional 
markets, especially in Europe and North America (where sales of South African products 
were inhibited by sanctions in the mid- l 980s) but has also opened up the possibility of 
developing new markets all over the world and which hitherto have been closed to a 
greater or lesser extent to South African producers for political reasons. 
77 Blumenfeld op cit 13. See also Padayachee op cit 170. 
78 Padayachee, Ibid. 
79 Op cit 15. 
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On the investment front, Blumenfeld opines that the multitudes of exploratory visits (and 
trade missions) from foreign corporations is testimony to the potential that they perceive 
not only for bi-lateral trade with, but also for investment in the 'new' South Africa.80 
3.3.1.2 The 'Southern Africa' factor 
South Africa is viewed by many, including the international community as a 'gateway' to 
Africa, and Southern Africa's 'engine of growth' .81 Given its comparatively strong 
dynamic economy, South Africa is poised to attract to the region investments, 
entrepreneurship and skills from overseas. Padayachee82 claims that there has been 
enormous pressure both within and outside the World Bank about -its role and lack of 
success in recent years, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. According to Padayachee, 
South Africa appears (in the eyes of the World Bank and other institutions) to have been 
latched upon as a possible success story in this part of the continent where the World 
Bank and the IMF have failed miserably.83 In other words, the fact that South Africa is 
viewed by its neighbours and the world as a catalyst of economic growth and 
development, and the last ray of hope of ever making the economies of Sub-Saharan 
Africa relevant and important in the broader changing world economy, suggests that this 
country is likely to receive foreign investment capital, the spin-offs of which will 
rejuvenate the entire region.84 With the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique over, and 
stability restored in South Africa, this region is likely to be a viable destination for FDI, 
the bulk of which is expected to go to South Africa. 85 86 
80 Ibid. 
81 Erich Leister, 'Post-apartheid South Africa's economic ties with neighbouring countries', in 
Development Southern Africa, Vol. 9., Halfway House, May 1992, p.169. 
82 Loe cit. 
83 Ibid. 
84 See Desmond Colborne, 'South Africa and France - A new realism', in South Africa International, 
Vol.22, July 1991, p.43. 
85 Ibid. See also Padayachee op cit. 171-172. Swain op cit 16. 
86 Rudolf Gruber, 'Germany- the cost of unification', in South Africa International, Vol. 23, April 1993, 
p.170 maintains that there is a deep political perception and awareness that Europe cannot allow the 
neighbouring continent (Africa) to collapse into anarchy and destitution, and in this context, there is 
recognition that South Africa could be the kingpin to recovery and redevelopment. 
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3.3.1.3 The World Trade Organisation and implications for South Africa 
The UR negotiations resulted in the firm commitment by as many as 124 nation 
participants from both developing and industrial countries to liberalise international trade, 
.· by reducing tariffs and non tariff measures substantially, and by reducing both nontariff 
support in agriculture and barriers to trade in services.87 
Zarrouk88 maintains that these trade-liberalising measures will improve access to 
developed country markets, which is important for countries that have implemented 
macroeconomic and structural policy reforms aimed to increase efficient resource 
allocation. In the case of South Africa, Matona89 is of the view that, despite having faced 
adverse external trading conditions due to political and economic sanctions for most of 
the past decade, this country stands to gain substantially from the WTO's market opening 
results, not only in its (South Africa) traditional markets (Europe and North America) but 
also in new ones (e.g. Asia, Latin America, and possibly Central and Eastern Europe). 
The other notable result of the UR, is that it increased the rules-based security of access 
to world markets through strengthened and expanded disciplines, procedures, and 
institutions, within the multilateral trading system.90 According to Zarrouk,91 such 
systemic improvements that protect the 'weak' and restrain the 'powerful' should benefit 
small developing countries (like South Africa). The installation of a legitimate 
democratic government in South Africa has resulted in the normalisation of this country's 
trade relations and the restoration of its trade rights within the WT0.92 
Matona93 points out for instance that, a benevolent attitude toward South Africa 
(following the installation of democracy) is reflected in the granting of limited special 
concessions such as longer phase-in periods in agriculture and textiles and clothing in the 
87 Jamal Zarrouk, 'Policy implications of the Uruguay Round for Arab countries', in Said El-Naggar (ed.), 
The Uruguay Round and the Arab Countries, IMF, Washington DC, 1996, p.66. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Tsediso Matona, 'From GATT to the World Trade Organisation : Opportunities and constraints for South 
Africa', in Trade Monitor, Vol. 9, June 1995, p.18. 
90 Zarrouk loc cit. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Matona loc cit. 
93 Ibid. and 19. 
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UR, as well as of preferences (e.g., Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)) outside the 
GAIT, which are in principle, effectively precluded by South Africa's traditional 
classification as a 'developed' economy in the GATT.94 95 
3.3.2 On the national level 
3.3.2.1 The economic framework 
South Africa is a relatively large country with a low population density, abundant natural 
resources, as well as a developed infrastructure and annual per capita income of US$ 
2800.96 South Africa is thus placed among the upper middle-income countries, and is the 
dominant economic power in southern Africa.97 Padayachee98 says that aggregate net 
resource flows to developing countries mainly in the form of private direct and portfolio 
investment and banking lending in 1992, were destined for countries such as Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, Turkey and South Korea, mainly middle and upper income developing 
countries sharing many common characteristics with South Africa. In other words, South 
Africa's relatively strong economy (as compared to other African economies) is likely to 
be an attraction to potential foreign investors who may look for investment opportunities 
in this part of the world. 
94 Matona, ibid, 20 makes an interesting observation that, an argument against South Africa's formally 
reclassifying itself as a "developing" country (as opposed to the present "developed" status by 
GA TT/WTO) has surfaced in South Africa; it is to the effect that a "developing" status may lower this 
country's investment profile! Alan Hirsch, 'The external environment and the South African trade 
policy debate', in Economic Trends Research Group, Development Policy Research Unit, Working 
Paper No. 13, UCT, Rondebosch, 1992, pp.1-2, on the other hand, argues that 'the moment ofre-
admittance to the world economic community will be a unique opportunity to re-negotiate South 
Africa's status from developed to developing country, which would remove some of the reciprocal 
obligations of the GA TT[/WTO] (though the trend in the GATT[/WTO] is away from special conditions 
for developing countries'. 
95 For examples of preferences extended to South Africa by some OECD countries, after the installation of 
a democratic government, see P.D.F. Srydom, 'International trade and economic growth: The opening -
up of the South African economy', in The South African Journal of Economics, Vol. 63 ., December 
1995, p.557. 
96 See Munslow and Fitzgerald loc cit. See also GATT, Trade Review Policy : South Africa, Vol. 1, 
Geneva, September 1993, p.9. (hereinafter 'TRP: SA Vol. 1 '). 
97 TRP: SA Vol. 1, ibid. See also Leistner op cit 492. 
98 Op cit 170. 
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South Africa derives approximately 70 per cent of its export earnings from mining, of 
which gold accounts for one-half.99 Belli et a/100 maintain that, among its mineral 
resources, South Africa accounts for approximately 44 per cent of all the gold produced 
in the world (excluding the former Soviet Union). South Africa is also the second largest 
producer of manganese, chrome, antimony and lithium. 101 Other important mineral 
resources include asbestos, vanadium, uranium, nickel, coal and iron ore. This country 
also produces maize, wool, sugar, wheat and several fruits, including grapes 'which 
support a growing wine industry' .102 Further, South Africa has an extensive coastline 
with important fishing resources. As far as the manufacturing sector is concerned, 
although small by international standards, Belli et a/103 maintain that it is very diversified 
and includes chemicals, textiles, shipbuilding, pulp and paper, and various consumer 
goods industries, as well as a highly protected motor vehicle industry. 
Besides these resources, South Africa has an impressive physical infrastructure ( airports, 
harbours, railways, electricity, etc.), a sophisticated financial, banking, legal and 
communications network, as well as lengthy and ( until the mid-1980s 104) impeccable 
standing and repayment record with the IMF, World Bank and private bankers. 105 
When all these factors are taken together, they portray a country that is not a typical 
'Third World' country. The determinants of FDI discussed in chapter two suggested that 
a country with South Africa's natural resources, a high annual per capita income, and 
superb physical and institutional infrastructure should be able to attract foreign 
investment. 
South Africa has managed to keep strong trading links with major trading nations such as 
Japan, the US and the EU - even during the years of isolation. For instance, according to 
99 Pedro Belli, Michael Finger and Amparo Ballivian, South Africa: A Review of Trade Policies, 
Discussion Paper No.4., The World Bank Southern Africa Department, World Bank, Washington DC, 
1993, p.44. (hereinafter 'Belli et al'). 




104 At the end of 1985 South Africa introduced a debt standstill agreement. 
105 Padayachee op cit 171. 
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Belli et al, '06 Germany was the leading exporter to South Africa in 1989, providing 
almost 17 per cent of the country's total imports, while the US represented almost 14 per 
cent, the UK 12 per cent and Japan 10 per cent. Developing countries in Asia on the 
other hand, provided approximately 4 per cent of South Africa's imports in 1989, while 2 
per cent originated in various African countries and the same proportion in several Latin 
American countries. 107 
As far as South African exports are concerned, the group of industrial countries 
represented 43 per cent of this country's exports in 1989, while the developing countries' 
share of South Africa's exports was 12 per cent in the same year. 108 Among industrial 
nations, the US and Japan are the most important markets for South African exports (8 
per cent each in 1989), followed by the UK ( 6 per cent), the Netherlands ( 4 per cent), and 
Switzerland and Germany (3 per cent each). 109 South Africa's established trade links with 
the industrial countries as well as other advanced developing countries will provide a 
basis for this country's trade links with other countries (in Africa, Asia, and Central and 
Eastern Europe) which were not South Africa's traditional trading partners. As can be 
seen, this country stands a good chance of attracting foreign investment capital should 
other countries wish to establish trade and other links with South Africa. The recent 
(March 1997) tour of President Mandela of East, South and South-East Asia and India 
has further resulted in the signing of important trade and co-operation agreements with 
countries such as Malaysia, Brunei and others. These countries have indicated a desire to 
expand their trade links with the Republic of South Africa. 
The GNU under the leadership of the ANC is committed to a free market economic 
system, embodied in its macroeconomic strategy which aims to achieve the following, 
inter alia, a faster fiscal deficit reduction programme to contain debt service obligations, 
counter inflation and free resources for investment; a further step in the gradual 
relaxation of exchange controls; speeding up the restructuring of state assets 
(privatisation) to optimise investment resources; and an expansion of trade and 




investment flows in Southern Africa. 110 The strategy has received the blessing of the IMF 
and World Bank, and should therefore be good news to potential foreign investors who 
may wish to take advantage of the opportunities opening up in the South African 
economy due to the government's commitment to privatisation and relaxation of 
exchange controls- to mention but two. 
3.3.2.2 The legal framework 
The legal framework is one of the key determinants of FDI. In our discussion of the 
determinants of FDI (in chapter 2), it was mentioned that a number of developing 
countries and countries in transition enacted new legislation ( e.g. privatisation laws, 
regulations providing for the removal of capital controls) during the 1980s and 1990s 
with the aim of creating a (legal) environment conducive to foreign investment. This is 
not surprising because, as Elster111 explains, laws and regulations matter for economic 
performance insofar as they promote the values of stability, accountability, credibility and 
predictability. 
In South Africa the laws and regulations of relevance to trade and investment include the 
Customs and Excise Act of 1964; Import and Export Control Act of 1963; Board on 
Tariffs and Trade Act of 1992; Industrial Development Act of 1940; Maintenance and 
Promotion of Competition Act of 1979; Marketing Act of 1968; Export Credit and 
Foreign Investments Reinsurance Act of 1957; Copyright Act of 1978; Convention on 
Agency in the International Sale of Goods Act of 1986; Agricultural Product Standards 
Act of 1990; Liquor Products Act of 1989; Sugar Act of 1978; State Tender Board Act 
109 Ibid. 
110 Department of Finance, Growth, Employment and Redistribution: A macroeconomic strategy, p.3. 
111 Jon Elster, 'The impact of constitutions on economic performance', in Proceedings of the World Bank 
Annual Conference on Development Economics 1994, The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, The World Bank, Washington DC, 1995, p.209. Elster discusses how various 
components, institutions and procedures in a constitutional democracy impact on economic performance 
and the trade-offs involved. For instance, Elster at p.217 suggests that there is conventional wisdom to 
the effect that (a) social rights promote social security, while at the same time they (social rights) may 
undermine economic efficiency; and (b) that economic rights promote economic efficiency, while at the 
same time they may undermine economic security. See however the criticism ofElster's propositions by 
"co'mments" made by Adam Przeworski at p227 et seq. and Pranab Bardham at p.232 et seq. in ibid. on 
Elster's paper supra. 
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of 1968; Guidelines for the General Export Incentive Scheme (GEIS) and the final 
Constitution (Act 108 of 1996). Among these, the more important are the Customs and 
Excise Act, the Import and Export Control Act, the Board on Tariffs and Trade Act, and 
the Constitution. 
The Customs and Excise Act provides the enabling legislation for tariffs, other import 
charges, including surcharges and antidumping andcountervailing duties, and duty 
refunds and rebates. /The Minister of Finance may amend the relevant Schedules to the 
Act with amendments published in the Government Gazette and reported once a year t~ 
Parliament, where they are subject to ratification. The Act also makes provision for 
appeals, to the High Court if necessary, on customs valuation and tariff decisions. The 
Import and Export Control Act provides statutory authority for quantitative b,order 
controls, with regulations issued by the Department of Agriculture and Land Affairs on 
products of concern to the latter. 
The new Board on Tariffs and Trade Act changed the name of the Board from the Board 
of Trade and Industry and specified its functions more clearly. The Act defines dumping 
and subsidisation with respect to imports, as well as disruptive competition, and provides 
that regulations relating to anti-dumping and countervailing action be issued by the 
Minister of Trade and Industry. Previously the Board made recommendations to the 
Minister of Finance. Under the amended Act, the Minister of Trade and Industry assumes 
responsibility for the determination of action against unfair trading practices, in effect 
giving the Minister greater authority and allowing for co-ordination with overall trade 
policy. However, Customs and Excise Act still provides for the implementation of the 
relevant duties of the Minister.of Finance. 
One of the important issues about a legal framework to an investor, is the position, nature 
and scope of property rights thereof. According to Schmidt-Hebbel et al,112 from a 
practical point of view, the formal definition of property rights must be complemented by 
a judicial system that guarantees their effective enforcement. In other words, 'the lack of 
112 Klaus Schidmt-Hebbel, Luis Serven and Andre Solimano, 'Saving and Investment: Paradigms, Puzzles, 
Policies', in The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 11., February 1996, p.107. 
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impartial mechanisms to resolve contractual disputes increases the costs of doing 
business by increasing the probability that contracts will not be respected and that 
expenses such as bribes will become necessary to enforce them' .113 Needless to mention 
that FDI is likely to be fostered in a legal environment that guarantees and protects 
property rights, and provides mechanisms to enforce them.114 
Now, in the case of South Africa the most important piece of legislation is the 
Constitution. The final Constitution115 guarantees certain fundamental rights, including 
the right to property (s25), right of access to court (s34), administrative justice (s33), and 
the right to economic activity (s22). Although the Constitution provides for 
expropriation of property (in s25(2)), it also sets out the grounds upon which such state 
action could be undertaken (see s25(2)(a),(b) and (3)), and the remedies (see s33(3)(a), 
(b) available to an aggrieved party for instance. As can be seen, the present and future 
trade and investment laws and regulations would be measured up against the dictates of 
the supreme law, thus guaranteeing to persons (both natural and juristic) a measure of 
protection, predictability and stability. 
In addition to these domestic laws and regulations, South Africa is also party to a host of 
multilateral and bilateral agreements/arrangements that may have an impact on its trade 
and investment policies. On multilateral bases, South Africa was a founding member of 
the GA TT and has participated in all subsequent rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. 
South Africa has accepted the MTN Tokyo Round Agreements on Customs Valuation 
and Import Licensing. 116 [In 1993] South Africa had observer status in the MTN 
Agreement on Government Procurement, Subsidies and Countervailing Action and Anti-
Dumping. 117 This country also participates in the International Dairy Agreement and the 
Arrangement on Bovine Meat, but not in the Multifibre Arrangement. 118 
I 13 Ibid. 
114 This point is also made by Paul Krugman, 'Changes in Capital Markets for developing Countries', in 
Baker et al (eds.), op cit 47. 
115 Act 108 of 1996. 




In addition to commodity arrangement in the GATT/WTO, South Africa is a member of 
the International Wheat Council and the International Cotton Advisory Committee. It has 
also acceded to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Montreal Protocol on Chlorofluorocarbons. 119 
On bilateral bases, in addition to the Southern African Customs Union, South Africa has 
trade agreements with Zimbabwe (since 1964 -but has since expired and a new one is 
been considered) and Malawi (1990, replacing a 1967 agreement). 120 South Africa also 
grants unilateral tariff concessions on certain imports from Mozambique and Turkey. 
The agreement with Zimbabwe applied only to imports into South Africa, while the 
Malawi agreement allows duty-free imports of all goods grown, produced or 
manufactured in Malawi. 121 Some Central and Eastern European countries that concluded 
bilateral trade agreements with South Africa during the course of 1990 and 1991 include, 
Hungary, Romania and Poland. The GNU has further signed trade and co-operation 
agreements with countries such as Libya, Iran, Brunei, Malaysia, India and the People's 
Republic of China. 
As can be seen, the legal framework for trade and investment in South Africa is quite 
extensive and covers many areas. Such an elaborate legal framework guarantees certainty 
and predictability(?), the two elements that are important to foreign investors. 
3.4 Concluding remarks 
Although South Africa faces huge macroeconomic problems ( attributed to apartheid, 
international isolation, etc.) which may be stumbling blocks to trade and investment 
flows into this country, nevertheless, this country stands to gain from re-entry into the 
international community and market-opening policies enshrined in the GATT/WTO 
system. The challenge for policy makers is to see what appropriate interventions could 
be implemented to remove existing stumbling blocks to trade and investment, while at the 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid., p.50. 
121 Ibid. 
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same time maximising the potential that exists; and that is the subject of chapter four to 
which we now turn. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE 'NEW' SOUTH 
AFRICA: POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
4.1 Introductory Remarks 
100 
The world trading system is currently undergoing profound changes in trade and 
investment patterns, as well as in regional integration arrangements. These changes are 
poised to influence the position of South Africa and the role it may play in the world 
economy of the 1990s and beyond. The challenge for South African policy-makers is to 
understand these changes and patterns, and forces behind them, as a basis for developing 
the ability to respond constructively and positively. In this chapter, we seek to explore 
some policy issues and/or recommendations that may maximise the opportunities 
provided by the new world trading environment. We will also consider those that could 
minimise the potential negative effects arising from increased world competition for trade 
and investment flows. It should always be borne in mind however, that the effectiveness 
of such policy recommendations will depend in large part on South Africa's efforts to 
adjust to the new opportunities and challenges of the international trading environment. 
However, owing to space constraints and the complex nature of the issues under 
discussion in this and previous chapters, our discussion of various policy implications (in 
this chapter) must necessarily be brief and introductory in nature, and more so because 
some policy implications have already been alluded to in the previous three chapters. 
4.2 Policy implications in the international context 
4.2.1 The Results of the Uruguay Round 
The end of the Uruguay Round (UR) of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and the advent 
of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have brought pressure to bear on many a 
country to liberalise trade and to open their markets to international capital. In pursuance 
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of its obligations under the WTO, South Africa will also be obliged to open up its 
markets to international competitors in various sectors. This country is likely to suffer 
from these market-opening pressures when, for instance, its gains from mining exports 
are competed away by mining exports from the former Soviet Union, and when other 
industrialised and NIC markets become competitive and efficient producers of products 
in which South Africa may have comparative advantage. 
This problem is not only confined to South Africa, but also to other developing countries 
of the 'Third World' .1 In the context of Arab countries (and this applies to South Africa 
too), Zarrouk2 advises (rather paradoxically) that a durable solution (to an erosion of 
possible comparative advantage due to international competition) should be pursued by 
taking advantage of world market openings as a result of the UR. The learned writer 
suggests that these policies be pursued through a diversification strategy aiming at the 
wider perspectives of trade liberalisation with respect to more quality products that are 
competitive in world markets. The learned writer's policy advise is predicated upon the 
widespread belief that the positive results of the UR with respect to market access are 
likely to favour outward oriented developing countries with more efficient and diversified 
production structures at the cost of those relying on trade preferences for their market 
access.3 
However, Bell4 argues that comprehensive import liberalisation in the case of South 
Africa, may aggravate existing macro-economic problems ( e.g. unemployment and trade 
balance). Consequently, the learned writer suggests that comprehensive tariff reductions 
(in order to liberalise imports for instance), must await a substantial improvement in the 
performance of the economy, so that they can be implemented without the danger of 
foreign exchange or fiscal crises, or intolerable effects on output and employment in 
1 See Trevor Bell, 'Should South Africa further liberalise it's foreign trade?', in Economic Trends Research 
Group, Development Policy Research Unit, Working Paper No. 16., UCT, Rondebosch, 1992, p.33. 
2 Jamal Zarrouk, 'Policy implications ofthe Uruguay- Round for Arab countries', in Said El-Naggar (ed.), 
The Uruguay Round and the Arab Countries, IMF., Washington DC., 1996, p.88. See also Tsediso 
Matona, 'From GA TT to the World Trade Organisation: opportunities and constraints for South Africa', 
in Trade Monitor, Vol. 9., June 1995, p.18. 
3 Ibid. 
4 <;)p cit 29-30. 
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import-competing industries.5 In other words, as far as Bell is concerned, improved 
economic performance is a prerequisite for further import-liberalisation , and that 
comprehensive tariff reductions are not only a necessary condition for such an 
improvement but conflict with it.6 Bell's argument would suggest that it is upon the 
government therefore to mobilise all the resources at its disposal to realise the objectives 
of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), before it can embrace 
comprehensive import liberalisation in pursuit of its obligations under the WTO. 
As far as liberalisation of trade in services is concerned Zarrouk7 is of the opinion that the 
crucial policy issue of opening domestic markets (in casu, South African markets) to 
foreign service suppliers should be best dealt with by assessing whether there are 
efficiency gains that a country stands to reap as firms and customers obtain access to 
lower cost and higher-quality services. The learned writer maintains that when services 
are used as intermediate inputs in the production of goods (for instance, financial services 
and shipping), the access to lower-cost and higher quality services should increase the 
competitiveness of domestic producers of goods on world markets.8 
In the opinion of Brown et al,9 an open policy adopted by South Africa towards inward 
foreign service investment should provide for some exceptions, and that a future South 
African investment code (if finally adopted?) should give the Minister power to exclude 
foreign investors from participating in certain activities. The learned writers cite the case 
of Namibia (which enacted a new investment code in December 1990) which excludes 
foreign investors from participating in activities such as hair dressing and retail trading. 10 
The reason for this (in Namibia) was that there was concern that some very small 
investments might be made by foreigners in businesses that could perfectly well be 
carried on by Namibians who might not have had many other opportunities. 11 This 
5 Ibid., 34. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Op cit 90. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Roland Brown, Mike Faber and Max Sisulu, 'Policies towards inward foreign investment', in Raphael 




concern will be acute in South Africa given the fact that apartheid had deliberately 
excluded the majority of South Africans from meaningful participation not only in 
mainstream economic activity but also in small businesses. 
Brown et al maintain further that in other countries foreign investors are excluded from 
participating in financial institutions, defence industries and the media. 12 When (if at all) 
South Africa adopts an investment code, South African policy makers would therefore be 
faced with a challenge of having to make a selection of those activities, businesses and 
services from which foreign investors will be excluded, while at the same time ensuring 
that domestic participation in those activities, businesses and services will best promote 
efficiency, competition and economic empowerment (particularly of the previously 
excluded). 
One of the crucial issues addressed by the UR is subsidies; a wi~ely used instrument of 
industrial policy for promoting national industries. The new Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures restricts the freedom of a country to use export subsidies. 13 The 
Agreement lists three categories of industry subsidies: prohibited ( export subsidies), 
actionable, and non-actionable. According to this Agreement, only nonactionable 
subsidies, which include subsidies for research and development (R&D) activities and aid 
for industries in disadvantaged regions of a country, are not prohibited and are non-
actionable. All other specific production subsidies (that are not tied to exports) when 
limited to certain enterprises are actionable. 14 In the circumstances, South Africa will be 
obliged to consider adjustment toward curtailing schemes (such as GEIS,) for export 
oriented enterprises. In such circumstances, Zarrouk advises that policy should be 
directed at rationalising these schemes 'by gradually replacing sectoral subsidies to 
12 Ibid. See also Sheila Page and Michael Davenport, World Trade Reform: Do Developing Countries Gain 
or Lose?, Overseas Development Institute, Special Report, London, 1994, pp. 70-71 where the learned 
writers discuss ways in which a country's treatment of services can be brought under the WTO. _For 
instance, a country can make a decision whether a service will be opened to international regulation, i.e. 
incorporated in a country's offer at all. Page and Davenport say that for those which are, a country can 
register any of three types of control: restrictions on market access, limitations on national treatment of 
the supplier, or derogations from the rule of MFN among suppliers. In other words, it should be possible 
to avoid a country's services industries and to retain the right to increase current control or by imposing 
and registering strict regulations. 
13 See ibid., p. l 0. See also Zarrouk loc cit. 
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encourage exports with more horizontal subsidies, such as support for the development of 
national research capabilities to foster the long-term diversification of comparative 
advantage in the manufacturing sector'. 15 
The South African government plans to terminate the General Export Incentive Scheme 
(GEIS) on 31 December 1997, in compliance with its commitments under the WTO. As 
Bell 16 explains, such a decision may have to be taken in the context of the overall 
economic performance, so that we avoid exacerbating the current structural problems of 
the South African economy: recession and unemployment for instance. In the meantime, 
as Clark has suggested,17 both government and private sector should find ways and 
means of increasing their expenditure in R&D, in the same way as other countries such as 
Korea have done. 
The new regulatory framework of the WTO 18 poses new challenges for policy-makers in 
South Africa. In order to limit the possibility of a real negative impact on domestic 
industries (as a result of increasing imports following increased import liberalisation), the 
government needs to adopt regulatory measures and procedures that conform to the UR 
agreements. Zarrouk suggests the following three: 19 'First, there is a need to put into 
place antidumping and cofmtervailing laws as well as customs valuation procedures that 
conform to the UR agreements. Second, there will be a need to develop an administrative 
capacity to administer these laws through 'trade remedies' machinery, to conduct material 
injury inquiries related to antidumping and countervailing duties actions as well as 
invocation of safeguard measures'. 20 
14 Zarrouk, ibid. 
15 Ibid., p.90. Bell op cit 35 also seems to suggest that a 'piecemeal' downward curtailment of subsidies (to 
promote import liberalisation) should be preferable, BUT points out that such further import 
liberalisation should be effected 'as and when economic conditions permit, as has in fact been adopted in 
most other countries, including ...... Korea and Turkey .... ' 
16 Ibid. 
17 J.B. Clark, 'The intraregional transfer of technology', in Africa Insight, Vol.21., 1991, pp.19-20. 
18 For a discussion of this new regulatory framework (trade policy reviews, dispute settlement, safeguards, 
anti-dumping etc.) see Page and Davenport op cit 91-100. See also Jesus Seade, 'Results of the Uruguay 
Round', in Said El-Naggar op cit 19. Zarrouk op cit 66. 
19 Zarrouk, ibid., p.91. 
20 See also Matona op cit 19. 
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Now, South Africa has already in place trade laws and regulations ( e.g., Customs and 
Excise Act of 1964, Import and Export Control Act of 1963, Board on Tariffs and Trade 
Act of 1992) designed to achieve policies recommended by Zarrouk above. The problem 
with all these trade laws and regulations however, is that they are far too complex; 
maybe a more simplified and streamlined code is desirable. 
The third policy recommendation by Zarrouk21 is that a country like South Africa, in 
pursuance of future multilateral trade negotiations especially in services, should foster 
'expertise of national trade administration in collecting adequate national statistical data 
and conducting related analyses, to enable the government to identify national trade 
interests accurately and develop a corresponding trade policy strategy' .22 
4.2.2 Trading with the European Union 
The European Union (EU) (which is about a quarter of South Africa's export market23) is 
very important to South Africa and the reasons for concentrating on it (EU) are manifold: 
many countries in the Union (e.g. the UK, Germany) are traditional trading partners of 
South Africa; South Africa has already adopted EU product standards, and this country 
has recognised the need to access EU markets;24 and Europe (Western) is perceived as a 
good base for developing further trade with the EFT A states and eastern and central 
Europe. Further, closer trade relations with the EU is perceived by South Africa as a 
grand opportunity for accessing not only markets, but also technology, finance and 
foreign investment funds/capital. 
21 Loe cit. 
22 Matona Joe cit explains that 'the South African Department of Trade and Industry's GATT 
section is inadequately staffed, needs technical expertise, is in insufficient co-ordination with the Board 
on Tariffs and Trade and other relevant government departments, and has a poor liaison and image with 
the business, academic, legal, and media communities affected by GATT/WTO matters. In all these 
respects, South Africa compares unfavourably with other countries similarly situated vis-a-vis the GATT, 
such as Australia and New Zealand'. In the light of these findings it is doubtful whether the Board on 
Tariffs and Trade will be able to steer South Africa's trade policy and administration in the right 
direction. 
23 Robert Swain, 'The European communities and South Africa - new threats, new opportunities', in Gavin 





It is stating the obvious, that one of the critical policy issues South Africa will have to 
grapple with, is what shape should the trade relationship between this country and the EU 
take. A closely related policy issue is whether South Africa should open the debate and 
apply for a new classification i.e. from 'developed' (as is presently the case within the 
GATT/WTO framework) to 'developing' status. The latter policy issue is important as 
the (re-)classification of South Africa will determine to a great extent its trade relations 
within the GATT/WTO framework, and (for present purposes), with the EU.25 
There are six possible trade regimes that have been proposed to govern future South 
Africa - EU trade relations, viz. (a) Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status within the 
GATT/WTO framework, (b) the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), a non-
reciprocal association agreement, ( d) associate Lome membership, ( e) full Lome 
membership, and (f) a reciprocal association agreement.26 
We tum to discuss briefly each of these proposals to see what options are available to 
South Africa and what the policy implications are. 
4.2:2.1 Most Favoured Nation Status 
The trade regime between South Africa and the EU based on the MFN principle27 within 
the GATT/WTO framework would be the simplest one to adopt, and no special action 
would be required in or out of GATT/WTO,28 where South Africa is still classified as a 
'developed' country.29 However, according to Holland,30 this trade regime would simply 
25 See ibid., p.13. See also Sheila Page and Christopher Stevens, Trading with South Africa: The Policy 
Options for the EC, Overseas Development Institute, Special Report, London, 1992, p.7. 
26 Page and Stevens, ibid., p.4. See also Martin Holland, 'From pariah to partner: relations with the EU,' in 
Greg Mills (ed.), From Pariah to Participant: South Africa's evolving Foreign Relations 1990-1994, The 
South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, with assistance from the Standard Bank 
Foundation, April 1994, p.134. 
27 MFN principle is based on the GA TT principle/rule of non-discrimination. In terms of this principle, no 
GATT member state(s) should grant some members or group of members preferential treatment over the 
others. For example, if one GATT member decides to lower its tariffs against products of another GATT 
member, then such bilateral tariff reductions are automatically extended to other countries. In other 
words, if a country lowers its tariffs against imports from a certain country in order to gain access to that 
other country's market it has to lower its tariff on all such imports regardless from which GATT member 
they come. 
28 Page and Stevens op cit 12. 
29 Swain op cit 14. 
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reassert the economic status quo, and will fail to provide any extra support to South 
Africa's efforts to develop new exports.31 Page and Stevens,32 as well as Holland,33 
believe that the MFN arrangement will do nothing to address South Africa's development 
needs (spelt out in the RDP and the macroeconomic strategy) and will fail to stimulate 
European investment, and continue to hinder the intra-regional production of exports to 
the EU. As Page and Stevens34 explain, 'it is important that any agreement between the 
[EU] and South Africa does not limit the scope for intra-regional trade and production, 
particularly at this time when the Southern African countries need to foster greater 
economic co-operation that ever before'. 
4.2.2.2 The Generali.sed System of Preferences 
Page and Stevens35 argue that if South Africa is offered preferences under GSP, the EU 
(and any other industrial country which offered GSP) 'would be placing South Africa at 
an advantage relative to its present status and relative to those developed countries (the 
US, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand) with which it does not have association 
agreements'. Holland36 on the other hand, argues that the effects of a GSP trade regime 
would be difficult to assess, more so because the EU's GSP is currently under review,37 
and also because (of South Africa's isolation) there is no GSP precedent to go by in 
allocating country/product pairs38 which is judged on past performance.39 In any event, 
30 Loe cit. 
31 See also Page and Stevens Joe cit. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Loe cit. 
34 Loe cit. 
35 Op cit 13. 
36 Loe cit. 
37 See also Page and Stevens op cit 12. 
38 Page and Stevens, ibid., say that the European Commission's proposals to restructure the EU's GSP 
would replace the existing system with one in which there would be three possible treatments for each 
product/ country pair: 
*duty-free entry without quantitative restrictions for most goods; 
*reduction in the MFN duty (without quantitative restrictions) for products which are recognised as 
being sensitive; 
*exclusion, pure and simple, of product/country pairs which cannot be fitted into either of the above 
categories, either because the product is extremely sensitive or because it is not possible to reduce 
the duty sufficiently to provide an acceptable margin of preference (EC, 1990: 11)'. 
39 Ibid., p.13. 
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like the MFN, the GSP provides few advantages beyond South Africa's existing position, 
and Holland recommends that this trade regime be chosen only if other more preferential 
options prove impossible to negotiate. 40 
4.2.2.3 A non-reciprocal association agreement 
The term 'non-reciprocal association agreement' is used to describe an agreement such as 
the EU has negotiated with most of the Mediterranean states.41 This trade regime will 
benefit South Africa in the sense that it would increase the scope for tailoring the 
preferences to this country's particular needs and capacities without imposing the same 
obligations on South Africa.42 However, this regime is fraught with difficulties. For 
instance, it could damage the interests of any non-associated developing or developed 
country, 'in absolute or real terms', and 'might not provide the trade support to a new 
South Africa' during the early days of its young democracy .43 In the long term, it could 
exclude products that become important exports to South Africa in which this country 
may gain comparative advantage. Finally, greater opposition to this trade regime could 
mount from groups in the EU on the grounds that it (this trade regime) does not provide 
for reciprocity.44 45 
4.2.2.4 Associate Lome membership 
Under this trade regime, a bilateral agreement with South Africa is envisaged, that would 
include all the trade provisions of the Lome Convention, including cumulation with ACP 
production for the purposes of the rules of origin, except for a negative list of specific 
exemptions, but not the non-trade elements.46 However, there is no precedent for such a 
40 Holland Joe cit. For a discussion of the problems which South Africa and the region may experience 
should the former be granted GSP, see Page and Stevens, ibid. See also Swain Joe cit. 




45 The other principle upon which the GATT is based is one of reciprocity. In terms of this principle, when 
one country lowers its tariffs against another's imports, it can expect the other country to lower its tariffs 
in return. 
46 Page and Stevens op cit 15. 
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status, and Holland argues that this option seems unlikely to be considered seriously, as 
'no one has really specified what such a relationship would amount t to, or how it might 
differ from full [Lome] membership or a bilateral association agreement'. ~7 
4.2.2.5 Full Lome membership 
The granting of full Lome membership to South Africa could be a valuable trade option48 
and would benefit this country in a number of respects. First, this trade regime would 
probably offer the greatest trade preferences to this country49 as the degree of preferences 
given to the ACP (under Lome) is the most substantial offered by the EU on a non-
reciprocal basis to any group of states, although less than is offered in reciprocal 
agreements like that with EFT A. 50 Second, South African membership would assist 
regional co-operation ( e.g. allow regional processing51 ) by placing this country on the 
same economic plateau with the EU as the other SADC states. 52 Third, the Lome 
Convention provides preferences over a wide range, an important consideration should 
South Africa be able to diversify its production, and thus be in a better position to access 
the important EU export market (which access would be nominally guaranteed (under 
Lome)) for the remainder of this century.53 
The argument against membership focuses again on South Africa's imprecise 
developed/developing classification. 54 As a matter of fact, South Africa's GDP would put 
it well above the other now 70 Lome states, and the commodities for which trade 
preferences are available would give South Africa an advantage over other Lome 
states.This trade regime is likely to meet with resistance from certain member states 
offering similar agricultural products.55 Holland claims that the SYSMIN56 and 
47 Holland Joe cit. 
48 Page and Stevens Joe cit. 
49 Holland loc cit. 
50 Page and Stevens Joe cit. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Holland toe cit. 
53 Page and Stevens op cit 15-16. 
54 Holland Joe cit. 
55 Ibid. 
56 SYS MIN and ST ABEX are commodity price stabilisation funds/programmes within the Lome 
/ 
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STABEX57 Lome schemes could not financially accommodate South Africa; but perhaps 
most crucially of all, to gain accession to the Lome Convention, South Africa would need 
the unanimous assent of all the other 70 signatories as well as the EU' s agreement. 58 As 
far as Holland is concerned, it is far from certain that all other Lome countries would be 
willing to allow South Africa to join.59 
4.2.2.6 A reciprocal association agreement 
This trade regime would be based on more of less the same terms as those existing 
between the EU on the one hand and countries like Israel and other EFT A states on the 
other.60 A reciprocal association agreement would take the form of a free trade agreement 
geared specifically to South Africa's needs. 61 
According to Page and Stevens, this regime is best adapted to the 'developed country' 
aspect of South Africa.62 The learned writers maintain that this agreement will go a long 
way to helping strengthen the South African government's hand in p~suing its trade 
liberalisation policy.63 However, the learned writers caution that this regime could be 
open to challenge under GATT/WTO 'because it would be neither a special non-
reciprocal concession to a developing country nor a preliminary to full EC 
membership. ' 64 
The reciprocal association agreement is not problem-free. There are possible adverse 
consequences for both developing country and EU producer interests. For instance, the 
Convention that provide ACP countries with minimum prices for specific primary products. SYSMIN 
covers mineral production/exports (for copper, phosphate, bauxite, alumina, manganese, iron ore and 
tin). Article 49 of the Lome Convention provides the legal framework for SYSMIN. 
57 ST ABEX is a similar scheme designed to stabilise earnings from specific agricultural primary products. 
Article 23 of the Lome Convention provides the legal framework for STABEX. (For footnotes 56 supra 
and 57 see also Alan Hirsch, 'The external environment and the South African trade policy debate', in 
Economic Trends Research Group, Development Policy Research Unit, Working Paper No. 13., UCT, 
Rondebosch, 1992, p.19. 
58 Holland Joe cit. See also Swain loc cit. Hirsch, ibid. 
59 Holland, ibid. . 
60 Page and Stevens op cit I 3. 
61 Holland Joe cit. 
62 Page and Stevens Joe cit. 
63 Ibid., p.14. 
64 Ibid. 
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eligibility of South Africa for this agreement (and other options other than MFN status) 
would first of all be dependent on the submission to GATT /WTO, and while the SACU 
remains, any agreement (geared towards trade liberalisation) by South Africa would also 
extend to the SACU countries of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, (and any 
additional members).65 Holland states that the EU Commission's External Economic 
Directorate has argued strongly in favour of this trade regime in keeping with the EU's 
commitment to trade liberalisation and competition. 66 The current trade negotiations 
under way between South Africa and the EU seem to be based upon the principles of a 
free trade agreement with reciprocal obligations.67 Now, in the quest for a better deal with 
the EU, South African policy- and decision-makers should guard against jeopardising 
existing and emerging trade links with neighbouring African countries, East Asia and 
Eastern Europe.68 
4.2.3 Trading with the United States of America 
The US is a powerful member of one of the most important trading blocs in the Western 
hemisphere, NAFT A. 69 It is envisaged that this regional trading arrangement could 
possibly be extended to include other Latin American countries.70 The Enterprise for the 
Americas Initiative (EAI),7 1 which aims to achieve a free trade zone for the entire 
Western hemisphere,72 could lead to stronger formal economic links between the US and 
several Latin American countries.73 
65 Ibid. See also Swain Joe cit. 
66 Holland op cit 135. 
67 The SABC 1 TV News at 19h30 on 27 January 1997 reported that, at the trade negotiations meeting 
between the EU and South Africa, held on 26 January 1997 in Gauteng (South Africa), the former 
offered to open its markets to the latter's products faster than the other way round. 
68 This suggestion is made by Hirsch op cit 20. 
69 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) comprises the US, Canada and Mexico. 
70 Hirsch op cit 18. See also World Economic and Financial Surveys, 'International Trade Policies: The 
Uruguay Round and Beyond', Volume II, Background Papers prepared by the team led by Naheed 
Kirmani, IMF, Washington DC., I 994, p.92 (hereinafter 'Kirmani et al'). 
71 Launched by the former US republican president, George Bush. 
72 Kirmani et al op cit 115. 
73 Hirsch Joe cit. 
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Hirsch maintains that such an arrangement could have serious negative implications for 
developing countries (like South Africa) hoping to export to the US, 'as they will 
increasingly be forced to compete at a severe disadvantage with what will probably 
become the new hinterland of the US'. 74 The learned writer argues that in such an 
arrangement, the US will favour its NAFTA partners with trade access and investment (to 
the detriment of developing 'outsiders' like South Africa?). 
Notwithstanding these potential setbacks, the US (under President Bill Clinton) seems to 
have adopted a benevolent attitude towards South Africa as far as trade and investment 
are concerned, more so in the wake of the latter's transition to democratic majority rule. 
The existing 'bi-national commission' co-chaired by Deputy-State President Thabo 
Mbeki and Vice-President Al Gore is a case in point. However, it is not clear whether 
this 'cordial' relationship between the US and South Africa will last when the euphoria of 
transition settles down in South Africa, or when/if a new Republican President enters the 
White House. 
Any country having or hoping to establish (formal) trade links with the US, should 
always take into account a myriad of US statutes which govern that country's trade and 
investment policies. Various US trade statutes espouse the principle of non-
discrimination as the fundamental principle upon which the US will do business with 
other countries. 75 
The US principle of non-discrimination was first described in the 1934 Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act, and was extended in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The latter Act 
was intended to strengthen 'economic relations with foreign countries through the 
development of open and non-discriminatory trading' .76 The US continued to advocate 
non-discriminatory policies in the Trade Act of 1974 and 1984. For instance, section 
104A of the 1984 Trade Act called for non-discrimination in three areas, viz. services, 
foreign direct investment and high technology practices, and specified national treatment 
74 Ibid. 
75 Edward A. Laing, 'Equal access/non-discrimination and legitimate discrimination in international 
economic law', in Wisconsin International Law Journal, Vol. 14., Spring 1996, p.266. 
76 Ibid., 266-267. 
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as the required standard.77 By this standard, treatment equivalent to that accorded to 
nationals must be accorded to US traders by foreign nations. 78 
Perhaps a far m(?re worrying factor about US trade legislation is the power of 
unilateralism79 which the US wields through the Trade Act of 1974 and 1984, as well as 
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. 80 Looking first at the 1974 Trade 
Act; the equivalent of section 301 ( of the 1974 Trade Act) in the United States Code 
(Title 19) requires action if the US Trade Representative determines that the foreign 
country 'deprived the US of its trade agreements rights', and/or an act, policy or practice 
of a foreign country 'violates US trade agreements rights' or 'unjustifiably burdens US 
commerce' .81 
In terms of this legislation, US mandatory action consists of suspension, withdrawal, or 
non-application of trade agreement benefits; duties (the preferred remedy), fees or other 
restrictions; and agreements to improve the situation in specified ways.82 Further, the 
Trade Representative may take action if/when (according to the US Code's version of the 
1984 Trade Act), a foreign country is designated as having embarked on a conduct that is 
in 'violation of, or is inconsistent with the international legal rights of the US', and that 
such conduct denies national or MFN treatment to US trade and investment, or the right 
to the establishment or protection of intellectual property rights.83 
As far as the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act is concerned, this Act 
introduced a new provision to counter any alleged unfairness toward US trade interests. 
Popularly known as 'special 301 ', this provision allows the US Trade Representative to 
name countries that 'deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual property 
rights' or 'fair and equitable access for [US] persons that rely on intellectual property 
77 Ibid., 267. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Which according to Hirsch, ibid. p.22 is entirely illegitimate in the GATT/WTO framework, which the 
US uses anyway because of its economic power, and the dependence of so many countries on the US as 
a market for exports. 
80 Hirsch, ibid., p.2 l. 
81 Laing op cit 305. 
82 Ibid., fn 315 thereto. 




The Trade Representative is further allowed to identify countries termed 
'priority foreign countries', which must be perceived as having the most egregious 
conduct. 
85 
Factors that are taken into account to determine the seriousness of the conduct 
include 'the extent of adverse impact on US products, the failure to enter into good faith 
negotiations, and failure to make significant progress in bilateral or multilateral ' 
negotiations'. 86 
As can be seen, the main objective of these and similar US trade statutes is 'to pry open 
insulated markets, or defend against unfair subsidies, ' 87 while at the same time ensuring 
that the US ends up with a lion's share of the world's markets.88 'Special 301' or a similar 
statute is bad news to developing countries like South Africa. In the case of South Korea, 
'special 301' was so effectively used that, once one of the biggest rice exporting countries 
to the US, South Korea became one of the biggest importers ofrice from the US.89 A 
scenario closer to home, was when the US threatened to take all sorts of unilateral 
retaliatory measures against South Africa in the wake of a proposed arms sale by the 
latter to Syria.90 
Now, South Africa under the leadership of the ANC has pledged undying solidarity and 
continued economic links with countries such as Fidel Castro's Cuba and Gadaffi's 
Libya, in full view of American campaign to 'punish' these 'regimes'. Whether the 
relationship with these or any other 'priority foreign country' will jeopardise South 
Africa's trade relations with the US is still a matter to be investigated. 
84 Ibid., 307. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. Although 'super 30 l' expired in 1990, Laing says that there have been persistent congressional 
efforts to re-enact section 301. 
87 Hirsch op cit 22. 
88 Laing op cit 309. 
89 A fuller exposition of how this was carried out is provided by Walden Bello and Shea Cunningham, 
'Trade warfare and regional integration in the Pacific: the US, Japan and the Asian NI Cs', in Third 
World Quarterly, Vol. 15., September 1994, pp. 447 et seq. 
90 A country accused by the US of sponsoring 'international terrorism'. 
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4.3 Policy implications in the regional context 
The return of political stability in Southern Africa offers countries in the region many 
opportunities for trade and investment. It is anticipated that South Africa, the economic 
giant of the region, will play a leading role in ensuring economic revitalisation of this part 
of the world.91 Although writers on Southern Africa agree that South Africa, because of 
its economic power, would play a critical role in influencing trade and investment 
patterns in the region, they are however, not in agreement on how South Africa should 
play that role. While Cassim92 suggests that South Africa should play this role through the 
process of deeper integration of regional economies, Sethi93 argues that the solution to the 
economic problems of this region do not lie in deeper integration, but in economic co-
operation and co-ordination of projects and activities.94 Davies95 on the other hand 
suggests that a blend of these (economic integration, co-operation and co-ordination) 
'which can best advance the goals of contributing to growth and development' should be 
pursued. 
91 See Rachad Cassim, 'Rethinking economic integration in Southern Africa', in Trade Monitor, Vol. I 0., 
Trade Monitoring Project, September 1995, p.9. Iraj Abedian and Barry Standish, 'The way forward: 
policy guidelines for the 1990s', in Iraj Abedian and Barry Standish (eds.), Economic Growth in South 
Africa: Selected Policy Issues, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1992, p.225. Gavin Maasdorp, 'Th~ 
advantages and disadvantages of current regional institutions for integration', in Pauline H. Baker, Alex 
Boraine and Warren Krafchik (eds.), South Africa and the World Economy in the 1990s, David Phillip: 
Cape Town and Johannesburg, The Brookings Institutions: Washington DC., in association with IDASA 
and Aspen Institute, 1993, p.244 (hereinafter 'Baker et al (eds.)'). Robert Davies, 'The case for economic 
integration in Southern Africa', in Baker et al (eds.), ibid., p.218. This view was also shared by countries 
in the SADC and the Preferential Trade Area (PT A). 
92 Ibid., p.16. 
93 S. Prakash Sethi, 'A cautionary note on the prospect of regional economic integration in Southern 
Africa', in Baker et al (eds.), op cit 223. 
94 Davies op cit 217-8 suggests that the terms 'economic integration', 'economic co-operation', and 
'economic co-ordination' that are often (erroneously) used interchangeably, do in fact refer to different 
things. According to Davis, 'economic integration', refers to 'a process in which the economies of 
individual states are merged (in whole or in part) into a distinct entity - a regional economy'. As far as 
'economic co-operation' is concerned, it is 'a much more open-ended concept referring to a range of 
situations in which individual states act together for mutual benefit'. 'Economic co-ordination' on the 
other hand, 'refers to cases where policies, strategies or regulations are harmonised to bring them into 
line with those of partners, again in situations where this is seen to be of mutual benefit'. The learned 
writer points out that co-operation or co-ordination may or may not be undertaken with the aim of 
promoting economic integration. 
95 Ibid., p.219. 
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In its interaction with regional economies, South Africa should guard against abusing its 
economic power. On the contrary, and notwithstanding the constraints that South Africa 
faces domestically (e.g. gross inequalities within the country, chronic unemployment, 
lack of investment capital), this country should ensure that any form of regional 
programme must promote equity and balanced development.96 It is stating the obvious, 
that, the wider the disparity between South Africa and the rest of the regional economies, 
the bigger the impact (negative) would be on South Africa's resources. 
When South Africa enters into trade negotiations/agreements with the EU, the US and 
Asia for instance, it should endeavour to balance the potential economic benefits of these 
agreements against the political costs of excluding its neighbours from these 
agreements. 97 Cassim98 explains that there is some concern that any kind of trade 
agreement that South Africa concludes with countries outside the region will obstruct the 
process of regional integration in Southern Africa.99 
On a more practical note, Sethi 100 recommends that, the best course of action for the 
region (in which South Africa can play a meaningful role, given its developed 
infrastructure, technical know-how, etc.) lies in 
'creating project-based strategic alliances where major capital-intensive industrial projects and 
physical infrastructure are collectively developed, organised and managed, on the basis of 
considerations of scale economies of production, unifonn product standards, a large tariff free 
internal market, and political guarantees of non-intervention on the part of national governments'. 
According to Sethi, 'these projects would have to be justified by productive efficiencies 
and distributive fairness'. 101 The learned writer points out that, projects that by their very 
native are best developed on a regional basis, e.g. common highway and railroad, 
'would be operated by professional management under common regional political oversight and with 
96 Point made by Cassim loc cit. 
97 Ibid., p.15. See also Vishnu Padayachee and Enver Motala, 'Regional development in the post-cold war 
era', in Minnie Venter (ed.), Prospects for Progress: Critical Choices for Southern Africa, Maskew 
Miller Longman, Cape Town, 1994, pp.76 et seq. 
98 Ibid. , 
99 For a discussion of the potential hardships that regional economies will face, should South Africa 
conclude an FT A with the EU for instance, see ibid. See also supra discussion under 4.2.2. 
100 Loe cit. 
101 Ibid. 
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investment capital raised in private markets and subject to the criteria of commercial feasibility'. 102 
The "'examples of how these projects can be managed, organised and co-ordinated are the 
Maputo corridor, 103 the proposed Benguela corridor104 and the Lesotho Highlands Water 
· Project. 105 
The other critical issues that countries in the region should consider, is the possibility of 
harmonising their investment laws. This is important, as, without harmonisation of 
investment policies, the countries of the region will inevitably compete against each other 
by offering increasingly generous incentives to foreign investors, which will be to the 
detriment of the region as a whole. 106 A more balanced pattern of foreign investment 
would help strengthen weaker economies in the region and ensure a more balanced 
development process. 
4.4 Policy implications in the national context 
Many of the policy implications for fostering FDI in the 'new' South Africa have already 
been noted in passing in this and previous chapters. This section concludes by bringing 
together the general arguments and putting forward suggestions that policy- and decision-
makers in this country could pursue in the quest for increased foreign-investment-flows. 
First, Padayachee107 has identified certain sectors in which little would be gained from 
more FDI. These are, mining and energy sectors, financial services and distribution 
( commerce, trade) activities,1°8 and labour-intensive industries. 109 However, the learned 
102 Ibid. 
103 The Maputo corridor joins South Africa's industrial heartland, Gauteng, with Maputo harbour in 
Mozambique. This project enjoys the co-operation of South Africa and Mozambique. 
104 The Benquela corridor is designed to connect South Africa and Botswana to Namibia. This project will 
greatly facilitate the exportation of Botswana products through Namibian ports. 
105 This project is been co-ordinated by both Lesotho and South Africa. For a fuller discussion of these and 
other infrastructural networks in the region, see Oliver S. Saasa, 'The effectiveness of the regional 
transport networks in Southern Africa: some post-apartheid perspectives', in Berti! Oden (ed.), Southern 
Africa After Apartheid: Regional Integration and External Resources, The Scandinavian Institute of 
African Studies, Uppsala, 1993, pp. 130 et seq. 
106 This point is made by Alan Hirsch, 'Prospects and policy implications', in Patrick Cull, Economic 
Growth and Foreign Investment in South Africa, IDASA, Cape Town, 1992, p.46. 
107 Vishnu Padayachee, 'Foreign capital and economic development in South Africa: recent trends and 
postapartheid prospects', in World Development, Vol. 23., February 1995, p. 173. 
108 Padayachee, ibid., seems to suggest that foreign investors will be excluded from participating in these 
services, as the government may wish to see the previously marginalised majority taking part in these 
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writer maintains that the industries that may benefit from FDI would include advanced 
engineering and electronics and high-tech industries in general. 110 According to 
Padayachee, the most appropriate type of FDI here will be those by innovation-driven 
'global firms', where the potential for indigenous development ( of all kinds) appears 
most strong. 111 
4.4.1 The role of the state 
One of the defining characteristics of technological· development in the 1990s, is the 
increasing role that governments of various countries are playing in fostering 
technological effort. 112 Wangwe 113 points out that governments have not only played a 
crucial role in forging new trade relations ( e.g. NAFT A, EU), but have also been 
instrumental in assisting firms to acquire international competitiveness. For instance, the 
. ..,. 
learned writer states that, in the OECD, 
'there is evidence of renewed interest in funding industrial research and development (R&D), with a 
shift from ensuring public funding on terms favourable to enterprises to greater emphasis on the 
organisation of capital markets and banking policies and the manner in which these influence finns' 
investment decisions'. 114 
It is clear that one policy implication for these patterns is that the government can 
facilitate the expansion of the sources of competitive advantage over time. 115 Classic 
examples of cases where government intervened directly in facilitating technological 
effort by selectively supporting specific high-potential industries, are Japan and the 
activities in an attempt to empower them economically. 
109 It is argued (see ibid.) that it is the very nature of FOi to be concentrated in capital-intensive industries 
and not labour-intensive ones. 
110 Padayachee loc cit. 
Ill Ibid. 
112 Ibid. See also Samuel M. Wangwe (ed.), Exporting Africa: Technology, Trade and Industrialisation in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, UNU/INTECH Studies in New Technology and Development, Published in 
association with the UNU Press, Routledge, London and New York, 1995, pp. 78-79. Daim Zainuddin, 
'Foreign direct investment: policies and experiences of Malaysia and other high-growth Asian 





NICs. 116 In Japan for instance, the government employed trade restrictions combined with 
limitations on FDI to encourage Japanese firms to invest aggressively in emerging 
technologies, at the time when the US had a first mover competitive advantage in 
mainframe computers and semi-conductors. 117 In South Korea, the government 
intervened selectively and favoured industries that were deemed to have dynamic 
comparative advantage.' 18 
In the case of South Africa, it will indeed be a big mistake to simply copy the various 
forms of government intervention employed by the NI Cs such as South Korea for 
instance. 119 However, there is a lot that South Africa can learn from the experience of 
other countries that may be applicable in the South African context. 12° For instance, 
Lall 121 suggests that, among other things, selective intervention can be used by the South 
African government to channel local and foreign (direct) investment 'in particular 
activities, or negotiating with and regulating international investment and technological 
transfer to achieve technological objectives'. 
According to Padayachee, 122 reliance on FDI to build South Africa's competitiveness and 
technological capacity should, however, be limited to instances where commitment is 
\ 
reasonably long term and where meaningful transfer of skills and technology is involved. 
The learned writer maintains that, foreign investment in sectors which will improve the 
country's access to markets for certain products in EU and North America may be useful, 
_given that industrialised countries are now organised i11to major trading blocs. 123 The 
other sectors in which foreign investment can be actively promoted, are those in which 
investment is made through licensing or franchise agreements or joint-ventures that 
116 Ibid. See also Sanjaya Lall, 'What will make South Africa internationally competitive', in Baker et al 
(eds.), op cit 66. Duck-Woo Nam, 'Trade policy and international competitiveness: the South Korean 
experience', in Baker et al (eds.), op cit 72 et seq. Zainuddin op cit 82. 
117 Wangwe, ibid., p.79. 
118 Ibid. and sources referred to in footnote 116 supra. 
119 This point is emphasised by Nam op cit 71. 
120 South Africa can also learn not to repeat the mistakes that these countries made in their quest for 
technological development. 
121 Op cit 67. 
122 Loe cit. 
123 Ibid. 
support black economic empowerment, and those which enhance the quality and 
productivity of the work force. 124 
120 
In South Africa presently, there are scores of foreign MNC affiliates operating in fields as 
diverse as mining, petroleum, manufacturing, etc. The crucial issue to consider in that 
regard, is what policy measures should South Africa adopt to get these affiliates to 
transfer more technology, and to increase the potential spill-overs. Does South Africa 
need to introduce new regulations to regulate the behaviour of these companies? Should 
South Africa put in place a new framework within which these companies could be 
encouraged/forced to transfer more technology, undertake local R&D, improve local 
content requirement, promote black economic empowerment and affirmative action? 
Kokko and Blomstrom125 say that in a study (conducted by them) examining how cross 
country differences in the technology imports of US affiliates in 33 host countries 
(including South Africa) (calculated from data on the affiliates' payments of royalties 
and licence fees and their imports of capital equipment from the US in 1982) showed, 
inter alia, that: 
I) 'Policies making use of market forces may be preferable to conventional technology 
transfer requirements. 126 For instance, policies increasing the level of competition in the host 
country may erode the MNC affiliate's technological advantages, and force it to import new 
technology from its parent. Similarly, policies improving local learning capabilities and labour 
skills may reduce technology transfer costs, and encourage imports of technology'. 
2) 'Those US affiliates which operated in conditions where they were required to use the most 
advanced technology available, perform R&D locally, have access to US parent's patents, or 
transfer skills to local personnel, these requirements increased the affiliate' s technology 
transfer costs and therefore had a negative impact on the affiliates imports oftechnology. 127 
Similarly, the various quantitative performance requirements (including import restrictions, 
minimum local content, and minimum local employment are also likely to increase the costs of 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ari Kokko and Magnus Blomstrom, 'Policies to encourage inflows of technology through foreign 
multinationals', in World Development, Vol. 23., March 1995, p.466. 
126 This point is also made by Paul Krugman, 'Changes in capital markets for developing countries', in 
Baker et al (eds.), op cit 4 7. 
127 Kokko and Blomstrom op cit 462. 
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importing and using advanced technologies, and thus had a negative impact on technology 
transfer'. 128 
The South African government is therefore faced with a daunting task of having to 
reconcile its economic priorities ( e.g. eradicating unemployment, fostering black 
economic empowerment, increasing inflow of foreign technology, capital and skills, etc.) · 
with the interests of (say) MN Cs. In devising a policy on MN Cs doing business or 
wishing to invest in this country, South Africa should also be guided by the guidelines set 
by the OECD countries for their MNCs operating in other OECD countries. 129 For 
instance, as far as general policies are concerned, the guidelines provide that MNCs 
should, inter alia, 'take fully into account established general policy objectives of the 
member countries in which they operate', and in particular, 'give due consideration to 
those countries' aims and priorities with regard to economic and social progress, 
including industrial and regional development, the protection of the environment and 
consumer interests, the creation of employment opportunities, the promotion of 
innovation and the transfer of technology'. 130 131 
In addition to selective intervention in channelling both local and foreign (direct) 
investment, the South African government will have to channel resources in infrastructure 
that will have an positive impact on FDI and technology transfer, e.g. schools for raising 
literacy rate and providing quality education and imparting skills, roads for improving 
transport networks and communication, and so on. In short, the government should 
actively create an enabling environment132 in which FDI and technology transfer, job 
creation and employment could be achieved. 
128 lbid., p.463. 
129 See International Investment and Multinational Enterprises: The OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, OECD, Paris, 1986. 
130 Ibid., p.13. 
131 It should however be noted that observance of the Guidelines is voluntary and not legally enforceable. 
For a detailed and interesting commentary on these guidelines by various Reports of the Committee on 
International Investment and MNEs (CIME), published by the OECD, see ibid., pp.17 et seq. 
132 This point is also made by Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Luis Serven and Andres Solimano, 'Saving and 
investment: paradigms, puzzles, policies', in The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 11., February 
1996, p.110, where the learned writers say a supportive policy and institutional framework would consist 
of four ingredients, viz. (I) macroeconomic stability, to reduce uncertainty surrounding investment; (2) a 
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4.4.2 Reforming South Africa's trade regime 
South Africa's trade regime is fraught with many problems. It is argued that it is not 
conducive to the development of competitive industrial capabilities, 133 and has a strong 
anti-export bias inherent in its policies. 134 According to Lall, 135 the current South African 
trade regime protects industries without regard to their competitive potential, 136 has no 
strategy for promoting new infant industries, and fails to offset the effects of protection 
by forcing firms to invest in building export markets. To cure this defect, Lall 
recommends that the protective regime be restructured, 'by lowering high levels of 
protection, making the system stable, removing many of the irrational elements of 
protection and, most important, gearing protection to the achievement of international 
competitiveness' .137 Practically, Lall suggests that this would involve, inter alia, greater 
selectivity based on a detailed analysis of the competitive problems of each industry, than 
exist at present. 138 
comparatively distortion-free relative price structure, to raise the productivity of investment; (3) a well-
defined (and effectively enforced) code of property rights, to create an environment conducive to a low 
cost of doing business; and (4) adequate political institutions, to foster social consensus and political 
stability. See also Accelerating the Development Process: Challenges for National and International 
Policies in the 1990s, Report by the Secretary-General ofUNCTAD to UNCTAD VIII, UNCTAD, UN, 
NY, 1991, P.26 where the importance ofa suitable climate for FDI for instance, is emphasised. 
133 Lall op cit 61. 
134 Pedro Belli, Michael Finger and Amparo Ballivian, South Africa: A Review of Trade Policies, 
Discussion Paper No.4., The World Bank, Southern Africa Department, Washington DC., August 1993, 
p.30. 
135 Op cit 61-62. 
136 For instance, textiles and related industries (which, according to Lall, are mature, labour-intensive 
activities that are clearly not undergoing learning, and are being protected for no other reason but to 
preserve employment) receive the highest rates of protection, and equipment the lowest. See also the 
Sunday Times, Business Times, March 30th, 1997 on p. l under the heading 'SA runs out of fuel in race 
to become competitive', where it is reported that this country slid to 45th place, second to last (Russia) 
among the 46 industrialised countries 'despite its [South Africa] best efforts to claim a higher ranking in 
the global economy'. The report shows the US and Singapore leading the rest in positions one and two 
respectively. 
137 Lall op cit 62. 
138 Ibid. 
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Both Lall139 and Belli et al 140 agree that in order to foster international competitiveness, 
and to address the anti-export bias inherent in South Africa's trade policies, an element of 
trade liberalisation would be required. Further, the learned writers agree that 
liberalisation for the above stated objectives should be achieved by a gradual, pre-
announced programme of tariff reductions, coupled with supporting supply-side measures 
(on skills, technology, etc.) and a strong push into exports, than by quick and substantial 
reduction of protection that exposes all domestic markets and industries to the same force 
of competition without regard to their capability development needs. 141 Belli et al caution 
that the need for gradual liberalisation (as opposed to rapid and sweeping liberalisation), 
does not mean to imply that no changes to the import tariff structure are warranted. 142 
The learned writers maintain that the current South African import duties have the 
following problems that need to be addressed quickly, viz. unevenness in the duty 
schedule, an unduly complicated tariff structure, and a highly unstable tariff schedule.143 
The formulation of a new trade regime that will ultimately promote FDI, should also take 
into account a host of other issues (which cannot be discussed here), inter alia, exchange 
rate policy, macroeconomic issues, existing investment climate, etc .• 
4.5 Concluding remarks 
The policy options for fostering FDI in the 'new' South Africa are many, complex and 
controversial. No attempt was made in this chapter to provide a definite policy 
framework within which the objectives of reconstruction and development could be 
achieved. On the contrary, only a few issues on policy were mentioned w~ich could be 
considered in devising an appropriate policy framework. In formulating appropriate 
policies, South Africa would have to always consider the impact that its policies would 
139 Ibid. 
140 Op cit 31. 
141 See Lall Joe cit, and Belli et al, ibid. 
142 Belli et al, ibid. 
143 Ibid. See also Avril Joffe, David Kaplan, Raphael Kaplinsky and David Lewis, 'Meeting the global 
challenge: A framework for industrial revival in South Africa', in Baker et al (eds.), op cit 98. Paul 
Hatty, 'The South African trade policy debate: A business perspective', in Baker et al (eds.), op cit 130. 
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have on its obligations under the GATT/WTO, on its neighbours, as well as on its 
economy. The challenge facing this country is to devise and implement those policies 
that maximise the opportunities provided by the new world trading system and minimise 
the potential negative effects associated with it. 
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CONCLUSION 
The world trading environment of the 1990s is characterised by rapid structural 
transformations. The accelerating pace of change in patterns of trade, investment and 
regional integration, together with the high degree of internationalisation of production 
and globalisation of world markets have transformed the world of the 1990s into a truly 
global village. These far reaching changes will have a profound impact on the future trade 
relations among the various countries of the world. 
The WTO in its turn, is poised to radically transform the way the world does business, 
and will be under pressure to remain effective in the trading environment increasingly 
dominated by rhetoric of trade liberalisation on the one hand, and the reality of growing 
protectionism on the other. It is against this background that South Africa's future trade 
and investment policy should be considered. 
South Africa is now a full member of the international community of nations. In pursuit 
of its trade and investment interests, this country will be expected to play according to the 
rules of the prevailing world economic order. Although there are still stumbling blocks in 
the way of FDI, South Africa has tremendous potential of attracting foreign investment 
into this country and the region as a whole. 
It is imperative for policy- and decision-makers to devise some ingenious strategies of 
ensuring that this country remains relevant and competitive in the changing world trading 
system of the 1990s. There is indeed a need for careful reassessment by government of 
its policies, especially in the crucial areas of investment strategy and international trade. 
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